No. 230.1 (I, p. 208f)

1. It is straightforward to specify and distinguish the sciences, just like all habits and powers, by their formal objects.

2. But the difficult thing is the way in which this object should be determined as formal.[1]

3. There is a distinction between the formal and the material object of a science. The material object is whatever a science is concerned with.

4. The formal object is that which it is concerned with formally, i.e. first and foremost,[2] and by means of which the material object is grasped.

5. Within a formal object itself are to be distinguished the ground of its formality "which" [*ratio formalis "quae"*] or the formal object as a thing [*res*] (the formal object "that" [*"quod"*]), which is that thing that is grasped in itself in the first instance, and the ground of its formality "under which" [*ratio formalis "sub qua"*] or the formal object as a knowable [*scibile*] (the formal object "by which" [*"quo"*]), which is that by whose mediation the formal object "which" is grasped [*attingitur*].

6. The formal object "by which" is for knowing intellection just as light is for vision: Just as light makes manifest a thing to vision, in the same way the formal object "by which" is a kind of objective spritual light, manifesting to the knowing intellect the formal object "that".

7. Now it is clear that what most differentiates sciences is the formal object "by which".

8. On the other hand, different pieces of knowledge are constitututed by different formal objects, therefore so are different sciences: Moreover, with a different formal object "by which" having been given, so a different formal object "that" is given, for a different light manifests a different object.

9. These things being so, our thesis states that: *(i)* the formal ground "under which" or the generic distinction of the speculative sciences are picked out by their different ways of abstracting from material or corporality, such that *(ii)* different ways of abstracting from material constitute different formal grounds "under which", and *(iii)* that specific distinctions accoridng

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[1] Reading this as a relative clause of characteristic.

[2] "*per se* in the first instance [*per se primo*]" could be a reference to Aristotle's first definition of *per se* predication in An. Post. 1.4, 73a.35–37: "Something holds of an item in itself […] if it holds of it in what it is — e.g. line of triangle and point of lines (their essence comes from these items, which inhere in the account which says what they are)." However, more work would need to be done to understand how this notion of *per se* predication is being applied to the grasping of an object. It also seems possible that *primo* is being used as an intensifier here, so that "*per se primo*" just means something like "first and foremost".

to atomic species come from different grounds of formality "which", these [the atomic species] having the same mode of abstraction.

No. 921 (II, p. 377)

Thesis 8: Primarily and specifically the morality of a human act is constituted by a moral object, secondarily by circumstances and by an end.[3]

The object can be picked out:[4]

1. broadly, on account of everything which the act concerns.
2. strictly, on account of that which is *per se* first and foremost concerns.

In this thesis the object is considered in the second sense, by which it is distinguished from circumstances, which nevertheless themselves are affected by the act, but secondarily, being the secondary objects of the act.

Circumstances are normally grouped as follows: Who, what, where, with what instrument, why, in what way, how much.

1. The particular circumstance is the end.

2. What nevertheless is rightly to be noted in connection with this is that the end, just like the circumstances, does not signify the end of the work [*operis*], which coincides with the object of the human act, but the end of the working [*operantis*], whose operation depends on being mediated by a grasp of the voluntary imperative.

3. This is shown with an example:

4. When someone intends to carry out servile work on the Day of the Lord, that which she intends first and foremost – the object of the humanan act and the end of her work – is servile work, but knowing that this is on the Day of the Lord, she nevertheless also intends this temporal circumstance (when).

5. When she carries out the work for vainglory, this will be the end of her work, which, working by means of her act by a voluntary imperative, i.e. by means of servile work, she depends upon to attain.

6. A moral object is an object in so far as it subsumes moral rules, or in so far as it is measured moral rules, i.e. in so far as it subsumes the prescription of a ground (proximate rules), which it also considers as conformity and nonconformity to the eternal law (supreme rules).

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[3]Reading "ex" [*ex*] here as referring to constitution.
[4]"Picked out" [*desumi*] perhaps in the sense of "individuated"?

