借金がある男性を、福島県の除染作業現場で働かせるために連れ去って監禁したとして、男３人が逮捕された。
営利目的略取と監禁の疑いで逮捕されたのは、建設会社社員の米倉二郎容疑者ら３人。警視庁によると、米倉容疑者らは今年３月、福島市内の除染作業現場で働かせるために、東京・府中市で当時２４歳の男性を車で連れ去り、福島市に向かうまでの間、監禁した疑いが持たれている。
被害に遭った男性は、以前、米倉容疑者の知人の女性と交際し、およそ２４０万円を借りていて、米倉容疑者から「逃げたら埋めるからな」などと脅されていた。男性は福島市内で実際に２日間、除染作業を行い、その後、逃げ出したという。
全文は借金男性を連れ去って監禁 福島県の除染作業現場で働かせるため（日テレNEWS24）
福島市、郡山市など福島県の都市部から、東京電力福島第1原子力発電所事故の除染で発生した除去土を運び出す作業が急ピッチで進んでいる。事故が起きた原発の立地する大熊町、双葉町に中間貯蔵施設の整備が進み、国や県は2021年度末までの搬出完了を目指す方針。都市部の原発災害への対応はひとつの節目を迎える一方、難題が原発の立地自治体に引き継がれる。
「庭の下の除去土はずっと心の重荷になっていた。運び出してもらいほっとした」。50代の福島市の会社員はこう語る。5年以上庭の下に埋まっていたのは合成樹脂製のコンテナバッグ3つ、約3トンの除去土だ。除染によって発生した土を袋に入れて庭に埋めたり、シートをかけて積んでおいたりする方法を「現場保管」と呼ぶ。ピークの16年末には県内で14万9330カ所に達し大半が都市部にある。
震災直後は放射線に関する情報が錯綜（さくそう）し、市民に不安が広がった。放射線量を下げる切り札となったのが除染だ。屋根や壁は足場を組み、ぞうきんやブラシで土やホコリを取り除き、庭の土は表面を数センチはぎ取った。
（略）
環境省のまとめでは土の除去を中心にした除染によって、住宅地の線量は平均60%低下した。そして都市部には空き地が少ないうえ、運び出す先もないため大半が現場保管になった。
そんな現場保管の減少が進み始めた。今年3月末にはピーク比42%減の約8万6千カ所になり、「21年度内の解消を目指す」（県の除染対策課）計画という。
背景には中間貯蔵施設のため確保された用地が15年度末の22ヘクタールから今年3月末には1114ヘクタール（全体計画の約70%）まで拡大したことがある。国が自治体や土地所有者を説得し、一つ一つの土地を買収したり、賃借したりした結果だ。
だが、用地は原発の周辺にあり現在も国の指示で人が住めない地域だ。避難指示の基準となる線量は都市部が除染を実施した水準に比べて20倍と高い。
国は用地の取得にあたり「30年以内に福島県外で最終処分を完了する」ことを約束し、特別法にも明記した。しかし、その場所や方法のメドはまったくたっていない。また避難指示が出た区域では復興拠点となる一部地域を除き、除染が手つかずの場所が多く残る。原発事故から8年余りたち、除染にかかった費用は約3兆円に及ぶ。そして場所を変えながら難題は今後も継続する。
By Kate Brown
Powerful storms, record-breaking temperatures and rising water levels remind us daily of the impact of climate change and our need to address it. Policymakers are debating what shape the post-carbon future will take and SA is one country where that conversation is taking place.
Proponents of nuclear power argue that nuclear energy is the most viable and powerful alternative to fossil fuels. Opponents point to waste storage problems, plus the slow pace and high cost of building new reactors. And, they ask, what about when something goes wrong?
I recently published a book called Manual for Survival: A Chernobyl Guide to the Future, about the 1986 explosion of reactor number four at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine, which was at the time a republic in the Soviet Union. I found as I worked through 27 archives that much of what we are told about the Chernobyl accident is incomplete or incorrect. People were far sicker and far more people died than we are led to believe. Chernobyl contaminants were not safely enclosed within the Chernobyl Zone. Nor has the chapter been closed. We are still ingesting Chernobyl fallout from 33 years ago.
[…]
First, shortly after the accident, pilots chased clouds of radioactive fallout flowing northeast from the burning reactor. They manipulated the weather to make radioactive rain land on rural Belarus in order to save several Russian cities, including Moscow. That triage operation saved the contamination of millions of people but created a second Chernobyl Zone that few know about today.
