

[Dear Workshoppers – I realize this is rather on the long side. But you can easily skip the first part (pp. 3-15), and skim through the third part (pp. 32-52), which contains a very detailed discussion of a small portion of text. I hope that makes it manageable. Thank you for your patience! I look forward to your comments.]

## Chapter One Intuition and Judgment

Kant attributes to the understanding, the faculty of spontaneity, two kinds of acts: judgment and sensible synthesis. In the Introduction I argued that it would be a mistake to regard these as identical. Rather, they are specifically distinct, so that an act of synthesis is not an act of judgment, and vice versa. If these acts are distinct, however, we need to ask on what grounds both of them are attributed to the understanding. This problem, which I call the Problem of the Unity of the Understanding, or Unity Problem, is exacerbated by the fact that Kant seems to define the understanding as a capacity for judgment. So the problem is how a capacity that is defined as a capacity for judgment can also be responsible for an act that is specifically distinct from judgment.

In developing a solution to this problem I want to begin by considering Kant's conception of judgment. This is the topic of the present chapter as well as the next one. Specifically, I will focus on the relation judgment bears to intuition. This relation is of particular relevance to the Unity Problem for the following reason. The act of sensible synthesis concerns sensible manifolds. This means that it concerns intuition. Kant's view is that a sensible manifold amounts to an intuition only on the condition that it exhibits a certain kind of synthetic unity. This is the unity for which the act of sensible synthesis is responsible. If we want to investigate the relation

between the capacity to judge and the capacity for sensible synthesis, we therefore need to determine what the relation is between the respective products of these acts; that is, between judgments, on the one hand, and intuitions, on the other.

Beginning with the relation between judgment and intuition is recommended by another consideration, as well. As I shall argue in the course of this chapter, the role intuition plays in Kant's theory of cognition is frequently misunderstood. Failure to understand the relation between judgment and intuition, however, in turn leads to a distorted view of the relation between the underlying capacities; in particular, it leads to a distorted view of the relation between judgment and synthesis. To get the Unity Problem properly into focus, therefore, I shall give a rather detailed discussion, in this chapter and the next, of Kant's theory of judgment, with the focus being on the place of intuition in it.

The task of Chapter One is largely negative: I shall discuss in some detail a family of views of how judgment relates to intuition, and argue that they are mistaken. As part of the discussion, however, significant insights will emerge about how Kant's theory of judgment needs to be understood. Building on these insights, I develop my own positive interpretation of this theory, and the role of intuition in it, in Chapter Two.

Chapter One breaks down into four parts. In the first part I give a preliminary discussion of Kant's fundamental division of cognitive faculties into understanding and sensibility, and, building on this discussion, turn to the distinction between Pure General and Transcendental Logic. I argue that for the purposes of this investigation the focus must be on the theory of judgment as it is developed in Transcendental Logic, because Transcendental Logic does, whereas Pure General Logic does not, consider the relation of judgment to intuition.

In Part Two I introduce a view of the relation intuition bears to judgment which I call proto-Fregeanism. Proto-Fregeanism is an instance of a family of views I call Component Views, according to which intuition is, in a sense to be determined, a component of judgment. The discussion, and rejection, of Component Views of intuition occupies the remainder of the chapter. In Part Two I motivate proto-Fregeanism and raise some objections for it. Part Three continues the discussion of proto-Fregeanism by developing an interpretation of the first section of the chapter of the *Critique* entitled “Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding,” in which Kant sketches his theory of judgment. On the basis of this interpretation, I conclude that proto-Fregeanism must be rejected. The chapter concludes, in Part Four, with a discussion of a different kind of Component View, which is advocated by Henry Allison. I argue that this view is equally inadequate, and end by suggesting that Component Views of any kind should be rejected. I thus lay the ground for developing what I take to be the correct view of the relation of judgment to intuition in Chapter Two.

## 1. Judgment in Transcendental Logic

### 1.1 Judgment and Cognition

A theory of judgment has its proper place in logic, because logic, in Kant’s view, treats of the rules of the understanding in general.<sup>1</sup> These are the rules that govern the characteristic exercises of this faculty, and judging is central among these. But since Kant distinguishes different kinds of logic, it is not immediately clear which kind, or kinds, contain those aspects of the theory of judgment that matter for the purposes of the *Critique*.<sup>2</sup> In particular, the distinction

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. A52/B76.

<sup>2</sup> In the Introduction to the Transcendental Logic, he distinguishes between pure general and applied general logic, as well as various particular logics (cf. A52f/B76f). It is not necessary for our purposes to discuss these distinctions in any detail. We can simply note that while general logic is concerned with thought about any subject-matter

between Pure General Logic (PGL) and Transcendental Logic (TL) is important here. Judgment is treated in both, and a complete, general account of judgment has to accommodate this fact.<sup>3</sup>

However, as I argue in what follows, for our purposes only TL is relevant. The gist of the argument is that TL does, while PGL does not, treat judgment as a species of cognition. Since we are interested in the relation between judgment and intuition, and this relation comes into view only if one considers judgment as a species of cognition, this is the aspect of judgment that matters.<sup>4</sup>

As Kant uses the term, it is essential to a cognition that it has objective purport, but it need not amount to knowledge.<sup>5</sup> With regard to judgment this means that insofar as it is a species of cognition, a judgment purports to be true or false of objects. This feature is constitutive of judgment qua cognition. If a judgment fails to be true or false of objects, it is therefore deficient.

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whatsoever, a particular logic deals with thought about a specific subject-matter, such as the objects of physics or the objects of biology. Applied logic, by contrast, is a kind of cognitive psychology. Unlike general logic, which is pure, applied logic is an empirical discipline.

<sup>3</sup> A general account of judgment does not, however, need to take into consideration the various particular logics, which deal only with judgments about objects of a particular kind.

<sup>4</sup> One might object that there are kinds of judgments which bear a relation to intuition, yet do not amount to cognition. The *Prolegomena's* Judgments of Perception are perhaps a case in point (cf. *Prol.*, §18, Ak. IV, 297f.). Arguably, then, it is not necessary to focus on judgment as a species of cognition if one wants to bring into view the relation between judgment and intuition. My response to this objection is that I am interested in the relation between judgment and intuition in the first place, because the topic of my inquiry is the role of the understanding in cognition. The argument I am about to give is intended to show that for the purposes of this inquiry the account of judgment contained in Pure General Logic can be disregarded because this account is so abstract that it applies to all kinds of judgments whatsoever, regardless of whether they purport to be cognitions. If Judgments of Perception do not purport to be cognitions, the nature of the relation between judgment and intuition in such judgments can likewise be disregarded, as far as the topic of this inquiry is concerned.

I should add that it is by no means clear how the distinction between Judgments of Perception and Judgments of Experience that is sketched in the *Prolegomena* relates to the account of judgment given in the *Critique*. Taking a stand on this issue would take me too far afield from my present concerns. For discussion of this topic, as well as references to further literature, see Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 178-185, and Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 167-197; see also the extended discussion in Prauss, *Erscheinung bei Kant*, who makes the Judgment of Perception doctrine a central element in his interpretation of the *Critique*.

