In this episode, we talk some metaethics with David Enoch, Professor of Philosophy and Jacob I. Berman Professor of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Click here to listen to our conversation with him.
Are moral judgments, for example “stealing is wrong,” ever true? Are they even the kinds of things that can be true or false, or are moral judgments just fancy ways of expressing our feelings about stuff, so that “stealing is wrong” is just a fancy way of saying “Boo stealing!”? If there are some true moral judgments, what makes them true? Does the world include special, irreducible moral features, or are “moral facts” reducible to facts about the natural world?
These are the kinds of questions metaethics is concerned with. In our interview, Prof. Enoch discusses his own metaethical view, which he refers to as robust realism and which he defends in his latest book Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Is the view stark raving madness or good moral sense? See what you think!