At the time, Moscow officials told no one in Belarus about the weather manipulation operation. The head of the Belarusian communist party, Nikolai Sliunkov, only found out about the accident, about 5km over the Belarusian border, by phoning the head of the Ukrainian communist party several days later. The 200,000 people who lived in the Mogilev province under the seeded clouds of fallout were mostly farmers. They ate what they grew and lived with high levels of radioactivity for up to 15 years until the territory was finally evacuated in 1999.
Nor is nature in the zone thriving. I observed the work of two biologists, Tim Mousseau and Anders Møller, who have since 2000 conducted twice-yearly experiments in the Chernobyl Zone and published hundreds of papers on their findings. Their studies show cascades of extinction in the most contaminated areas. “Every rock we turn over,” Mousseau commented, “we see damage.”
The records of the Soviet state committee for industrial agriculture reveal how radioactive contaminants concentrated in the food chain and in places of human habitation. A few weeks after the accident, Soviet shepherds corralled 100,000 head of livestock from a 60km radius around the Chernobyl plant. While teamsters drove the bleating animals to slaughterhouses, Moscow agronomists issued a special manual for meat packers with instructions to mix low- and medium-level radioactive flesh with appropriate proportions of clean meat to make sausage.
The sausage was to be labelled as it normally would and to be shipped across the great Soviet Union, everywhere but Moscow. Meat with high levels of radiation was to be stored in freezers until the radioactivity decayed. Soon managers in Belarus were asking for more freezers. They asked again and again, but no freezers arrived, so they located a refrigerated train car and packed in 317 tons of highly radioactive meat and sent the dubious gift to the Georgian Republic, where it was rejected and passed on.
For the next three years, the radioactive ghost train circled the western half of the Soviet Union; no-one wanted it. Finally, four years later, KGB agents buried the train and its radioactive meat inside the Chernobyl Zone, where it should have gone in the first place.
[…]
The insistence on selling radioactive food was not uniquely Soviet. Chernobyl fallout also landed in Greece and contaminated fields of grain. The Greeks harvested the grain and exported 300,000 tons to Italy. The Italians didn’t want the wheat. The Greeks refused to take it back because, they said, they were “afraid of the reaction from Greek wholesalers”. The two Mediterranean neighbours started fighting. Finally, the European Economic Community agreed to buy the contaminated wheat. They mixed it with clean grain and shipped it to Africa and East Germany as “aid”.
What were the effects of ingesting radioactive contaminants in food? Some Moscow experts in radiation medicine concurred with the UN and international experts in asserting that the doses villagers were taking in were too low to cause any detectable health problems.
The specialists made this prediction extrapolating from the Japanese bomb survivor Life Span Study. The study has a troubled political history. After the war, American officials were anxious that nuclear bombs would be banned like chemical and biological weapons. So they censored information about Japanese exposures to radioactivity and seized measurements of fallout which Japanese physicists had collected.
After tossing out Japanese scientists’ real-time measurements, American scientists had five years later to reconstruct doses survivors received. They included in their dose estimates only exposures from the bomb blast, one very large x-ray, and denied the fact of radioactive fallout. As calculated, a dose in the form of a large external x-ray differed greatly from the chronic low doses of radioactivity that residents of Chernobyl-contaminated territories ingested daily in their food, water and air.
Soviet doctors treating Chernobyl-exposed suddenly had an unwelcome crash course in this medical problem. They found that radioactive contaminants, even at relatively low levels, infiltrated the bodies of their patients, who grew sicker each year. Gradually, health officials understood they had a public health disaster on their hands. Thousands of archival records document the catastrophe. Ukrainian doctors registered in the most contaminated regions of Kiev province an increase between 1985 and 1988 in thyroid and heart disease, endocrine and GI tract disorders, anaemia and other maladies of the blood-forming system.
[…]
With these prospects, many women did not have the courage to reproduce. An uncommonly high percentage of women, up to 75%, chose to terminate their pregnancies. By 1989, doctors were noticing a dramatic rise in thyroid cancers and leukaemia among exposed children, normally very rare occurrences.
