■ 5

Excursus on Philosophy

1

Concept as a form of the image was formed at the same time in Classical literature and Classical philosophy. Between these two domains, however, there was a radical difference. Art sprang from mimesis, philosophy, from contemplation—from "mental viewing." The universe created by art was "as if" a second cosmos, formed materially of rhythm, word, marble, bronze, stone or wood. But the world comprehended by speculation turned into theory.

There was no philosophy in the modern sense in Greece until formal logic became stabilized, and this happened after the downfall of Classical Greece, in the age of Hellenism. Greek science, though created by theoretical thought, is not yet an abstract discipline, not speculation; it is basically a conceptual mythologem at root. This is why links with tradition can be found in the figures of theurges and in the fact that the philosophers cultivate the genre of mime, and in the philosophizing slave of palliata, and in the philosophical and mysterial parody of Old Comedy.

The relationship between image and concept determined Classical philosophy, meanwhile. Its entire Classical period is founded on genres coinciding with poetry and poetic genres. Furthermore, it is balanced in essence with mime and comedy. Epic, lyric, and drama

are so close to philosophy that distinction between the genres can sometimes be achieved only artificially. At first they are parallel. But the more abstract concept becomes, the more theoretical thought is separated from artistic.

Cosmogony still belongs equally to both ideologies. Here we have pure epic and the first explanations of the creation of the world. This is the realm of the mythological image.

Under the influence of the first concepts poems and gnomes (aphorisms) appear which go back to "popular philosophy," i.e. cosmogonic and eschatological folklore, divination, theogony, sayings and "folk wisdom." Concept, which is still far from being born, has to be built on the image and speak through the image. It cannot yet make logical arguments. Because of its dependence on concrete representations the concept still has no ethical or gnoseological purpose. The only forms of ancient philosophy are cosmology and ontology. In them the concepts which are being born ask questions about the origins of worlds, about "being" and the first elements. In these archaic philosophical pre-Attic systems one can already see clearly the change in the function of the image. Now we no longer feel the metaphorical nature of "the truth of existence" or "nonexistence as a phantom of existence," but the appearance of this idea is as much a result of the appearance of concepts as is the whole illusory side of metaphor.

The philosophers of Miletus and Elea already seem to us the founders of finished "professional" systems of thought. This is true insofar as they have behind them a long history of the formation of anonymous philosophical thought. But on the other hand these early philosophers are themselves still very archaic. The spirit of antiquity is still very strong in Parmenides; at least the concepts he works out still look like mythological images. Thus he presents his system in the form of a verse poem; according to its plot, Parmenides ascends in a chariot to the goddess Dike (*i. e.* to the truth), to the governor and gatekeeper of the world, who "opens" [reveals] to him the teaching of "truth" and "doxa" (that which appears or seems). However, these same images, exactly the mythological images of ascent to a heavenly mountain, of the heavenly gatekeeper Dike (whose role is transferred three centuries later in Plato to Diotima, and still later, in the Stoics, to Wisdom), images of revelation, in which the philosophical system is cast, and of the teaching itself of "seeming," and "authentic"—these very mythological images are used by

Parmenides to construct abstract concepts, and he thinks in them through mythological images. For him the two worlds are already defined, the object of cognition is separated from cognition, "truth" and "doxa" are generalized. But he still does not use all the means of conceptual thought. Within this very teaching of the authenticity of the "other world" and the illusion of "this world" which has as its intellectual content abstract concepts, there are still many traditional ideas which have their origins in mythology and have a mythological form. These very ascents to heaven or descents into the underworld are parodied in popular comedy; it was not the intention of the authors of the comedies themselves, but ancient comedy is a parody of just such folk, pre-Parmenides cosmogonies; the genre is the "double" of philosophy. As a prophetic and visionary genre Classical popular philosophy is inseparable from popular (folk) comedy. In both cases the first subject is revelations-prophecies and prophets. In comedy they are pseudo-messiahs. In philosophy they are mythic Dikes or Philias or illusory Diotimas or Sibyls, or real Parmenideses, Empedocleses, Heraclituses. This affects both the self-perception of the oldest philosophers and the systems they constructed. Parmenides, like the singers of epic and lyric, did not feel his own authorship. We do not see Parmenides. The whole poem is ascribed to divine revelation. Parmenides is still passive, while Dike is active. Parmenides only listens and remembers.

In spite of the apodeictic nature of Heraclitus' and Empedocles' presentation, both are earthly forms of the divinities they represent. Empedocles experiences himself directly as an incarnation of a god. Like Parmenides, he has heard his cosmology from a god. The "divinity" of philosophers, which becomes more and more conceptual with time, eventually takes on figurative meaning ("the divine Plato").

Both the Milesian and the Eleatic schools represent the world as dual. It is characteristic that they begin precisely from the problem of the basic features of the structure of the world and the origins of the Universe: what theogonic folklore presented in the form of mythological images the Milesians and Eleatics translated into the language of the concepts. The duality of "external form" and "essence," phantom and authenticity lived as parody in comedy. In early Greek philosophy this ability of phantom to take on the "external form" of the authentic turned into "non-being" and "seeming" identified with the real world. "Being" on the other hand was

of the real

cleansed of ~~real~~ features. It began to be understood as something passive lying outside reality, a non-real "eternal;" while "non-being" or "seeming" was understood as the moving, varied everyday real "phenomenon" (i.e. what is shown, what appears externally).