<sup>5</sup> In the *Jäsche-Logik* Kant glosses 'cognition' as 'conscious representation that is related to an object'; there is a similar gloss in the so-called *Stufenleiter*-passage at A320/B376f. Note that, as both passages make clear, Kant regards not just judgments, but also intuitions and concepts as cognitions. For a passage in which he speaks of false cognitions see A59/B83: "[...] denn eine Erkenntnis ist falsch, wenn sie mit dem Gegenstande, worauf sie bezogen wird, nicht übereinstimmt [...]" (For a cognition is false, if it does not correspond to the object, to which it is related).

Kant calls this defect emptiness.<sup>6</sup> He also says of empty judgments that they do not have “sense or meaning”.<sup>7</sup> A judgment counts as a cognition, then, only if it is not empty.

This point follows from a general thesis of Kant’s concerning cognition, which I call the Heterogeneity Thesis. This is the thesis that there are two distinct sources of cognition, each having its own distinctive form.<sup>8</sup> The Heterogeneity Thesis implies that there are two distinct, and logically independent, sets of conditions on cognition, one for each of the two sources. Since Kant calls these sources, respectively, the faculty of sensibility and the faculty of the understanding, I will talk about sensible conditions and intellectual conditions. For a representation to be a cognition it has to satisfy both sets of conditions. Only then do we have the kind of cooperation between the two faculties requisite for cognition.

The cooperation requirement can be spelled out as follows. Because each faculty is the source of a distinct kind of representation, cooperation requires that the representations of one faculty meet the conditions deriving from the other faculty. Thus, for cognition to occur, the representations of sensibility, intuitions, must meet the intellectual conditions, while the representations of the understanding, concepts and judgments, must meet the sensible conditions. It follows that there are two ways in which a representation can satisfy one set of conditions, but not the other. Kant has names for the resulting defects. Failure of an intellectual representation to satisfy the sensible conditions results in the emptiness of a judgment.<sup>9</sup> The corresponding failure of a sensible representation to satisfy the intellectual conditions results in the blindness of an intuition. I take it that this is the point of the famous dictum that thoughts without content are

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. e.g. A62/B87, A155/B194.

<sup>7</sup> *Sinn oder Bedeutung* (A155/B194f.; see also A240/B299).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Introduction, p.\*\*\*

<sup>9</sup> Note that the same holds for concepts. A concept which fails to meet the sensible conditions on cognition is likewise called empty. However, since concepts can only be used in judgments, we need to focus on judgment.

empty, while intuitions without concepts are blind.<sup>10</sup> Empty thoughts, then, are judgments which fail to satisfy the sensible conditions on cognition.<sup>11</sup>

Part of my point in talking about sensible and intellectual conditions on cognition is to resist too simplistic a model of what the needed cooperation of sensibility and understanding consists in. On the simplistic model every act of cognition requires the joint occurrence – the simultaneous tokening, we might say – of an intuition and a judgment. But the simplistic model is not Kant's. On Kant's view, a judgment satisfies the sensible conditions on cognition by being related, in the right way, to possible intuitions. These intuitions need not be actual, that is, they need not ever occur. All that is required is that the conditions governing the *possibility* of these intuitions are satisfied. Correlatively, an intuition can satisfy the intellectual conditions on cognition by being related, in the right way, to possible judgments. The judgments need not be actual, that is, they need not ever be made. The point can be summed up by saying that cognition requires that the object of a judgment be *intuitable*, and that intuitions be *thinkable*. I will say more about what these conditions amount to in the sequel.

One thing needs to be clarified right away, however. What I have said may make it seem as if intuitions and judgments are on a par, in the sense that they are equally kinds of cognition. But this is mistaken. Properly speaking, only judgments count as cognitions. To be sure, in the

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<sup>10</sup> “Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind“ (Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind) (A51/B75). – Kant does not use the term ‘thought’ in the Fregean sense of a judgeable content. Rather, for Kant ‘thought’ and ‘judgment’ are equivalent. Consider, e.g., the following passage from §22 of the *Prolegomena*: „Denken [...] ist Vorstellungen in einem Bewußtsein vereinigen. [...] Die Vereinigung der Vorstellungen in einem Bewußtsein ist das Urtheil. Also ist Denken so viel, als Urtheilen [...]“ (To think [...] is to unite representations in one consciousness. [...] The unification of representations in one consciousness is judgment. Therefore, thinking amounts to judging [...]) (Ak. IV, 304).

<sup>11</sup> Notice that an empty judgment is not nothing. It is a judgment, in that it is an act of the understanding, which has both the logical form of a judgment, as well as a certain kind of content. The judgments of traditional metaphysics, which Kant discusses in the Transcendental Dialectic, serve to show this. They are paradigm cases of judgments that fail to satisfy the sensible conditions on cognition. Exactly how the kind of content an empty judgment has is to be characterized we are not in a position to say yet. I come back to this issue in Chapter Two, §3.2 (\*\*\*). For now, all we can say is that an empty judgment is an act of the understanding, which purports to, but fails to be, a cognition, where this means that the judgment purports to, but fails to be, true or false of objects.

famous *Stufenleiter*-passage referred to above (see p. 4, fn. 5), Kant speaks of intuitions and concepts as, respectively, species of cognition. But I think this remark can be read in a way that makes it compatible with the claim that, strictly speaking, only judgments count as cognition. The latter claim depends on the definition of cognition as a representation that can be true or false of objects. Clearly, only judgments are cognitions in this sense. Neither concepts nor intuitions, taken individually, are truth-evaluable.<sup>12</sup> By contrast, in the *Stufenleiter* Kant defines cognition as ‘conscious representation relating to an object’.<sup>13</sup> On this definition, both concepts and intuitions do count as cognitions, because, as will become clear in what follows, both concepts and intuitions are conscious representations relating to an object.

The charitable reading, it seems, would be to say that we have two different uses of the term ‘cognition’ in play; call them cognition in the wide sense and cognition in the narrow sense, respectively. As long as we are clear on which sense is at issue, this should not pose a serious problem. For the wide sense, on which intuitions and concepts taken individually count as cognitions, is parasitic on the narrow sense, on which only judgments can be cognitions. This is easy to see in the case of concepts. For Kant holds that a concept relates to an object just in case it can enter into judgments which are true or false. It may be harder to see that a similar point holds with regard to intuitions. However, as will emerge from my discussion in this chapter and the next, an intuition relates to an object just in case it is the possible content of a judgment, which is truth-evaluable.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> It is clear that Kant would agree with this claim. By way of evidence, consider the following two passages: At A68/B93 he says that concepts can only be used in judgment (I discuss this claim below, in §3.2). And at A293/B350 he says that the senses do not err because truth and error are only in judgment. Clearly, the implication is that intuitions cannot be true or false. Only judgments can.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. A320/B376f.

<sup>14</sup> Calling intuition a content of judgment is a kind of shorthand-talk, which I adopt for the sake of convenience. To avoid misunderstanding, the proper thing to say is that an intuition is objective just in case it is a sensible representation which gives to the mind the object of a possible judgment, where, again, the judgment must be capable of being true or false. I discuss these issues in Chapter Two.