For three years, Soviet physicians had to sit on this information, telling no one but their bosses. Finally, in the spring of 1989, censors lifted the ban on Chernobyl topics. Residents made alliances with doctors and radiation monitors. They organised, petitioned, broke laws and carried on when dismissed as ignorant provincials in order to get the world to understand the new precarious life they led. Soviet officials found crowds on the streets more threatening than radioactivity. They called in UN agencies to send foreign experts to do an “independent assessment”.
[…]
Consultants from UN agencies dismissed the findings of scientists in Ukraine and Belarus. Again extrapolating from the Japanese Life Span Study, the UN experts stated in 1991 that radioactivity at Chernobyl levels would cause no major damage to human health except for the risk of a small number of future cancers among children. They reiterated this statement despite evidence they possessed and failed to publicly acknowledge of an alarming childhood cancer epidemic under way.
The denials came at a critical time. Just after UN consultants declared they found no Chernobyl health effects, the UN General Assembly held a pledge drive to raise $346m to help pay for resettling people living in highly contaminated regions and for a long-term epidemiological study on chronic low doses of radioactivity, something scientists around the world had called for since the Chernobyl plant blew. Unfortunately, the big donors begged off, pointing to UN experts’ assessment that there had been no Chernobyl health effects. As a consequence, the pledge drive raised less than $6m.
Why would UN officials whitewash evidence of Chernobyl health damage? At the time the US, Russia, France and the UK faced huge lawsuits from their own exposures of people to radioactive contamination during four decades of reckless bomb production. If they could assert that Chernobyl was “the worst disaster in human history” and only 54 people died, then those lawsuits could go away. And that is indeed what happened.
Today, the low Chernobyl death toll is used as a rationale to continue building nuclear power plants; it’s said to be far safer than the thousands who die annually from burning coal. But that number — 54 dead — is incorrect. The Ukrainian state currently pays compensation not to 54 but to 35,000 people whose spouses died from Chernobyl-related health problems. This number only reckons the deaths of people old enough to marry. It does not include the mortality of young people, infants or people who did not have exposure records to qualify for compensation. Off the record, Ukrainian officials give a death toll of 150,000. That figure is only for Ukraine, not Russia or Belarus, where 70% of Chernobyl fallout landed.
Underestimating Chernobyl damage has left humans unprepared for the next disaster. When a tsunami crashed into the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in 2011, Japanese leaders responded in ways eerily similar to Soviet leaders: with denials, obfuscation and a declaration of bankruptcy. Today, 33 years after the Chernobyl accident, we are still short on answers and long on uncertainties. We understand little about low-dose exposure because no large-scale studies have been conducted.
Ignorance about low-dose exposures is tragic and not entirely accidental. Before SA leaders invest in a new generation of power reactors to stem global warming and solve SA’s energy crises, it would be smart to ask a new set of questions that is, finally, useful to people exposed over lifetimes to chronic doses of man-made radiation. Unfortunately, few people on earth have escaped those exposures.
Read more.
九州電力の川内原発1号機（鹿児島県薩摩川内市）が来年3月に運転を停止するのが確実となったことが14日、分かった。テロ対策施設「特定重大事故等対処施設」の建設が遅れ、完成が期限に間に合わないためで、特重施設の完成遅れによる原発の稼働停止は全国初となる。川内2号機も来年5月に停止し、全国で2例目になるのは確実。
原子力規制委員会は今月12日、特重施設が期限日の約1週間前までに完成していない原発については、電力会社に運転停止命令を出す方針を決めた。九電関係者は「特重施設の完成が期限に間に合わず、稼働を停止するのは確実だ」と明らかにした。
By Thierry Ribault
This article is a contribution to the political economy of consent based on the analysis of speeches, declarations, initiatives, and policies implemented in the name of resilience in the context of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. It argues that, in practice as much as in theory, resilience fuels peoples’ submission to an existing reality—in the case of Fukushima, the submission to radioactive contamination—in an attempt to deny this reality as well as its consequences. The political economy of consent to the nuclear, of which resilience is one of the technologies, can be grasped at four interrelated analytical levels adapted to understanding how resilience is encoded in key texts and programs in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The first level is technological: consent through and to the nuclear technology. The second level is sociometabolic: consent to nuisance. The third level is political: consent to participation. The fourth level is epistemological: consent to ignorance. A fifth cognitivo-experimental transversal level can also be identified: consent to experimentation, learning and training. We first analyze two key symptoms of the despotism of resilience: its incantatory feature and the way it supports mutilated life within a contaminated area and turns disaster into a cure. Then, we show how, in the reenchanted world of resilience, loss opens doors, that is, it paves the way to new “forms of life”: first through ignorance-based disempowerment; second through submission to protection. Finally, we examine the ideological mechanisms of resilience and how it fosters a government through the fear of fear. We approach resilience as a technology of consent mobilizing emotionalism and conditioning on one side, contingency and equivalence on the other.