2

as it were,

In epic "pictoriality" the perception of time was absent; in philosophy it already plays an important role, ~~but~~ with a negative value.[1] Time as the concrete increase or decrease of separate phenomena is attributed to inconstancy and acts as its sign. Time and space, liberated from their former "object-ness," closure and delimitation, are understood by philosophy in the form of the variety of phenomena. And both time and space come unstuck and go beyond the bounds of their former physicality and begin to take on a new abstract function: the variety of phenomena, the changeability of phenomena, the beginnings of appearance, enlargement and reduction, the ends of death—still expressed in mythological form—are in fact understood causally, as a product of time and space.

Thus "phenomenon" is a category of everyday reality opposed (even inimical) to "being". In Greek "phenomenon" is τὸ φαινόμενον, i.e. "shining," "appearing" in the visual sense, "showing itself." It is the same term Homer used to describe the "appearance" of light or luminaries or a god that suddenly "showed themselves" from out of the darkness of clouds or fog, the term for a "vision" unexpectedly "revealed" to view.[2] Like all Classical concepts, the word is metaphorical; in its meaning as concept, as a philosophical concept, it communicates the mythological image of "shining" in the sense of something passing, temporary, endowed only with "temporality" and "seeming," therefore unstable. "Phenomenon" is thought of in time and in space as an opposition to "being," which does not appear and disappear, does not occupy space. I will not dwell here at length on the role of the "phenomenon"—τὸ φαινόμενον in comedy; I will only say that there it is the visual mirages, the miraculous vision, the "*tableaux vivants*", the shining, gleaming "spectacles" seen by the audience. In astronomy τὸ φαινόμενον means "the stars" ("shining"), but it is not hard to see their semantic link to "visions" in the sense of "apparitions" and *visiones*, and transparent "seeming" objects or events.[3]

however opposed

Being (τὸ ὄν) and non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν), ~~though contrasted~~, are attached to one another by the negation that makes nonbeing "nonbeing being". In Russian it does not work; but in Greek "nonbeing" has no term of its own and is designated as "being", but with the negative particle and the article (τὸ μὴ ὄν). This connection between nonbeing and being paved the way for the peculiar Greek monism, which never attained a complete division of the two worlds, but never eliminated their opposition.

Non-being imitates, copies being without having its essence. But they are gnoseologically different as well. Being is identified with speculation, non-being with sensation. But speculation is metaphorical. "Reason" itself is thought of concretely, as a divine "first principle," as a "cause" and "first cause" in flesh, in material—hyloistically. Mental understanding is thus an act by which material reason concretely enters into concrete "elements" of a subject. Of course such thinking in concrete images was necessary as the only possible form for the appearance of abstraction. What was important was the new function of the images, the desire to give the contents of the former images an abstract sense.

The features (attributions) which described both worlds grew out of the semantic variants of the former mythological images of "essence" and "appearance." Empedocles says that everything is made of elements, like a picture of paints; but what is important is the combination—which paint (element) is there more of, which less. And as in painting, trees, people, animals, birds, fish, and gods have a "similar appearance" (εἴδεα ἀλίγκια), i.e. they are an image made like reality, so the real world is a result of a certain mixture of elements.[4] For Empedocles the external "visible" world subject to the decomposition and combination of elements is the same as a picture created entirely by paints—an "image" "similar in appearance" to the real. It is easy to see why the theory of art is later worked out in philosophy (imitation, illusion, catharsis, etc.): philosophical thought and artistic thought had a common gnoseological base.

In Greek philosophy "appearance" is also characterized as visual. Non-being is "seen" (τὸ ὁρατόν), "appearing" (τὸ φαινόμενον), "sensed" (affective—τὸ παθητικόν), "limited" or "bounded" (πέρας). "Essence" is defined by the opposite of these features: it is invisible, eternal, speculative, unbounded.

The opposition of the features shows both where they came from and their nature. They appear from the heart of the same bifurcation

and opposition that were characteristic of mythological image in its transition to concept. Thought did not go beyond dichotomy and antithesis. Non-being is given a series of features, each of which splits and becomes an antithesis, like warmth-cold, thinness-thickness, etc. Behind these conceptual features lie the mythological images of winter-summer, heaven-underworld, warmth-cold, etc. Even in conceptual form they remain static, monolithic, summary and schematic. Thickness and external thinness of physical "particles" (e.g. atoms and the atomistic theory), the division and unification of the "elements" ("primary elements") of the cosmos are a conceptual form of the mythological "sparagmos" (division) and "genosis" (uniting) of the mythic cosmos. In Empedocles these primitive physical concepts present a remarkably telling picture: Love and Hate divide the world into parts (Hate) and then unite it into one (Love). By means of a pure myth Empedocles achieves conceptual generalization. This he does by giving the mythological images in his system the function of concepts: the cosmic "sparagmos" and "genosis" are the form of *such* a content that turns them into "disintegration" and "unification" of elements of the real cosmos.

Thick and cut, hard and soft, warm and cold grow as concepts out of paired mythological antitheses. The Pythagoreans still have such antithetical pairs as light-darkness, rest-movement, male-female, right-left, bounded-unbounded, good-bad. Originally such antipodal images had neither ethical nor any other qualitative contents (cp. in myth the portrayal of good and evil in the form of two cities, two rivers, or two countries). When individual images take on the function of "features" of the object, they begin to become abstract and generalized, but the concrete meaning of the object still does not disappear, but remains beside the new abstract meaning. The structure of paired opposition also remains.