If this is right, it becomes clear why saying that intuitions may fail to satisfy the conditions on cognition does not put intuitions on a par with judgments. A crucial asymmetry obtains between the understanding and sensibility, in that both intellectual and sensible conditions on cognition ultimately derive from the requirement that, for cognition to be possible, judgments must be truth-evaluable. While sensibility imposes a set of conditions on cognition, which are independent of the intellectual conditions in the sense that what these conditions are cannot be determined by consideration of the understanding alone, the fact that there are sensible conditions at all can be so determined. It derives from the fact that human understanding is finite.<sup>15</sup>

## 1.2 Pure General Logic vs. Transcendental Logic

A judgment, then, amounts to cognition only if it satisfies the sensible conditions on cognition. I now want to argue that since Pure General Logic does not take these conditions into account, the notion of judgment at issue in Pure General Logic is not judgment considered as a species of cognition. Since Transcendental Logic does attend to the sensible conditions, it is TL that matters for our discussion of judgment, rather than PGL.

Consider how Kant describes the defining characteristic of Pure General Logic:

Die allgemeine Logik abstrahieret [...] von allem Inhalt der Erkenntnis, d. i. von aller Beziehung derselben auf das Objekt, und betrachtet nur die logische Form im Verhältnisse der Erkenntnisse auf einander, d. i. die Form des Denkens überhaupt.

General logic abstracts [...] from all content of cognition, i.e. from all relation of it to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to one another, i.e. the form of thought in general. (A55/B79)

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<sup>15</sup> For the time being, this point must remain a mere assertion. I will support it when I discuss Kant's conception of human understanding as discursive, rather than intuitive, in Chapters Two (§2.4) and Three (§\*\*\*), below. For an excellent account of the asymmetry between intuition and judgment I am gesturing at here, see Stephen Engstrom, "Understanding and Sensibility."

So Pure General Logic is characterized by the fact that it abstracts from all content of cognition. We need to understand what this means. A possible gloss is to say that PGL is topic-neutral, where this means that it does not consider any particular subject-matter of thought; rather, it considers what is constitutive of thought about any topic at all.<sup>16</sup> But, as John McFarlane has argued, this characterization is insufficient for capturing what Kant means by abstracting from all content of cognition.<sup>17</sup> As Kant's gloss on what it is to do this – “that is, [PGL abstracts] from all relation of cognition to its object” – indicates, PGL abstracts not only from every particular subject-matter of thought, but also from the way in which thought relates to its objects. While Kant apparently takes this point to be a mere gloss on the generality of PGL, it is in fact a substantive point, which goes beyond generality, if we interpret generality along the lines of topic-neutrality. So we have to ask what exactly this point is.

Kant calls a judgment empty just in case it fails to satisfy the sensible conditions of cognition. And as the famous dictum about thoughts without content makes clear, to say that a judgment is empty is equivalent to saying that it has no content. It follows that, in this sense of ‘content,’ a judgment has content accordingly as it does, or does not, satisfy the sensible conditions of cognition. Above I said that this sense of ‘content’ is also called, by Kant, ‘content of cognition,’ where cognition is defined as a representation that purports to be true or false of objects.<sup>18</sup> Thus, if PGL abstracts from all content of cognition, it thereby abstracts from the fact

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<sup>16</sup> See also A52/B76: “[Die allgemeine Logik] enthält die schlechthin notwendigen Regeln des Denkens, ohne welche gar kein Gebrauch des Verstandes stattfindet, und geht also auf diesen, unangesehen der Verschiedenheit der Gegenstände, auf welche er gerichtet sein mag.“ ([General logic] contains the absolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which no use of the understanding takes place, and it therefore concerns these rules without regard to the difference of the objects to which it may be directed).

<sup>17</sup> See John MacFarlane, *What does it mean to say that logic is formal?*, Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pittsburgh 2000, 81-94.

<sup>18</sup> We can leave open, for now, exactly how the notion of an object needs to be understood here; whether, for instance, a state of affairs, the referent of a that-clause, qualifies as an object in this sense, or only the referents of singular terms do. What we need is a sense of ‘object’, which allows us to say that a judgment is true or false of objects. But we can be non-committal about what this requires.

that judgment-qua-cognition purports to be true or false of objects.<sup>19</sup> We can now see why Kant takes the claim that PGL abstracts from the relation of cognition to its object to be a gloss on the idea that PGL abstracts from the content of cognition. If the content of cognition is constituted by the objects it purports to be true or false of, then to abstract from this content is to abstract from what it takes for cognition to be related to objects in this way; that is, to abstract from what it takes for cognition to stand in the relation ‘true of’ (or ‘false of’) to objects.<sup>20</sup> It follows that PGL does not consider judgment as a species of cognition. More precisely, what PGL says about judgment is not sufficient for deciding whether or not a given judgment is in fact a cognition.

The suggestion that to abstract from the way in which thought relates to its object is to abstract from the sensible conditions of cognition fits well with Kant’s characterization of the function that each of the two sources of cognition serves. And it will be helpful to make this connection explicit. Kant characterizes these functions by saying that through sensibility objects are given to the mind, and through the understanding they are thought.<sup>21</sup> If we take the idea of giving objects to the mind to be about our cognitive access to objects, it becomes clear that, taken in isolation, the understanding does not have access to objects. It follows that, in the relevant sense of ‘object’ – viz. object of which we can have cognition – there are no objects of thought our access to which is not through sensibility.

In speaking of our cognitive access to objects what I have in mind is that sensibility enables us to determine how things are with the objects we judge about. Sensibility thus enables

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<sup>19</sup> There is a potential ambiguity in this use of ‘abstract.’ The claim that PGL abstracts from the content of cognition can be taken to mean that PGL is about contentful judgments, but considers these judgments without attending to their content. Or it can be taken to mean that PGL does not consider whether or not a judgment is contentful. Kant intends the latter. The rules laid out in PGL govern all thought, including empty thought.

<sup>20</sup> Some remarks from the *Jäsche-Logik* corroborate this interpretation of the terminology. Kant there equates the content of cognition with the matter of thought (§5, note 1). Thought is cognition through concepts (§1), and the matter of concepts is the object (§2). Presumably, then, by the matter of thought Kant means the objects it is about.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. A19/B33 and A50/B74; see also Introduction, p.\*\*\*

us to determine whether or not a given judgment is true.<sup>22</sup> Since the idea of an object of cognition, which is in principle unknowable, does not make sense for Kant, he holds that the capacity to be given in sensibility is constitutive of objects of cognition.<sup>23</sup> Thus, only sensible objects are objects of cognition. We can now see why abstracting from the sensible conditions of cognition amounts to abstracting from the content of cognition, where that means abstracting from whether or not a cognition has content. For a cognition to have content is for it to be true or false of sensible objects. Therefore, a judgment which purports to be about objects, but violates the sensible conditions on cognition, does not have a truth-value.<sup>24</sup> In Kant's terminology, it lacks objective validity. And to say that it lacks objective validity is to say that it lacks content. It is empty.<sup>25</sup>

In light of these considerations, I want to interpret the claim that PGL abstracts from the relation of cognition to its objects as saying that PGL does not consider whether, and under what circumstances, intellectual representations satisfy the sensible conditions on cognition. As a result, the principles of PGL apply to empty and non-empty thoughts alike. A different way of expressing this point is to say that the principles of PGL by themselves are not sufficient for

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<sup>22</sup> This is a point about the basic cognitive function of sensibility. It does not imply that we are always able to reach a verdict on the truth-value of a given judgment. We may not succeed in determining it. But this does not detract from the fact that the basic function of sensibility, in giving objects to the mind, is to enable us to determine whether our judgments are true.