Read article.
Man behind hit TV series among those criticising people taking inappropriate selfies
The writer of the acclaimed TV series Chernobyl has called for visitors to the site of the nuclear disaster to behave “with respect”, after a number of photographs emerged on social media apparently showing tourists taking inappropriate or lewd selfies.
Visitor numbers to the site of the former Soviet-era power plant in Ukraine have soared since the five-part miniseries began airing on HBO and Sky Atlantic in May, with some tour companies reporting a 40% increase in bookings.
But the behaviour of some visitors has been met with criticism, with photographs emerging of tourists beaming or posing provocatively in front of the ruins. In one image, which has circulated widely on social media, a woman unzips a hazmat suit to reveal a G-string. Several of the images have since been deleted.
[…]
An estimated 116,000 people who lived in the town of Pripyat and within a 30km (18.6-mile) radius of the site were evacuated in the weeks following the disaster, though the effects of radiation exposure for the broader population of Ukraine and Europe is still a concern. An exclusion zone of more than 2,600 sq km remains sealed off.
Visitors to the zone do not need to wear hazmat suits but are warned not to touch anything. They pass through military passport checks to enter and are scanned for radiation levels.
A tour guide at the site, Viktoria Brozhko, attributed the recent rise in the number of visitors to the success of the drama. “Many people come here. They ask a lot of questions about the TV show, about all the events. People are getting more and more curious,” she told Reuters.
[…]
An Israeli artist who was offended at some visitors’ use of the Holocaust memorial in Berlin for tasteless photo-ops – including striking yoga poses, juggling or jumping between its concrete slabs – has launched an art project in which their photographs are combined with real, distressing images taken from the concentration camps.
Chernobyl, starring Jared Harris, Stellan Skarsgård and Emily Watson, and directed by Johan Renck, follows the immediate aftermath of the nuclear reactor explosion at the power plant in the town of Pripyat, and the political repercussions of the toll it took on the people, animals and environment in the region.
Read more at Chernobyl writer urges Instagram tourists to ‘respect’ nuclear site
（ＣＮＮ） 世界最悪の原発事故が発生し、廃墟と化したチェルノブイリ。あれから３０年たった今、テレビドラマになったことがきっかけで、世界から観光客が押し寄せている。
打ち捨てられ、朽ちて行く原発の街の光景は、数年前から観光客を引き付けるようになっていた。しかし地元の観光業者によると、米ＨＢＯのテレビドラマ「チェルノブイリ」が始まったことで、同地を訪れる観光客が急増したという。
(略）
チェルノブイリはウクライナの首都キエフから約１１０キロ北部の都市プリピャチ近郊にある。世界一汚染された街として、案内できるのは資格を持ったガイドに限られる。
ガイド付きツアーでは、原発跡地を中心とする４０００平方キロあまりの「立入禁止区域」を訪れる。２０年前からチェルノブイリツアーを営むソロイーストの担当者は、「予約が３５％増えた」と打ち明けた。「テレビ番組を見て予約を思い立った人が大半を占める」という。
最も人気があるのは１人あたり約９９ドルの日帰り団体ツアー。２０１１年以来、同地の大部分が観光客に解放されたが、「機械の墓場」と呼ばれる場所などは、今も立ち入ることはできない。
それでも打ち捨てられたプリピャチの街や、原子炉の残骸を覆う巨大な石棺を３００メートル離れた場所から眺められる展望台などを訪れることはできる。
この原子炉跡地や、プリピャチの遊園地の観覧車は、観光客に最も人気があるという。「チェルノブイリ」の放映が始まって以来、ソロイーストの週末のツアーに参加した観光客は１００～２００人に上る。放射線を不安に思う人も多いものの、「観光客が浴びる放射線の量は、大陸を横断する飛行機に乗るよりも少ない」とツアー業者は強調している。
By Victor Gilinsky, Henry Sokolski, June 4, 2019
In its effort to revive a moribund US nuclear industry, the Trump administration has put itself in the hands of our national laboratories. The laboratories have used the opportunity to reach for the public purse to pursue their nuclear dream, the same one that they have had since the beginning of the nuclear age, and that now has nothing to do with the country’s energy needs. The starting point on their wish list is a multibillion-dollar “Versatile Test Reactor” at the Idaho national laboratory, to test fuel for a new generation of advanced “fast” plutonium-fueled reactors.