3

The Classical languages had many terms for "image" but not one for "concept." The "external appearance" without the "essence" of the object is called εἰκών, εἶδος or ἰδέα (*imago, forma, figura, species*). All *also* of these meant "image", but ἰδέα, εἶδος, *species* were used when one wanted to refer to "concept." Thus ἰδέα and *forma* ("idea" and "form") were used alike to signify "image," "idea," and "outer

form," "external appearance"—in other words "idea" originally corresponded to a formal feature of the object. This terminology alone should be enough to prevent us from modernizing the interpretation of Plato's "ideas" and Aristotle's "form".... On the contrary, in later Greek philosophy the "appearance" of things, εἶδος, takes on the meaning of "idea" in the sense of "essence": it expresses the basic quality, the former "property," the main feature of the thing. Separated from reality the "image" in Greek philosophy is double. In Parmenides it is a phantom and non-being. In Plato it is being and essence. But, paradoxical as it may be, there is hardly any difference between the theories of Plato and Parmenides. The distinctive feature of every "appearance" and "image" is its opposition to the "authentic," i.e. to that existence which is true, eternal, unchanging, immobile. Parmenides (like Xenophanes) divides the world into the true and the seeming; Plato does the same. For both of them being and non-being correspond to ideal and real, the speculative (τὸ νοητόν) and the sensory (τὸ αἰσθητόν). In Plato the opposition of being and the "idea" of being, of soul and body, is even more emphasized, furthermore body corresponds to phantom "image," and therefore to death, while soul corresponds to eternally "being" ("the body of the dead," he says, "is an image, while ~~being~~ is what is called the *that which is reasonable* soul"[5]). And this is ~~logical~~: Consciousness, beginning with the primitive division into "thing" and "appearance" still understands "appearance" as a phantom. In the 6th century Parmenides could not have "ideas," because "idea" is a form of abstract concept. It is a different matter for Plato in the 4th century, when Classical Greece is already leaving the historical arena and beginning the transition to Hellenism with its new social consciousness, in which concepts will be predominant. Plato divides the world not so much into "thing" and "appearance" as into concrete and speculative. Thus for Parmenides "phantom" is physical, but "truth" is also concrete. The speculative (that which is graspable by the mind) is also concrete because of the concrete nature of the mind itself and of understanding itself. In archaic Greek philosophy "mind" has dimensions like air, water, fire, like all "primary elements" and "principles." It has already lost its purely mythological image nature, but has yet to become a pure concept: *✳* "mind" is god.[6] The same can be said for mental "understanding." Even in Classical Greece, long before Stoicism, "~~idea~~" was understood as "image" (εἴδωλον), impressed in *"representation"* the soul; such an "image" was like a physical likeness ("phantom"),

✳ "mind" is an element capable of producing physical cosmoi,

which emanated from the authentic object into the eyes and/or the soul of man (Xenophon's *Symposium*). Later Classical philosophy develops and grounds this theory of physical, dimensional "imprints" and "stamps" on the mind or soul from the external cover of things. We would call all such theories materialistic, though in fact they are completely created by the mythological concept of "image." "Imagination" (φαντασία) is a term of the same order. Its nature is purely visual and also phantom; it is related to the "external" world and not the internal, to "appearance" and "showing," to those "external" impressions that enter into the soul physically, concretely. The meaning of imaginary and mirage remains in "imagination" for a long time (cp. R. *"fantazer," "fantazirovat'"*). For the Greeks this term derives from "empty deception," "phantom," even "apparition" (φάντασμα), for the Romans from "image" (*imago*) and "imaginary" (*imaginarius*). We must add that even the concept of speculation has for the Classical period a concrete character; in the language of epic, the terms "think," "perceive," "understand" are still synonyms of "watch" and are accompanied by visual images ("understand with the eyes," "think, seeing" etc.). Even Plato speaks of intellect as a spatial object ("bodiless in appearance"). Further νοητόν, the speculative, preserves the meaning of "spectacle" in the abstract, intellectual sense (cp. R. *umozren'e*).

I opposed "truth" and "doxa" in Parmenides and Plato. In Parmenides, I said, their concreteness can still be fully felt: his "truth" is a goddess. Plato is a different matter. His "ideas" are things taken speculatively, without real concreteness. They show a specific, Classical step in the formation of general (abstract) concepts.

Plato's ideas of things are separated from the things and live independently, outside of things, outside of existence. Modernists wrongly see in them our contemporary ideas and call the Classical system of Plato idealism, like German Idealism. Platonic "ideas" represent typological Classical "images" and "proto-images" separated from objects, but images that have become concepts, i.e. Classical general concepts that took on the form of independent "ideas."

In Plato's formulation "table" or "bed" is a single idea, while there are in existence many tables and beds, and they are all different from each other. But the idea has a super-sensible existence, and it is created by divinity, while the real multiplicity of objects is created by

the hands of craftsmen, whose "tables" and "beds" lack "authenticity." Art, Plato teaches, is mimesis not of the divine essence of things, not of the "idea" and not of the "authenticity," but of that "seeming" real world that is itself imaginary.

Plato's "ideas," which appeared in post-Classical Greece, show how abstractions began from the isolation of concepts from the objects they defined. Now authenticity signifies what in reality does not exist; by the 4th century, the real is finally identified with evil, with a negative tradition behind it in ontology and ethics, as well as gnoseology. At the same time conceptual processes are developing which separate the properties of phenomena from the phenomena themselves.

Unlike Parmenides, Plato makes the "image" authentic, but this image already has the character of a general concept, an "idea." Plato's thought moves by means of concepts; for it "image" is not a mirage, but "being," completely separated from the world of phenomena. Therefore "mimesis" moves ahead in Plato. It represents a secondary illusion, "imitation of imitation," creating a "cast" not of authenticity, but only of its reflection. In this respect Plato is like Tolstoy: great artists and aesthetes, they both deny art. Plato removes the literary image even farther from the "truth" than it would have followed from previous philosophy. His "mimesis" is a simple imitation of that reality which is itself like a shadow and a mirage.