<sup>23</sup> See Posy, "Immediacy and the Birth of Reference in Kant: The Case for Space," for an interesting discussion of this point.

<sup>24</sup> Two points should be noted. First, the qualification 'which purports to be about objects' is added so as to make room for analytic judgments. Since the truth of an analytic judgment depends only on the principle of contradiction, such a judgment need not conform to the sensible conditions on cognition to have a truth-value. By the same token, we should not regard analytic judgments as purporting to be about objects, precisely because their truth is independent of whether they have objective purport. In Kant's view, they express containment-relations among concepts. The second point pertains to the judgments of mathematics. Since, famously, Kant takes mathematical judgments to be synthetic a priori, my claim implies that mathematical judgments must be about sensible objects if they have a truth-value. And this is indeed Kant's view, as he makes clear in the Axioms of Intuition (A162/B202-A166/B207). Mathematical judgments, for Kant, are about the sensible form of objects, which is constituted by the pure forms of intuition, and this means that there is a sense in which they are, ultimately, about sensible objects. For helpful discussion see Daniel Sutherland, "The Point of Kant's Axioms of Intuition," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 86 (2005), 135-159.

<sup>25</sup> See e.g. A62/B87: "[...] ohne Anschauung fehlt es aller unserer Erkenntnis an Objekten, und sie bleibt alsdenn völlig leer" ([...] without intuition all of our cognition would lack objects, and remain completely empty).

determining whether a purported cognition is indeed a cognition, or whether it is defective; whether or not, in other words, it has a truth-value. It is worth emphasizing, once again, that this kind of abstraction goes beyond topic-neutrality. PGL leaves out of consideration not only which kind of object a given thought is about. It also leaves out the conditions that determine whether or not a thought is about any objects at all.

Transcendental Logic, by contrast, does not abstract from the conditions of sensibility. According to the initial characterization Kant gives of TL, its subject-matter is pure thought about objects.<sup>26</sup> For it to be about pure thought, it has to be possible, within TL, to draw the – exhaustive – distinction between pure and empirical thought. But this distinction is drawn in terms of the content of thought, and this means that it is drawn in terms of thought's relation to sensibility. As we have seen, sensibility provides the content for thought in the sense that through it the objects that thought is about are given to the mind. In the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, Kant argues that sensible intuitions come in two kinds, empirical and pure. On this distinction is based a corresponding distinction between two kinds of thought. Accordingly as the intuitions to which a thought relates are pure or empirical, the thought has pure or empirical content. This difference in content gives rise to a distinction between two species of thought, pure thought and empirical thought.<sup>27</sup> It follows that if TL is the logic of pure thought it must take into account the conditions of sensibility at least to the extent required for the relation of thought to pure intuition to come into view.

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<sup>26</sup> Cf. A55/B79f. – In what follows, I shall use 'pure thought' as shorthand for 'pure thought about objects'. The qualification is meant to indicate that we are concerned with synthetic, as opposed to analytic, judgments.

<sup>27</sup> "Weil es nun aber so wohl reine, als empirische Anschauungen gibt, (wie die transzendente Ästhetik dartut,) so könnte auch wohl ein Unterschied zwischen reinem und empirischem Denken der Gegenstände angetroffen werden" (But since there are pure as well as empirical intuitions (as the transcendental aesthetic showed), a distinction between pure and empirical thinking of objects could also well be found) (A55/B79f).

We have to ask what this entails. A representation is pure, Kant stipulates, just in case it does not contain any sensations.<sup>28</sup> Sensations are produced in the mind as a result of affection by objects. A pure intuition, then, would be a sensible representation, which is not dependent on affection by an object. I discuss the notion of pure intuition in detail in Chapter Five (\*\*\*)). For now I want to focus on the claim, which Kant seeks to establish in the Aesthetic, that pure intuition constitutes the form of empirical intuition. Again, the precise sense of form at work here will be determined later (\*\*\*)). It is clear, however, that Kant is committed to the thesis that the pure form of intuition isolates at least some of the essential properties of empirical intuition. It follows that there are no empirical intuitions which do not exhibit the properties that the pure form of intuition isolates. Because Kant recognizes two pure forms of intuition, space and time, the thesis becomes slightly more complex. But the idea should be clear: To say that the form of intuitions of inner sense is time is to say that there are no empirical intuitions which do not have temporal properties. To say that the form of outer sense is space is to say that there are no empirical intuitions of outer sense which do not have spatial properties.<sup>29</sup> I will also sometimes express the general point by saying that there are no empirical intuitions which do not exhibit the formal properties of intuition.

Since objects are given to the mind through empirical intuition, considerations concerning the form of intuition can support conclusions about the conditions that have to be

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<sup>28</sup> “Ich nenne alle Vorstellungen *rein* [...], in denen nichts, was zur Empfindung gehört, angetroffen wird” (I term all representations *pure* [...], in which nothing is to be encountered that belongs to sensation) (A20/B34). – There is more to say about exactly what Kant means by ‘pure,’ in particular about how purity differs from apriority. But for present purposes we don’t need to go into these questions. A book-length treatment of the topic is provided by Konrad Cramer, *Nicht-reine synthetische Urteile a priori: Ein Problem der Transzendentalphilosophie Immanuel Kants*, Heidelberg: Winter 1985.

<sup>29</sup> As the case of space makes clear, talk of intuitions here should be taken as being, not about the representations, but about their contents, or intentional objects: The intuition of a house represents its object as having a certain shape and size. The intuition qua act of representing does not have spatial properties. In the case of time, of course, matters are different, in that it is not just the object of the representation, but the act of representing itself, that is in time.

satisfied for objects to be given to the mind. In this sense, attention to the form of intuition yields information about the sensible conditions on cognition. This implies that, because pure thought is thought whose matter is constituted by pure intuition, pure thought is, among other things, thought about the conditions under which objects can be given to the mind. Or, to put it differently, pure thought concerns the conditions that govern our access to objects. Pure thought, therefore, is thought about all possible objects, or, as Kant likes to put it, about an object in general. In virtue of having pure intuition as its matter, then, pure thought concerns not a particular kind of sensible object, but all possible sensible objects without distinction.