From the beginning, the nuclear power technologists have really had one idea that gripped their imagination: that it is possible to build a plutonium-fueled fast reactor (“fast” because the neutrons released in the fission reaction are not slowed by a moderator) that produces more plutonium than it consumes. This allows continually refueling the reactor and using the excess plutonium to start more such reactors (hence the name “breeder reactors”).
It sounds like getting something for nothing, but in reality, it means using all the relatively cheap natural uranium as fuel instead of only the less than 1 percent that is uranium-235, as is done in the current generation of power reactors […]
In the 1960s the US Atomic Energy Commission saw the fast breeder reactor as the answer to the country’s long-term energy needs. It organized itself to produce prototype breeder reactors that industry would then replicate commercially. Breeder cores needed lots of plutonium as an initial charge. This had to come from reprocessing of spent fuel of existing reactors, so reprocessing was an essential feature of the shift to a fast breeder future. “Atomic” commissions in countries around the world followed this example, all with experts absolutely sure fast breeders would soon take over electricity generation.
As we know, it didn’t happen. The fundamental flaw in the argument was that uranium wasn’t scarce at all, there’s lots of it. Also, the breeder and reprocessing technologies turned out to be much more challenging and expensive than expected. Altogether, they didn’t make economic sense.
Another negative element entered the equation in the late 1970s. In their excitement over the fast breeder, the nuclear community ignored the consequences of feeding plutonium, a fuel but also a nuclear explosive, into commercial channels throughout the country, and ultimately the world. In 1976, to the dismay of fast-breeder enthusiasts, President Gerald Ford announced that US non-proliferation objectives would take precedence and put the technology on the shelf. He added that we could develop nuclear energy perfectly well without it. Jimmy Carter continued these restrictive policies with respect to plutonium.
None of this, however, changed the fast breeder’s Holy Grail status within the nuclear engineering community. That community got another chance during the George W. Bush administration, under a program called Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, or GNEP. This time, instead of arguing uranium resource constraints, an economic non-starter, they focused on the nuclear waste issue and claimed fast reactors (now dubbed as “burners” rather than breeders) had special advantages in dealing with waste.
GNEP proposed to “burn” the (mildly radioactive) longest-lasting waste, by incorporating these elements into the plutonium fuel and consuming them along with the plutonium. The trouble was, making such fuel to commercial standards remained an unsolved problem, and the fast breeder prototype, slated for the Nevada nuclear lab, never got off the ground. In any case, with the advent of the Obama administration, the GNEP program was disbanded, and the Energy Department’s fast reactor program dropped out of sight.
It is now returning for the third time in the guise of the Versatile Test Reactor, which itself is derived from a fast breeder reactor design. Just like the old Atomic Energy Commission did half a century ago, the Energy Department now tells us plutonium-fueled fast reactors are in our energy future, never mind economics or the dangers of flooding the world with plutonium fuel. Under the heading of “Putting America First,” the Energy Department tells us building fast reactors is essential for “protecting our interests,” apparently because the Russians and the Chinese, unconstrained by economics, would be building them, and we would fall behind. It is thus “imperative” to build the several-billion-dollar VTR as a first step.
The first surge of interest in fast breeders the 1960s had a certain rational basis in resource economics, even though it got the basic facts wrong about the scarcity of uranium. The second surge, during the George W. Bush administration, however poorly conceived and opportunistic, was an effort to take advantage of a real public concern about disposal of nuclear waste. The current third push, using the Versatile Test Reactor as the thin end of a larger wedge of government support for fast breeder reactors, is based far less on economics or concern about waste than purely on patriotic slogans. We don’t need it. Congress should say, “No.”
by Harvey Wasserman
10 June 19
A huge proposed bailout of two Chernobyl-in-progress Ohio nukes (plus two old coal burners) would put $20 million directly into the pockets of seven utility executives. Their bankrupt company last year spent $3 million “lobbying” the legislature.
Akron’s bankrupt FirstEnergy (FE) owns the Perry nuke, east of Cleveland, which in 1986 became the first US reactor damaged by an earthquake. Critical pipes and concrete were cracked, as were nearby roads and bridges. A top-level state study showed soon thereafter that evacuation amidst a major accident would be impossible.