In the course of re-organizing images and concepts, the ideas of illusion were completely transformed in Plato. In the division into real and ideal, concrete and speculative, primacy remains with the abstract. The phantom no longer imitates the authentic; the authentic imitates the ideal, in effect it imitates the abstract, for the Platonic realm of "ideas" must be understood not in the sense of that which is unattainable and perfect, *i. e.* not only through its content, but also as the realm of the abstract, free of all matter.

I have selected Parmenides and Plato, whose ontology is characteristic for Greek philosophy at its two chronological ends. The difference between the two great metaphysicians lies only in their individual systems of cognition. One and the same ontology can hardly break out of the images in Parmenides; in Plato it is expressed in concepts.

The third stage between them is Socrates. Also of interest is the line of the atomists, which lies outside the main stream of Classical phi-

losophy. In the atomists we again encounter "image" and "authenticity," but they perform the function of concepts, and of concepts related to physics, including optics. They take atoms for the immutable principles of life; in their view all phenomena (including psychic phenomena) and all objects consist of indivisible, eternal, uniform atoms, the proportions between which create different objects and phenomena. Consequently the principle thought of the atomists we now call "materialists" and of "idealists" of Parmenides' persuasion is the same; only for the atomists "being" and "elements" are multiple. According to the atomistic theory, reflections separate from (or "flow from") real objects; these reflections are the "images" encountered by our organs of sense perception. As the very terms εἰκόνες, εἴδωλα, imagines, effigiae show, the atomists rely on the old idea of "image" and "likeness" as an imaginary authenticity which "copies" real authenticity. In fact, by "image" of the object the atomists understand such a "reflection" which is itself physical and consists of atoms, but lighter ones than those of the object itself. The "image" corresponds precisely to the object, though it is not the authentic object, but only its "likeness," i.e. its physical, material "appearance." I must say that "phantoms," "images" of objects (εἴδωλα) and Platonic "ideas" (εἴδεα) are close not only in terminology. Speculative things in the form of independent "ideas," or the "doxa" of Parmenides, or reality "appearing" in the form of a "likeness" or "image" of being—all these are not very far from the "physicalized" (if we can put it that way) "phantoms" and "images" of objects in the atomistic theory of "reflection."

If this theory proved tenacious in the Classical world, then it was because it rested on traditional ideas. One can follow the effects of its views all the way to Rome. But the theory of "reflection" outlasted other forms of the same ideas because the atomists made the images into concepts, the same concepts that rational physics grew out of. From then on all Classical systems of conceptual physics (especially optics) began to imitate and work out the same theory.

4

Socrates is interesting and new in his empiricism. Along with the Sophists he so hated, he pulled the heavens down to the social earth. He and the Sophists were the first champions of concept. As the

founders of formal logic, which broke with traditional dialectical logic, they could be considered the forerunners of Aristotle.

If we take Sophistic philosophy gnoseologically, it will become clear that it is a stage in the development of separate formal-logical concepts which have yet to reach the level of general concepts (it is no accident that Antisthenes did not recognize general concepts!). The Sophists emphasized the absence of mental normativity and therefore proposed the subjectivism of concepts, i.e. their arbitrariness. The ontologists already denied the reliability of sense cognition; it was the contribution of the Sophists to undertake the analysis of concepts themselves seriously, thereby clearing the methodological way for later philosophers, beginning with Socrates. In Sophistic philosophy one can clearly see the beginnings of judging, which begins by developing naked logization, the mechanics of constructing formal-logical processes devoid of essence. They study verbalmental tricks and teach argumentation, the basis of which consists in the purely external construction of judgments, then deductions, as a formal chain of judgments.

Socrates, on the other hand, strove for the non-arbitrary and the objective, and this historically leads him from the Sophists to Plato. It is in Socrates that the sphere of the "ideal" begins to take on the character not of a model, but of an abstraction that he derives from the empirical and returns to the empirical. Both the Sophists and Socrates are a reaction to the metaphysics of the ancient philosophers. Representatives of the new way of thinking, formal-logical thought, the Sophists and Socrates break with the dialectics of the Milesians and the Eleatics.

Socrates was attempting to construct general concepts. But the way he chose to get to them is significant for the history of cognition. Socrates still had not mastered abstract processes, still was at the beginning of their formation, and he constructed the abstract through the visible and concrete, the general through the particular (problems and illustrations of human behavior, the citation of myths, famous "examples," and other concrete material). This was the road from the image to the separation of features, which were narrowed down and made precise, the way of empirical generalization. No less famous is Socrates' "midwife" method; it was deductive in essence, heuristic in methodology. Socrates constructed general concepts through the concrete, purely empirical example. He asked his interlocutor questions, "leading" him to the answers

and forcing him "in torment" to recognize what he would like to deny. This was the methodology of "discoveries," heuristics.

We are used to saying that the Greeks are rationalists. But it is funny to think that they are rationalists in their national essence (as the Eastern peoples are mystical by nature). Only a philistine could think this, the learned philistine who seriously believes in "the fantasy of the Greek people, who created myths" and in "the utilitarian, practical, sober mind of the Roman, who could not create myths, but who invented the aqueduct."

The Greeks were rationalists because as a result of historical laws they were the first to work out logical processes. The Romans "already" do not have to do this, the Eastern peoples "still" have to reach this point. We must not forget the laws of phylogeny, which apply in sociology as well as in biology. Historically it fell to the lot of the Greeks to be the first to form logical concepts, and this was their great function; other peoples no longer needed to repeat this function.