At the same time, Transcendental Logic is still a logic, not an aesthetic.<sup>30</sup> It is primarily concerned with conditions of thought. While it takes into account the sensible conditions on cognition, these conditions are not an object of investigation in their own right within TL. A brief look at the Transcendental Aesthetic serves to clarify the point. The task of a transcendental doctrine of sensibility is to identify the sensible conditions on cognition. Accordingly, the Transcendental Aesthetic provides arguments for the thesis that space and time constitute these conditions. By contrast, the Transcendental Logic takes this thesis for granted. It treats of sensibility only to the extent that it takes the results of the Aesthetic into consideration. As a logic, its primary concern is with the intellectual conditions on cognition. But because it is a logic of pure thought, hence thought that does not abstract from all content, TL considers these intellectual conditions under two side-constraints: (i) there is also an independent set of sensible conditions on cognition; and (ii) the sensible conditions are the ones identified in the Transcendental Aesthetic, that is, the pure forms of space and time. The guiding question of TL,

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<sup>30</sup> Cf. the regimentation of the terminology at the opening of the Transcendental Logic: “Daher unterscheiden wir die Wissenschaft der Regeln der Sinnlichkeit überhaupt, d. i. Ästhetik, von der Wissenschaft der Verstandesregeln überhaupt, d. i. der Logik“ (Hence we distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility in general, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the rules of understanding in general, i.e., logic) (A52/B76).

then, can be put like this: What are the intellectual conditions on cognition, and what does it take to satisfy them, *given that there is an independent set of sensible conditions, which must also be satisfied?*

To be concerned with the intellectual conditions of cognition is to investigate what it is to think objects.<sup>31</sup> But because it takes into account that there are sensible conditions, as well, TL also attends to the question of how the thought of an object relates to the conditions of the object's being given. TL thus considers the relation of understanding to sensibility. Another way of putting this point is by saying that TL considers how thought relates to its object. This brings us back to Kant's official characterization of TL, in terms of its contrast with PGL. Unlike PGL, TL does not "abstract from all relation [of cognition] to its object" (A55/B79). Because it takes into account the sensible conditions on cognition, it considers the way in which thought relates to its object. And this means that it considers the conditions under which thought is objectively valid. Unlike PGL, therefore, it considers thought as a species of cognition, that is, as something that can be true or false of objects. In a nutshell, then, Transcendental Logic is concerned with the conditions that have to be satisfied for object-directed thought to be truth-evaluable.<sup>32</sup>

Thought, for Kant, takes the form of judgments.<sup>33</sup> TL thus is concerned with judgment considered as a species of cognition. Qua cognition, a judgment is truth-evaluable, and as we have seen, this means that it satisfies, or at least purports to satisfy, the sensible conditions of cognition. To satisfy these conditions, a judgment must be related, in the right way, to intuition.

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. e.g. A62/B87: „[Die Transzendente Analytik enthält] die Prinzipien, ohne welche überall kein Gegenstand gedacht werden kann [...]“ ([The Transcendental Analytic contains] the principles, without which no object can be thought at all).

<sup>32</sup> Again, the qualification 'object-directed' is meant to indicate that the primary concern of TL is with synthetic judgments. Analytic judgments are of only secondary interest. – For an account of TL along similar lines see Prauss, "Zum Wahrheitsproblem bei Kant."

<sup>33</sup> It is worth noting that this statement subsumes inference, because Kant regards inference as a species of judgment; see A307/B364 and A330/B386.

Therefore, being related to intuition is constitutive of judgment, in the sense of ‘judgment’ under consideration in Transcendental Logic.

## 2. Proto-Fregeanism

In the preceding section I discussed Kant’s distinction between Pure General and Transcendental Logic, and argued that the latter does, while the former does not, treat judgment as a species of cognition. I argued, further, that consideration of Kant’s conception of Transcendental Logic shows that for judgment to be a species of cognition, judgment must bear a relation to intuition. I expressed this point by saying that bearing a relation to intuition is constitutive of judgment as considered in Transcendental Logic. For the remainder of this chapter, the task is to investigate the nature of this relation. I shall discuss in some detail two versions of a widely held view of this relation, and argue that it fails. Seeing why it fails will be instructive, because it allows us to gain a deeper understanding of Kant’s conception of judgment. Once this conception of judgment is in place, we will be in a position to get the relation judgment bears to intuition properly into view. Developing what I take to be the correct view of this relation, however, will be the task of Chapter Two.

To say that judgment is constitutively related to intuition is not yet to specify what the nature of this relation is. I want to approach this question by discussing a family of views, according to which intuition is a component of judgment. Intuition is a component of judgment, in the sense I am interested in, just in case it is essentially a subject of predication.<sup>34</sup> The rationale for regimenting the terminology in this way is as follows. A natural way to divide a

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<sup>34</sup> I include the qualification ‘essentially’ so as to make room for the fact that any intuition can be made the subject of a predication in a judgment of inner sense. Thus, if I have an intuition of a house, I could, by turning my mental gaze inward, make judgments about this intuition, such as, for instance, the judgment that the intuition lasted a certain time, or that it had a certain feel to it. That an intuition can figure as subjects of predication in judgments of this kind is accidental to it, as far as my the issue under discussion in this chapter is concerned.

judgment into its components is to distinguish between the predicate, and that which the predicate is predicated of.<sup>35</sup> Accordingly, if intuition is a component of judgment, it functions either as a predicate or as a subject of predication. Since the former is clearly ruled out – for one thing, a predicate must be a general representation, and, as we shall see, intuition is singular – to conceive of intuition as a component of judgment is to conceive of it as a subject of predication.

Call any view that construes intuition as a component of judgment in this sense a Component View of intuition. Among Component Views, it will be useful to distinguish what I want to call Simple and Complex Component Views, respectively. On a Simple Component View, a judgment is to be analyzed, in the basic case, as having as its subject of predication an intuition, and nothing else. By contrast, on a Complex Component View intuition is a subject of predication in a less direct manner. One way to characterize a view of this kind is by saying that the predicate of the judgment is ascribed, not to an intuition, but to an intuition-concept-compound. How one might work this out in detail need not concern us for now.

I shall discuss the Complex Component View in §4, below. In §§2 and 3 my focus will be on the Simple Component View. Simple Component Views regard intuitions as playing a role analogous to that of singular terms. This treatment of intuitions takes as its natural complement a conception of concepts as analogous to open sentences. A view that conceives of intuitions and concepts along these lines makes Kant something of a forerunner to Frege, because this conception is clearly informed by Frege's treatment of concepts as functions. For this reason, I will call advocates of the Simple Component View proto-Fregeans, and refer to a view of this kind as 'proto-Fregeanism.'

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<sup>35</sup> Talk of a judgment's predicate is to be taken in the sense in which the term is used in traditional Aristotelian logic; see the discussion below, in §2.2.

## 2.1 Motivation

Perhaps the clearest expression of the proto-Fregean view of intuitions is given by Robert Howell who explicitly says that “intuitions are analogues of singular terms.”<sup>36</sup> But he is by no means the only adherent of this view. I single him out just because he expresses it so unequivocally. The view is also held by such prominent commentators as Beck, Hintikka, Prauss, Sellars, and Strawson.<sup>37</sup>

Before I consider the motivation for ascribing the proto-Fregean view of intuitions to Kant, let me add one clarificatory remark. If intuition is a singular representation, then a judgment in which an intuition figures as a component will be a singular judgment. But clearly not all judgments are singular judgments. It may seem, therefore, that proto-Fregeanism cannot be a view of the relation that judgment bears to intuition generally, but rather only a view about a special class of judgments, viz. singular judgments. But to say this is to misconstrue the nature of the view. Adherents of proto-Fregeanism typically take singular judgment to be the fundamental case, and then account for judgments of different quantity in terms of operations on the fundamental case. The view is thus intended to cover judgment in general, and this is how I shall treat it. A proto-Fregean view of the relation between judgment and intuition, then, is partly characterized by the fact that it takes singular judgment as the fundamental case of judgment, in terms of which all other cases are to be understood.