FE’s uninsured Davis-Besse nuke, near Toledo, is a 42-year-old Three Mile Island clone. In 2002, boric acid ate through its head, threatening a Chernobyl-scale accident irradiating Toledo, Cleveland, and the Great Lakes. At FE’s request, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has exempted Davis-Besse from vital regulations for flooding, fire protection, earthquake vulnerability, and security. Its radiation shield building is literally crumbling.
In 2003, when nearby power lines sagged onto tree limbs, FirstEnergy blacked out some 50 million people throughout the northeast and well into Canada.
By then, FE had scammed Ohio for some $9 billion in “stranded cost” bailouts. The utility said “open market competition” would lower rates … after it pocketed the public’s money.
Now FE says its subsidized nukes can’t compete with gas and wind power. It wants $190 million/year or more from all Ohio ratepayers, even though most get zero nuke electricity.
FE first said the money was for “clean air” and “zero emission reactors.” But all nukes emit heat, chemicals, radiation, Carbon 14, and more. Their cooling towers kill birds, their waste hot water kills marine life, their cores (at about 300 degrees Centigrade) heat the planet.
The bailout bill, called HB6, attacks renewable and efficiency programs that have saved Ohio ratepayers billions of dollars and created thousands of jobs. A single sentence in the Ohio Code is blocking some $4 billion in turbine development.
The breezy “North Coast” region along Lake Erie is crisscrossed with transmission lines and good sites near urban consumers. Farmers throughout the flat, fertile agricultural land desperately want the income turbine leases could provide. The new projects would create thousands of construction and maintenance jobs. They would feed Ohio’s manufacturing base, which produces a wide range of wind and solar components. By lowering electric rates, they would restore a competitive position long lost to high electric rates. Indiana, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania all have at least double Ohio’s installed wind capacity. Texas has twenty times more. By 2022, Germany will be totally nuke-free.
Ohio has just been shaken by findings that significant radiation has leaked from a dead uranium plant in southern Ohio, contaminating schools and terrifying local residents.
Like that old “stranded cost” scam, FE’s new bailouts would suck desperately needed capital from Ohio’s faltering industrial base. The reactors are obsolete. The workforce is aging. The nukes will shut anyway … if they don’t blow up first.
[…]
長崎大原爆後障害医療研究所 原爆症と被ばく線量の関連解析
長崎大原爆後障害医療研究所は、長崎原爆の投下直後に約5800人の被爆者の健康状態を調査した「原子爆弾災害調査票」をデータベース化した。データを解析した結果、被ばく線量が高い人ほど、脱毛や嘔吐（おうと）、発熱など放射線による急性症状の種類が増える傾向にあることを確認した。
（略）
横田氏は「今後は急性症状と後年のがん発生との関連を調べ、薬が不足していた当時の治療記録も歴史的資料としてまとめたい」とし、歴史的・医学的に貴重な資料である調査票の研究活用を進める考えだ。
調査票は、1945年10月下旬～11月上旬を中心に、長崎医科大（現長崎大医学部）の第一外科教授だった故・調来助（しらべらいすけ）氏が中心となり、医師や医学生約100人が被爆者の氏名、性別、被爆状況、症状などを聞き取った。長崎大は2015年、日米共同機関の放射線影響研究所から原本の移管を受け、18年度にかけて全てをデータ化した。
サンプル数は爆心地から5キロ以内で被爆した1～86歳の男女5795人分。比較調査に適した3566人分を抽出して解析した。全身の推定被ばく線量は遮蔽（しゃへい）物がない屋外の場合、爆心地から1キロで約8シーベルト、1.5キロで約900ミリシーベルト、2キロで約130ミリシーベルト。木造家屋内はそれぞれ半分の線量だった。
解析では、線量と、出血、下痢など16種類の急性症状の発生率の関係を調べた。発熱の発生率は、推定被ばく線量100～199ミリシーベルトで35％、2～4.9シーベルトになると50％になり、5シーベルト以上で69％に上昇した。4種類以上の症状の発生率は100～199ミリシーベルトで34％、2～4.9シーベルトで68％、5シーベルト以上で77％に達した。
A nuclear power plant in Byron, Illinois. Taken by photographer Joseph Pobereskin (http://pobereskin.com).