Socrates proved unrepeatable in philosophy, as Old Comedy or tragedy were in later literature—these were genres which recorded the appearance of concepts; such phenomena of "first birth" are very powerful and original, but they are so original that they can never be repeated again. Socrates is a rationalist for historical reasons. He is completely occupied with the formal-logical substantiation of what before him was proved by means of dialectic images, still only on the way to concepts.

The dual world for Socrates takes place wholly in the logical sphere. "The seeming" (*doxa*) is for him a subjective and unreliable opinion, and what had been "existing" in ontology changes for him into objective cognition. Thus in Socrates cosmology becomes logic.

His "epagogical" method consists in deriving one thought from another with the object of finding a general concept. For this he resorts for the most part to excluding false individual concepts. "General" for him is a chain of "particulars." Only through the concrete "particular" can he reach the "general," moving through formal logic, discourse, judgement—not "from" the particular to the general (not inductively), but "through" consistent logical passage through all the steps of particular concepts, from one to another, beginning with the general, summary concept, examining and discarding what is not necessary, defining feature after feature until he reaches the deductive result which contains for him the general def-

inition of the concept. This passage through the links of thought is dressed by Socrates in leading questions. I have already pointed out that this wandering representative of unwritten philosophy is a folk type. His balagan quips bring together in him all his folkloric features. Socrates presents philosophy in question and answer form, anticipating the dialogues of Plato, but also continuing the dramatic, balagan line of verbal agones, riddles-solutions, and all kinds of griphs. Socrates is still close to the trickster; his questions resemble riddles, because he knows his intent in advance and carefully hides it, forcing his interlocutor to follow him, leading him astray and deceiving him. In the end his interlocutor makes a fool of himself, recognizing what he had denied and accepting what he did not want to accept. In this respect Socrates does the same thing to his interlocutor as the slave in palliata does to his master.

The agon of riddles and solutions, of questions and answers was the "popular" form of future metaphors. In Socrates this traditional form passes by metaphoristics. Metaphoristics are already overcome. The question-riddles serve the purpose of logization. But it remains characteristic that all of the first formal-logical, discursive deductions are built of riddle-questions and answer-solutions born in balagan. And this is no accident. In Greece logical concepts rest on images, arise from them and are their new, abstract form.

In Socrates they are seen not only in heuristics. His "example"—the particular case from which he pushes off—is a new transformed form of the former "picture." The Socratic "example" continues to be a narrative. It gives one particular case which does not unfold in time. General concepts are formed by means of "deduction" or "drawing out" from empirical concrete "particularity" which is not at all a premise or an experiment. Its role is that of a genealogical "beginning" from which thought starts to "come out;" it sprang from "showing," from the image system by means of which concept was created.

The purely human subject, the only thing Socrates is interested in (unlike the hyloists and Plato), testifies to the mental epoch characterized by the appearance of logical concepts. The Sophists and Socrates were interested not in the concrete contents of "that which is," not in one or another cosmological construction, but in logic, the theory and practice of cognition, the sphere of human "wisdom," which is identified with virtue and divinity: for him ethics is gnoseology and religion is the domain of human cognition. Socrates' main

problem is the truth; his main goal is to find the correct definition for truth and separate it from its phantom likenesses. The cosmological image, therefore, took on for him the character of a gnoseological concept.

For Socrates correct formation of the concept meant finding the "truth"; correct concepts became the same thing as correct world-order was for the cosmologist philosophers. The object of his denunciations were the imaginary likenesses of truth—incorrectly formulated logical concepts.

5

Socrates is undoubtedly the predecessor of Aristotle, the father of scientific, finished, maximally formal-logical thought. But an interesting interim period lies between Aristotle and Socrates. In the 4th century, characterized by the working out of judgment, it was not only philosophers who engaged in logic. The so called orators did as well, whether they wanted to or not. This Greek rhetoric is a peculiar and unrepeatable phenomenon! We explain it incorrectly by analogy to our contemporary parliamentary or judicial eloquence. The Greek rhetors were like poets and philosophers, but of a kind whose works are written on the one hand and theoretical and "speculative" on the other. They were writers and logizers, and the fact that they "pronounce" their works in one case or another is merely a question of professional application of these works. The Greek rhetors were writers and logizers whose genre was specially designed to sound orally, though written, and to be applied practically, though it is pure theory.

It has long been known that the Greek rhetors are interested in character sketches, "ethos," that they are teachers of morals, and basically teachers. The entire texture of their genre is dramatic. Who are they? Actors in their pronouncing function, in declamation, dress, expression, gesticulation, in all their "epideictic" nature, even in the setting of their performance (agonistics, theater, halls, Hellenic holidays, squares). As "epideictists" they are "showers" who have long had something in common with balagan rayoshniki.[8] They are "ethologists," formerly the buffoons that were called ethologists or tricksters in balagan. Then they became ethologists in the sense of teachers of morals and composers of character sketches. They develop the theory of characters and "morals," but still do not know

the general concept of "morality." Later they are pronouncers, saying their speeches orally. They are prosecutors, lawyers, publicists, pedagogues, writers, philosophers, politicians. They are specialists in literary theory and eloquence, poets in prose, and especially in business prose.

It is clear that they are not what they were once and not what they would become later. They are distinguished on the one hand by their practical function, on the other by the personal element, the subjective element that makes their appearance possible only after the Sophists. They are everyday poets and philosophers who do not mix with the poets of art and the philosophers of science. In ancient Greece art and science were making their preliminary way in folklore, ethics, and religion. Rhetoric has its own path in everyday life, and it is even called practice. This happens because in Classical Greece everyday life is already separated from cult: the two worlds, the sacred and the profane, are divided and delimited. But behind this division religion was still everyday life and everyday life was the basis of all image ideas. This is why one can find so many sides of rhetoric that border on drama, balagan, figural arts, ethics, and philosophy.