There are at least three considerations that might be thought to recommend a proto-Fregean view. The first derives from what Kant says in the first section of the *Leitfaden der Entdeckung aller reinen Verstandesbegriffe* (for short, *Leitfaden I*). He there characterizes

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<sup>36</sup> Robert Howell, “Intuition, Synthesis, and Individuation in the CPR,” *Nous* 7 (1973), 207-232, at 216.

<sup>37</sup> See Beck, “Did the Sage of Königsberg Have No Dreams?”; Hintikka, “Kant on the Mathematical Method” and “On Kant’s Notion of Intuition (Anschauung)”; Prauss, *Erscheinung bei Kant*, 41-45 and 48-53; Sellars, “The Role of the Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Experience” and “Sensibility and Understanding”; Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, 74-85. See also Rainer Stuhlmann-Laeisz, *Kants Logik*, 77-81.

intuitions and concepts in terms of the way in which each kind of representation relates to objects. Concepts, he says, relate to objects mediately, while intuitions relate to objects immediately.<sup>38</sup> If ‘mediate relation to objects’ means that a concept relates directly, not to an object, but to another representation of the object, which in turn relates to the object directly, then a concept must be immediately related to an intuition. The thesis, which is also stated in *Leitfaden I*, that concepts are predicates of possible judgments, may be taken to provide a natural specification of this relation: In a judgment, at least in the basic case, a concept is predicated of an intuition. Thus, concepts relate to objects mediately, because they relate to objects in virtue of being predicated of intuitions.

Here is a brief account of how this reading might seem to fit the text. Kant says:

Denken ist das Erkenntnis durch Begriffe. Begriffe aber beziehen sich, als Prädikate möglicher Urteile, auf irgend eine Vorstellung von einem noch unbestimmten Gegenstande. So bedeutet der Begriff des Körpers etwas, z. B. Metall, was durch jenen Begriff erkannt werden kann. Er ist also nur dadurch Begriff, daß unter ihm andere Vorstellungen enthalten sind, vermitteltst deren er sich auf Gegenstände beziehen kann.

Thought is cognition through concepts. Concepts, however, as predicates of possible judgments, relate to some representation of an as yet undetermined object. Thus the concept of body signifies something, for instance, metal, which can be cognized by means of that concept. It is therefore a concept solely because other representations are contained under it by means of which it can be related to objects. (A69/B94)

The characterization ‘some representation of an as yet undetermined object,’ in the second sentence, seems to fit intuition. In at least one of its uses, the term ‘determination’ is used by Kant to refer to the act of making explicit what properties a given object has, and this is done by bringing the object under concepts in judgment. On this conception of determination, an

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<sup>38</sup> “Da keine Vorstellung unmittelbar auf den Gegenstand geht, als bloß die Anschauung, so wird ein Begriff niemals auf einen Gegenstand unmittelbar, sondern auf irgend eine andre Vorstellung von demselben (sie sei Anschauung oder selbst schon Begriff) bezogen” (Since no representation relates to the object immediately except intuition, a concept is never immediately related to an object, but is always related to some other representation of it (whether it be an intuition or itself already a concept)) (A68/B93).

intuition, taken by itself, represents its object as undetermined.<sup>39</sup> We should note, however, that saying this is meant to be neutral with respect to the question whether intuitions ever represent objects outside the context of judgment, that is, whether it is possible to have occurrent episodes describable as mere intuitions, intuitions without any conceptual determination. For all we know, Kant may be drawing a “distinction of reason” here, not a “real distinction.”

If we interpret Kant’s example in the quoted passage as saying that the expression ‘(this piece of) metal’ refers to the object that is given in intuition, to which the predicate ‘x is a body’ is then ascribed, the judgment subsumes the representation of the piece of metal under the concept ‘body.’ When Kant says, in the next sentence, that ‘body’ is a concept only in virtue of having “other representations” contained under it, he is presumably referring to intuitions of bodies, of which the intuition of this piece of metal is an instance. That the concept’s relation to its objects is mediated by these other representations – they are that “by means of which it [i.e. the concept] can be related to objects” – fits with the characterization of intuition as immediate representation, by way of relating to which mediate representations, i.e. concepts, relate to objects.

The second reason why intuitions may be thought to be analogues of singular terms rests on Kant’s characterization of intuition as the singular representation of an object. In the *Jäsche-Logik* this characterization is expressed as follows:

Alle Erkenntnisse, das heißt: alle mit Bewußtsein auf ein Objekt bezogene Vorstellungen sind entweder *Anschauungen* oder *Begriffe*. – Die Anschauung ist eine *einzelne* Vorstellung (repraesentat. singularis), der Begriff eine *allgemeine* (repraesentat. per notas communes) oder *reflektierte* Vorstellung (repraesentat. discursiva).

All cognitions, that is, all representations which are consciously related to an object are either *intuitions* or *concepts*. – An intuition is a *singular* representation (repraesentatio

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<sup>39</sup> The following passage from A20/B34 may be taken to support this claim: “The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called *appearance*” (Der unbestimmte Gegenstand einer empirischen Anschauung, heißt *Erscheinung*).

singularis), a concept is a *general* (repraesentatio per notas communes) or *reflected* representation (repraesentatio discursiva). (Ak. IX, 91)<sup>40</sup>

Intuition is introduced here as a species of cognition, on the same footing with concepts. Both intuitions and concepts are cognitions insofar as both purport to be of objects.<sup>41</sup> Now, as Kant makes clear in *Leitfaden I*, concepts can only be used in judgment.<sup>42</sup> It follows that concepts relate to objects only insofar as they enter into judgments. But, as we just saw, a concept does not relate to objects immediately, but by way, ultimately, of intuitions. In light of the fact that intuitions are singular it seems natural to see judgment as the place where intuitions and concepts make contact: A concept relates to objects by way of intuition, because a concept is a general representation, which is predicated of a singular representation, which in turn is immediately related to an object. And predication is clearly tied to judgment. In sum, since intuitions are singular and immediate, they are tailor-made to play a role in judgment analogous to that of a singular term.

The third consideration advocates of proto-Fregeanism can appeal to concerns the fact that Kant does not recognize the existence of an *infima species*. If we think of concepts as arranged in a Porphyrian tree of genus-species relationships, the tree terminates, at one end, in one or more concepts of the highest possible degree of generality (the *summum genus*). At the other end, it would bottom out in *infimae species*, that is, in concepts of the lowest possible degree of generality. The idea of an *infima species* is the idea of a concept such that only

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<sup>40</sup> The *Stufenleiter* makes essentially the same point; see A320/B376f. I am quoting from the *Logik* instead merely for stylistic reasons.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. the discussion above, in §1.1.