No. 640. (II, pp. 31-33)

640. **On the kinds of goodness**

1. Specific divisions.

    (a) Essential divisions (according to analogy)

        i. The good is divided essentially according to its reason for being desired as good, in that it is useful, worthy or agreeable.
        ii. The useful is desireable as a means: It is the good of the means.
        iii. The worthy and the agreeable are desirables as an end and a goal: They are the good of the end and of the goal.
        iv. The worthy is the intrinsic good of the goal, to the extent that is determined by right reason.
        v. The agreeable is the intrinsic good of the goal, in so far as it silences appetite.

    (a) Accidental divisions.
        i. According to completeness [*perfectum*], goodness is divided into the good *simpliciter* and the good according to something.
        ii. Because the good is complete, *the good* simpliciter is the perfect *simpliciter*, which is complete in the highest degree; *the good according to something* is that which, although it is not complete in the highest degree, nonetheless is to some extent complete, in as much as it is with respect to an act [*inquantum est actu*].
        iii. The good *simpliciter* is a being according to something, and a being *simpliciter* is good according to something.
        iv. A being is sometimes said according to substantial being, by which it is said foremost; but according to being an affixture or accident, a being is said according to something [*secundum quid*].
        v. Now it is true that the primary perfection or primary act is in respect of substantial being, but further in respect of being an affixture and especially in respect of work concerning final ends, the being which has its rational development in the highest degree.
        vi. Parallel to these divisions is the division of the good into the moral good, what is agreeable to volition in conformity to moral rules, or agreeable according to ultimate ends, and hence perfect in the highest degree, and the physical good, which might be agreeable in any way, apart from moral rules.

3

No. 820 (II, p. 260)

1. Although the material object of volition can be any being whatever, the formal object is the good; for volition grasps [*attingit*] a being under the guise of the good.

2. The *common* formal object (the formal object of any volition whatever) is the guise of the good generically, just as the the common formal object of the intellect is a being, as it is a being.

3. The *characteristic* [*proprium*] formal object or the primary object in respect of some volition is the good, just as a declaration [*propositum*] to the intellect is for volition.

4. Thus the characteristic formal object of human volition is the guise of the good, just as it is for what is grasped by the human intellect, i.e. the guise of the good, just as something known by *abstraction*.

5. The *characteristic* formal object or the primary object of volition is the good *simpliciter*, or the ultimate end (beatitude [*beatitudo*]).

6. For the formal object of a power is that which grants specificity to it, that which is first and foremost grasped, and by means of which the others [*cetera*] are grasped.

7. This is the end in the order of appetites, and indeed the final end.

8. For man, who understands by abstraction, the end is double: formal (common beatitude) and material (the ultimate end *in concreto*, objective beatitude). The *strict* characteristic formal object for man is therefore common beautitude. Because man does not obtain objective beatitude except by means of common beatitude, objective beatitude can be called the formal object *broadly*.

9. God and the angels have a different formal object, which they do not know by abstraction, and which does not concern their objective beatitude by means of common beatitude.

10. Hence their immediate volition of these is produced in objective beatitude.

11. In this way, objective beautitude is the characteristic formal object of their volition, the thing which grants it specificity, in a similar way to how common beatitude grants specificity to human volition.

12. Just as human volition is referred to some object in respect of common beatitude, so this volition is referred to some divine object in respect of objective beatitude.

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13. The ultimate material end or objective beatitude is that which completely satiates or silences some volition, or that which is perectly agreeable to it; therefore the ultimate end, in as much as it is not subordinated to some other end, owes its being to that which perfectly completes the desiring power.

14. The secondary object is what is grasped by means of the primary object.

15. In the rank of appetite, this is the non-ultimate good, which has its ground in mediation and in an intermediate end.

Figure 1: Glossary

attingere to concern, to affect, to grasp

ratio ground

formalis "quae" of formality "which"

formalis "quod" of formality "that"

formalis "quo" of formality "by which"

formalis "sub qua" of formality "under which"

desumere picked out

opera work

mediante by means of.

imperatum imperative

dictamini prescription

proprium characteristic

abstractio abstraction

conveniens agreeable

Formal object quo/sub qua
Formal knowable
Objective spiritual light

mediates the grasp of...
manifests to the intellect...

Formal object quae/quod
Formal thing