In the form in which we find rhetoric in the 4th century, it is business prose, written poetically, pronounced orally. From the formal side this prose comes from the folk peculiarities of puppet theater, but of course with a complete change of linguistic function. In Gorgias the folk style of oral speech already takes on a purely metaphorical character. The famous oratorical "period" with isocola, antitheses, figures comes out of aphorism and mythological metaphors, from rhythmic folkloric speech with its agonistic oppositions, repetitions, identities, images. In the reworking of concepts all this image system takes on sometimes an indirect function, sometimes a purely formal, ornamental function that occasionally even verges on the comic.

The orators of the 4th century make this image system, which was still formal in Gorgias in the 5th century, into a tool of conceptual thought. Isocrates' periods, isocola, parisosis, antitheses and figures function as a medium of extremely logized argumentation: he makes each thought into a closed link—a rounded period—which can be broken up into an equal quantity of internal parts (πάρισα), with two equivalent oppositions, and moves from link to link by a long discursive chain of judgments subordinated to a single purpose and

leading him to a conclusion that is firmly argued in detail all along the way. Nevertheless, in spite of all the mental novelty of Isocrates, in spite of his mental centralization, the "atomism" of Isocrates' "round" period, with its closed independence, its internal completeness, is striking. Isocrates' periods are feudal fiefs, independent concentrations of thought, and his metaphors and figures, the euphony of his rhythms, the avoidance of clusters of vowels or consonants, all act as a medium for a discursively thought-out logic that is very consistent and calm.

Proof is the soul of the Greek orators of the 4th-3rd centuries. Whether they are pronouncing gushing praises, court speeches, or political philippics, whether they are for Macedonia or against it, for the Attic or the Gorgian school, only one thing is equally important to them—proof. They prove. Judgments, conclusions, deductions carefully work out a chain of proofs and establish the truth of their premises. They require isocola and antitheses for defense and refutation of the judgments cited, periods and rhythms for well-formed conclusions.

The age of constructing formal-logical processes reaches its fullest expression in Aristotle, the theoretician of syllogism. It is no coincidence that the causality, discursivity, and logization of Aristotelian thought finds such sympathy in medieval scholasticism: they are linked by analysis and the well formed mental mathematics of thought that was historically inevitable for Aristotle, lifeless (and thereby useful) for the scholastics.

But Aristotle's syllogism is not a bare abstraction born only of pure logic. It too is merely a new abstract form of the former mythological image. Syllogisms usually consist of three members: two premises and a conclusion—two judgments and a result. In reality, beneath syllogism lies comparison; the two parts of syllogism, united by a single common concept (I—man is mortal, II—I am a man), have something in common (man), which conditions the result of the whole mental conclusion (I am mortal). In everyday image folklore every agon is like this: two parts have similar features, and the third is the arbiter between these two. Let us say that Battus is a poet, Menalcas is a poet; Corydon is their judge. However, in syllogism the images have become judgments, flat statement—consequence, conclusion. In the image proposition the third part represents the flat presence of the first two parts (for example, in the structure of strophe, antistrophe, epode). But such an ancient image proposition frozen, for example, in

aphorism, takes on a new character in the rhetorical "period" which is built on judgment. What is new here is not only the replacement of images by concepts, but the fact that the flat series of images has taken on a new mental composition—namely from premises to consequence, in logical sequence. The period in itself and images in themselves remained in syllogism in the form of its structure, but its formal-logical essence made them the formants of a deductive mental conclusion.[9]

The theory of proof reached its apogee in Aristotle. These are no longer the lively proofs of the orators—Liciuses, Antiphons, Isocrates, Demosthenes—full of practical, concrete contents. Aristotle's proofs are purely logical conclusions, the basis of formal logic, i.e. "logical operations independent of the content of thought" (Radlov[10]). Aristotle for the first time in history breaks with the old ontology, replacing it with natural history; in logic he is already abstract.

If we look back from Aristotle to Socrates, we can see that the earlier philosopher built the abstract by means of the concrete, and his "examples" served as a form in which he presented concepts. The Greeks of the 5th century could derive the general from the particular only by means of an image based story, an example, digressions, an original empirical "case." Thus Herodotus builds his documentation on folktale. Thus the orators in absolutely all cases introduce a special διήγησις, a narration that takes center stage in their argumentation. What once acted as "showing" or "picture" became in conceptual thought a medium of argumentation. This was the path taken by abstraction: the concrete, taking on a logical function, became the constructive principle of formal logic.

Concrete in abstract form, Classical concept does not break with concrete image even when it becomes an abstraction.

Columbia Univ. Pr., 1923); P. Boyanée, "A propos de la 'satura' drama-tique," *Revue des études anciennes*, Vol. 34, 1932, 11–25; W. Herring, "Satura und Hyporchem (Einige Gedanken zu Livius VII 2)," *Römische Satire* (WZUR. Jg. 15, H. 4/5, 1966). The basis for defining it (and the existence of dramatic satura could explain the comparison of satire and Greek dramatic genres) is the second chapter of the 7th book of Livy's *History*, where improvised dialogical musical scenes, folkloric acts of a buffoon are called satura.

44. Lucian's mimes 42: Ἀλέξανδρος ἤ Ψευδόμαντις, 55: Περὶ τῆς Περεγρίνου τελευτῆς, 13: Ἀληθὴς ἱστορία and 14: ʼΑληθῶν Διηγημάτων, 34: Φιλοψευδεῖς, 59: Πῶς δεῖ ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν.