<sup>42</sup> “Von diesen Begriffen kann nun der Verstand keinen andern Gebrauch machen, als daß er dadurch urteilt” (Now, of these concepts the understanding can make no other use than to judge by means of them) (A68/B93). – From a post-Fregean perspective, this may seem to be a truism. But the tradition leading up to Kant held that there is a self-standing species of concept-use – called *apprehensio simplex*, or the conceiving of an idea (concept) – in which one represents an object (or objects) by having the concept before one’s mind, independently of connecting it with other concepts in judgment. A classic source of this view is Arnauld/Nicole, *Logic or the Art of Thinking* (the so-called *Port-Royal Logic*).

individuals fall under it. It cannot be divided into further species. But Kant holds that there is no such thing as an *infima species*. For every candidate concept, it is always possible, at least in principle, to identify further differentiating characteristics, such that there is specific, as opposed to merely numerical, difference among the items falling under the concept.<sup>43</sup> While we may not manage, or even feel the need, to come up with such differentiating characteristics in practice, and thus *de facto* treat certain concepts as *infimae species*, it is always possible in principle to do so.<sup>44</sup>

The concept of an *infima species* would be such that, in Kant's terminology, no further conceptual determination could be added to it. But this means that it would be completely determinate. However, Kant holds that only individuals are completely determinate. The idea of a completely determinate concept is thus the idea of a complete individual concept, along Leibnizian lines.<sup>45</sup> Since Kant denies the possibility of such concepts, he holds that it is impossible for us to have purely discursive, that is, conceptual, representations of individuals. But since we do represent individuals, there must be another, non-discursive mode of representing them. Intuition is the obvious candidate.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> My talk of numerical difference is here is not meant to rule out the possibility of qualitative differences among the individuals belonging to an *infima species*. What matters is that there can be no *specific* difference among them, that is, no difference which would warrant the attribution of different *essential* properties to these individuals. But sameness of essential properties is clearly compatible with difference in accidental properties.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. A655f/B683f; also *Logik*, §11.

<sup>45</sup> For Leibniz's notion of a complete individual concept see e.g. *Discourse on Metaphysics*, §8. A succinct presentation of the connection between Kant's denial of the existence of *infimae species*, Leibnizian complete concepts, and Kantian intuition is given by Carl Posy, "Immediacy and the Birth of Reference in Kant: The Case for Space."

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *Logik*, note to §15: "Da nur einzelne Dinge oder Individuen durchgängig bestimmt sind: so kann es auch nur durchgängig bestimmte Erkenntnisse als *Anschauungen*, nicht aber als *Begriffe*, geben; in Ansehung der letzteren kann die logische Bestimmung nie als vollendet angesehen werden" (Since only particular things, or individuals, are thoroughly determined, there can be thoroughly determined cognitions only as *intuitions*, but not as *concepts*; with regard to the latter, their logical determination can never be considered complete) (Ak. IX, 99); cf. also Kant's rejection of the traditional division of concepts into singular, particular, and universal concepts in *Logik*, §1, which I discuss below, in §2.2.

These three considerations appear to support the view that concepts relate to intuitions by being predicated of them in judgment. On this view, the logical form of an atomic judgment for Kant is ‘*Fa*,’ where ‘*F*’ stands for a concept, and ‘*a*’ for an intuition. Intuition thus appears to have a role analogous to that of a singular term.

## 2.2 Objections

There are several objections to the proto-Fregean view, beginning with some direct textual evidence. In a number of places Kant speaks of judgment as a relation between concepts, and this is clearly incompatible with the proto-Fregean account. Thus, consider two of the comments Kant appends to the Table of Judgments in *Leitfaden II*. The first comment pertains to the forms of quantity and Kant’s claim that under this heading one must distinguish the three forms of universal, particular, and singular judgment. He says:

Die Logiker sagen mit Recht, daß man beim Gebrauch der Urteile in Vernunftschlüssen die einzelnen Urteile gleich den allgemeinen behandeln könne. Denn eben darum, weil sie gar keinen Umfang haben, kann das Prädikat derselben nicht bloß auf einiges dessen, was unter *dem Begriff des Subjekts* enthalten ist, gezogen, von einigem aber ausgenommen werden. Es gilt also *von jenem Begriffe* ohne Ausnahme, gleich als wenn derselbe ein gemeingültiger Begriff wäre, der einen Umfang hätte, von dessen ganzer Bedeutung das Prädikat gelte.

Logicians are justified in saying that, in the employment of judgments in inferences of reason, singular judgments can be treated like universal ones. For, since they have no extension at all, their predicate cannot relate only to some of what is contained under *the subject-concept*, and be excluded from the rest. The predicate is thus valid of *that concept* without exception, just as if it was a general concept having an extension, to the whole of which the predicate applied. (A71/B96, my emphases)

What is notable here is that Kant is talking specifically about singular judgment, and saying of it that it contains a concept in the subject-position. For the proto-Fregean view singular judgment is the basic case, in terms of which other forms of judgment must be understood.

Evidence suggesting that the proto-Fregean analysis does not apply specifically to this case is thus particularly salient.

The second comment regards the forms of relation, the third class on Kant's table, which comprises the forms of categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgment. Kant's characterization of the categorical form as concerning the relation of the predicate to the subject makes it clear that he thinks of both of these components as concepts:

Alle Verhältnisse des Denkens in Urteilen sind die a) des Prädikats zum Subjekts, b) des Grundes zur Folge, c) der eingeteilten Erkenntnis und der gesammelten Glieder der Einteilung untereinander. In der ersteren Art der Urteile sind nur *zwei Begriffe* [...].

All relations of thought in judgments are those of (a) predicate to subject, (b) ground to consequence, and (c) the divided cognition and the members of the division, taken jointly, to one another. In the first kind of judgment there are only *two concepts* [...]. (A73/B98, my emphasis)

Again, the passage indicates that Kant thinks of a categorical judgment as containing two terms, the subject and the predicate, and that both of these are concepts. There is no suggestion that he is open to the proto-Fregean idea that, at least in the basic case, the subject is an intuition.<sup>47</sup>

Given the historical context in which Kant is writing, this should not come as a surprise.

The logic Kant inherits is essentially the traditional logic of terms, which ultimately goes back to

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<sup>47</sup> Compare also the following passages: "In jedem Urteile sind [...] *zwei Prädikate*, die wir mit einander vergleichen. Davon das eine, welches die gegebene Erkenntnis des Gegenstandes ausmacht, das logische Subjekt, das zweite, welches damit verglichen wird, das logische Prädikat heißt." (In every judgment there are [...] *two predicates*, which we compare with one another. Of these, the one, which constitutes the given cognition of the object, is the logical subject; the second one, which is compared with the first, is called the logical predicate) (R4634, ca. 1772-76, Ak. XVII, 616, my emphasis); it is clear that by a 'predicate' Kant here means a general representation, that is, a concept.

"Im allgemeinen Urteile wird die Sphäre eines Begriffs ganz innerhalb der Sphäre eines andern beschlossen; im partikularen wird ein Teil des erstern unter die Sphäre des andern; und im einzelnen Urteile endlich wird *ein Begriff*, der gar keine Sphäre hat, mit hin bloß als Teil unter die Sphäre eines andern beschossen" (In a universal judgment the sphere of one concept is wholly included in the sphere of another; in a particular judgment a part of the former is included in the sphere of the latter; and, finally, in a singular judgment *a concept*, which has no sphere at all, is included as a mere part in the sphere of another) (*Logik*, §21, my emphasis). In the note attached this section of the *Jäsche-Logik*, the judgment 'Caius is mortal' is given as an example of a singular judgment. In light of the preceding comment this suggests that Kant regards the proper name as expressing a *concept* without a "sphere."