45. The *Milêsiaká* of Aristides.

46. In her monograph *Sappho* (1946–47) Freidenberg analyzes in detail the "Theocritan renaissance" in ancient Greek lyric.

47. "Helen" = "The Epithalamium of Helen," Id. 18; "The Lover" is Id. 23; "The Conversation" is presumably 27; "Achilles' Epithalamium" is attributed to Bion.

48. Daphnis was a Sicilian herdsman who died of love. The son of Hermes, he was the legendary inventor of pastoral song. In Theocritus Id. 6, 8, 9, and 27 he is a cowherd. Thyrsis appears in Id. 1, Battus in 4, Corydon in 4 and 5, and Menalcas in 8, 9, and 27.

49. Erinna was a Greek poetess, see Bergk PLG III.141 and Richard Reitzenstein, *Epigramm und Skolion*, NY: Olms, 1970, 142. The name is related to ἐαρινός "of spring." Kalyke (rel. to Eng. "calyx") was the beloved of Euathlos; she jumped from the Leucadian cliff: fr. 43 Athen. XIV 619d. There was also an ancient song "Kalyke:" Stesichorus' spurious fragment, Page PMG fr. 277. See also Freidenberg's *Poetics*, 130-1. Eriphanis was a poet who fell in love with the hunter Menalcas and wandered in the woods.

50. See H. Reich, *De Alciphronis Longique aetate*, Diss., 1894, on the creation of the bucolic novel based on bucolic mime.

51. On vegetation gods in the Greek novel see *Poetics*, 277–78.

52. 119.

53. 127.

54. The name of the girl, Σίμαιθα, is of interest. The Greeks attributed the epithet σιμός to the "pug-nosed" goat, satyr, Socrates. It is not unlikely this name has some relation to the goat (σιμή) nature of the girl, who was a former nymph in myth, the female equivalent of the Hellenistic satyr, young and beautiful. The "bucolic" nature of the heroes does not at all contradict their being personifications of Eros and the moon in any modifications.—O. M. Freidenberg.

55. Idyll 2.131.

56. Idyll 2.133.

57. Pherecrates was an Athenian comic poet. Κοριαννώ CAF I.67–69.

58. On the cult drama, see *Poetics*, 205.

59. 83.

60. 80–83.

61. On the passions of Osiris see History II.171, on the mysteries of Sais—II.62–63.

62. 84.

63. See Fr. 10 Kaibel.

64. Athen. 362b.

Chapter 5

1. Earlier Freidenberg associated this negative evaluation with movement in Old Comedy as opposed to the monumental calm of tragedy: *Poetics*, 297–99.

2. The forms of the verb φαίνω, -εσθαι, which describe the appearance of something shining in Homer are used for heavenly phenomena, for the appearance of Eos and the beginning of morning: *Il.* 1.477, 6.175, 8.555, 9.240, 618, 682, 707, 22.27, 23.109, 24.13, 417, 600, 785, *Od.* 2.1, 3.404, 407, 491, 4.306, 431, 576, 5.228, 6.31, 7.222, 8.1, 9.152, 170, 307, 437, 560, 10.187, 12.8, 24, 316, 13.18, 14.266, 15.189, 396, 16.270, 17.1, 435, 19.428, 23.241, in the sense of "shining" and "illuminate" and about the light of a fire: *Il.* 2.455, 8.560, 19.375, *Od.* 7.100, 19.37, *et al.*

The hero is often compared to a luminary which appears in the heavens through clouds, through the darkness of night, or through other stars: *Il.* 9.64, 22.28, cf. 3.31. When Achilles has to "appear" to the Trojans, the goddess surrounds his head with a golden cloud and its brightness reaches the heavens: *Il.* 18.198ff. The fires of the Trojans "appear" like stars "appear" around the moon in clear weather, when hills, high mountains, and valleys "appear:" *Il.* 8.556ff. The divinity scatters a cloud so the sun may shine and the battle "appear:" *Il.* 17.650, cf. 16.299; the area "appears" to Poseidon, who watches from a mountain: *Il.* 13.13–14; a lighthouse "appears" to sailors in the night: *Il.* 19.375. The same verb is used to refer to the appearance of a god in some form: *Il.* 20.131, *Od.* 6.329, 7.201, 16.159, 161, 24.448. It is clear from many contexts that the appearance of a god equals the appearance of light or darkness. Thus Athena's eyes appear-shine: *Il.* 1.200; when the interior of Odysseus' house, the weapons and housewares begin to shine, to "appear to the eyes" like a hot fire, this means for Telemachus the presence of a god: *Od.* 19.39ff. Ares "appears" as the darkness of clouds "appears:" *Il.* 4.278, *Od.* 17.371. Particularly clear is the luminary nature of the "appearances" of divinity in Zeus, whose "appearance" is a flash of lightning in the clouds: *Il.* 2.353, 9.236, *Od.* 21.413. Φαίνω (φαίνεσθαι) is used as well for a marvel or a sign that "reveals" the divinity, or when the appearance of the god is a sign itself: *Il.* 1.197, 2.308, 318, 324, *Od.* 3.173, 8.112, 15.168, 18.379, 20.101, 114; also for the description of a sudden or long-awaited appearance of a countryman, of the shore to a sailor or traveller: *Il.* 7.7, 15.275, *Od.* 6.137, 9.230, 460, 12.242, 403, 13.194, 16.181, 410, 18.160, 165, 23.233, and others; cf. 12.44, 14.30, 302, 5.279, 7.268. The same term is used for the description of the "shining" of the

body through armor or rags: *Il.* 22.73, *Od.* 18.68, 74, and others. See Ch. Mugler, *Dictionnaire historique de la terminologie optique des grecs, Douze siècles de dialogues avec la lumière* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1964), 406–413.

3. Ch. Mugler, *Dictionnaire historique de la terminologie optique des grecs*, 412.
4. See 23 B Diels.
5. *Laws* 959 b: "image"—εἴδωλον; "the essence of each of us"--τὸν ὄντα ἡμῶν ἔκαστον.
6. In scholarship the "nous" of Anaxagoras, which is often translated as "reason" or "mind" is treated in the opposite way, as the mental principle in which, in the expression of one writer, there is the "phantom of a creator" and as a particular form of "the lightest and thinnest matter" (see on this question И. Д. Рожанский, Анаксагор, У истоков античной науки, (М: Наука, 1972), 70ff.) Freidenberg is apparently inclined to understand "nous" like the latter group of scholars. But for Anaxagoras himself the concrete and anthropomorphic characteristics of "nous"— the source of cosmic development and of the law of cosmic formation— must be considered an inheritance of the pre-scientific epoch, which shows only the genesis of the concept and the tendency to think by means of analogy (see И. Д. Рожанский, Анаксагор, 211-213).
7. *Sophist* 246 B.
8. See Freidenberg's «Семантика постройки кукольного театра», Миф и театр (М.: ГИТИС, 1988), 16.
9. Aristotle himself compares the period to the syllogism (see Античные теории языка и стиля, (Л.: Гос. Социально-экономическое изд., 1936), 184) It would be more accurate to say that the period corresponds in its syntax to the structure of formal-logical cause and effect thought. But more often the Greek period reflects antithetical thought without a conclusion. This circle of oppositions without a third member is typical of folklore syntax. See Freidenberg's «Происхождение греческого фольклорного языка», Ученые записки ЛГУ, № 63, Серия филологических наук, Вып. 7, 1941, 53–55.
10. Эрнест Львович Радлов, Этика Аристотеля (СПб: Изд. Акад. наук, 1884).

Chapter 6

1. Freidenberg's ideas about Old Comedy come in part from Cornford, whose *Origin of Attic Comedy* (London: E. Arnold, 1914) she knew. On the connections between ritual, tragedy, and comedy see *Poetics*, 167, 187–88.
2. Freidenberg has two articles devoted to parody: «Идея пародии», Сборник статей в честь С. А. Жебелева, Л., 1926, 378-76, and «Происхождение пародии» (1923-25), ТЗС, т. 6, 1973, 490-97. The latter, which is actually an earlier and less complete variant of the former, is translated as "The Origin of Parody" in Henryk Baran, ed., *Semiotics and Structuralism: Readings from the Soviet Union* (White Plains: Intl. Arts

and Sciences Press, 1974), 269–83. The phenomenon Freidenberg calls "parody" in these articles (most of the material is ritual) and "vulgar realism" in *The Poetics of Plot and Genre*, is called in the works of M. M. Bakhtin the "folk culture of laughter" and "carnivalization of literature." The contents of the first two terms almost coincides, the relation between "vulgar realism" and "carnivalization" is more complex. For all they had in common, the goals of Bakhtin and Freidenberg were different. Freidenberg wanted to find the "primitive semantics" of reversals, of parodic doubling, of the double, the "pseudo," the "phantom likeness of the truth," Bakhtin the function of the forms of these "semantics" in developed culture, far from the primitive stage.

3. Albrecht Dieterich, *Pulcinella: Pompejanische Wandbilder und romische Satyrspiele* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1897). The mixture of tragic and comic explains the proximity of two figures—one tragic, one comic—in a Pompeiian wall painting.
4. Freidenberg makes the same claim in «Комическое до комедии», Миф и театр (М: ГИТИС, 1988), 74.
5. See Ludwig Radermacher, *Weinen und Lachen, Studien über antikes Lebensgefühl*, (Wien: R. M. Rohrer, 1947); Radermacher, *Zur Geschichte der griechischen Komödie, 2: Stoffgeschichtliches*, SBAW, Bd. 202, H. 1, 1924.
6. ἀνάδοσις: giving up, sending up (of the dead from the underworld).
7. From "parabasis," the part of Old Attic Comedy in which the chorus breaks the stage illusion by addressing the audience directly in the voice of the author, praises the play taking place, criticizes the competition, and asks to be granted the prize.
8. Bergk. PLG, fr. 94 = fr. 172 West IEG.
9. Page PMG fr. 338.
10. Page LGS fr. 117 (43D), 140, 141.
11. A lyric poetess of Argos.
12. Festival of Apollo and Diana in Greece. For two days the young would carry olive branches with cakes and fruits; Athen. 12.
13. West IEG, fr. 5–10.
14. West IEG, fr. 37. The story is that Hipponax' attacks were so scathing that Bupalus (fr. 1, 4, 12, 15) committed suicide.
15. Problems of archaic lyric are discussed by Freidenberg in *Poetics* (pp. 42ff., 131ff., 274ff.) and in her unpublished monograph *Sappho* (1946–47). Some idea of the latter can be gleaned from «Происхождение греческой лирики», Воипросы литературы, 1973, № 11, 103–23, «Сафо», Доклады и сообщения Филологишческого института ЛГУ им. А. А. Жданова, Вып. 1, 1949, 190–98.
16. *Poetics*, 170.
17. Timocreon of Rhodes, comic poet, ca. 476 BC.
18. *Wasps*, 1043.
19. «Паллиата», Миф и театр, (М.: ГИТИС, 1988), 36–73.
20. Arignota: perhaps a girl loved by Sappho (alternate reading of ἀριγνώται in Page LGS fr. 218.4–5); Atthis, a girl loved by Sappho: Ox. Lyr. Gr. Fr. 206, 218.