Aristotle. The conception of judgment on which this logic is based is fundamentally at odds with the Fregean analysis of judgment in terms of function and argument, which proto-Fregeans think is anticipated by Kant's distinction between concepts and intuitions.<sup>48</sup> Let me elaborate.<sup>49</sup>

The traditional conception of judgment, call it the Two Term Model, has its home in a theory of syllogistic inference, and can be characterized by three tenets, each of which serves to mark the gulf that separates it from a Fregean conception of judgment.<sup>50</sup> It might be helpful to begin with an example. Consider the syllogism 'All men are mortal,' 'Socrates is a man,' 'Therefore, Socrates is mortal.' According to the Two Term Model, the inference is valid because the conclusion makes explicit a connection between the two terms it comprises, which is already implicit in the premises. But in the premises this connection is mediated by what is called the middle term. Using the letters 'M' for the middle term, 'S' for the subject of the conclusion, and 'P' for the predicate of the conclusion, we can give the following schematic rendering of the inference: 'All M are P,' 'S is an M,' 'Therefore, S is P.' The schematic rendering makes visible the fact that, if the inference is interpreted as depending on the relation each of S and P bear to M, M must occur in the subject-position of one premise, and in the predicate-position of the other premise. In a modern idiom, the validity of the syllogism depends on the principle that there is an asymmetrical and transitive two-place relation  $R$  such that S bears  $R$  to P because S bears  $R$  to M, and M bears  $R$  to P.

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<sup>48</sup> In speaking of Frege's analysis of judgment, I am not using the term 'judgment' in Frege's technical sense, in which it refers to the taking-as-true, or asserting, of a thought-content. Frege's distinction between force and content, which is reflected in his terminological distinction between a thought (*Gedanke*) and its affirmation in judgment (*Urteil*), has no bearing on the point I am concerned to make. My use of 'judgment,' therefore, is intended to be indifferent to it. See Frege, "Der Gedanke," for the distinction.

<sup>49</sup> A clear and concise account of the issue, to which my presentation is indebted, can be found in Peter Geach, "History of the Corruptions of Logic," in his *Logic Matters*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1972, 44-61. For helpful discussion see also Ernst Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik*, Darmstadt: WBG 1994 (originally published in 1910), 3-34.

<sup>50</sup> For ease of exposition, I will ignore, in the following, the difference between a judgment and its linguistic expression. I will thus speak of a term as if it was the component of a judgments, rather than its linguistic expression. But nothing depends on this.

This principle, in fact, holds for all valid syllogisms, no matter which of the traditional A-, E-, I, or O-forms their component judgments exhibit.<sup>51</sup> On this conception of syllogistic inference, therefore, it is essential that the terms making up the component judgments are indifferent to their positions in a judgment. One and the same term must be able to occupy the subject position in one judgment, and the predicate position in another.<sup>52</sup> This is the first of the three characteristics of the Two Term Model.

It directly implies the second characteristic, which is that no term of a judgment is essentially predicative. A term may function as the predicate of a judgment, but this is not constitutive of it as the term it is. If this is so, then no term of a judgment is essentially such that its only function is to be predicated of something else. No term of a judgment, therefore, can be conceived as being essentially what Frege would call unsaturated.

This leads us to the third characteristic. On the Two Term Model predication is understood as the attachment, by means of the copula, of one term to another, both of which belong to the same logical category. There is no logical space here for a function-argument analysis along Fregean lines, according to which the copula has no logically significant role to play. On the contrary, because the Two Term Model does not permit essentially predicative terms, it must appeal to some third element, whose logical function is precisely to connect one term to the other, and thus to generate the unity of a judgment. This is the copula.

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<sup>51</sup> Compare Kant's formulation of the principle governing what is traditionally considered to be syllogistic inference, and is called 'categorical syllogism' by Kant, at *Logik*, §63: "What pertains to the mark of a thing also pertains to the thing itself; what contradicts the mark of a thing also contradicts the thing itself (*nota notae est nota rei ipsius; repugnans notae, repugnat rei ipsi*)" (Ak. IX, 123). If we translate this into the terminology used above, what Kant here calls the "mark of a thing" is the *terminus medius*, the "thing" in question is the subject of the conclusion, and the "*nota notae*" is the predicate of the conclusion. Again, then, the idea is that S has *R* to P, because S has *R* to M, and M has *R* to P. If *R* is asymmetrical, it follows that M must fill the first argument-place of *R* in one premise, and the second argument-place in the other premise.

<sup>52</sup> Geach calls this "Aristotle's thesis of interchangeability" ("History of the Corruptions of Logic," 47).

With regard to these three characteristics, contrast a Fregean conception of judgment and inference. First, on such a conception, the validity of syllogistic inference depends on truth-functions and first-order quantification theory. It is not seen as in any way dependent on the position of the terms in the linguistic expression of the judgment. Second, every atomic judgment is composed of one element which is essentially predicative – what Frege calls a concept – and at least one element which is essentially non-predicative – what Frege calls an object and whose linguistic expression is a name. This, of course, is a manifestation of Frege’s construal of concepts in terms of the mathematical notion of a function and its arguments.<sup>53</sup> Third, predication does not require some third item, such as the copula, whose function is to connect the predicate with what it is predicated of. Rather, the components of a judgment are conceived as being logically heterogeneous, with one component being essentially unsaturated, the other being essentially saturated. The details of this conception are well-known, and there is no need to spell them out further here.<sup>54</sup>

The comparison of the Fregean conception of judgment with the Two Term Model shows that if Kant does in fact hold a version of the Two Term Model, it is not at all surprising that the proto-Fregean view of intuitions is false. The reason is that the proto-Fregean view of intuitions

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<sup>53</sup> Cf. Frege, “Function and Concept.” – For the purposes of this discussion, we can abstract from the complications that arise from the fact that Frege also recognizes second-level concepts, that is, functions whose arguments are, not objects, but first-level concepts. What matters is the basic idea of a function-argument analysis.

<sup>54</sup> We should, however, note the following point, at least in passing. Because Frege construes concepts as functions, he has at his disposal a criterion for what it is for an expression to be used predicatively, which is independent of what the Two Term Model regards as the subject- and predicate-positions, respectively, of a judgment, and which, by Frege’s lights, reflect a merely grammatical distinction. For the Two Term Model, talk of the logical subject and the logical predicate of a judgment is irreducibly tied to the position of the relevant terms in a sentence, hence to what Frege would regard as merely grammatical criteria. Because Frege has a different account of what predication consists in, he can find predication in places where there is, grammatically speaking, no predicate. An example will help to make the point clear. Consider the judgment ‘All whales are mammals’. On the Two Term Model, this is an instance of the form ‘All S are P’. Accordingly, the term ‘whale’ is not used predicatively; only ‘mammal’ is. Contrast a Fregean analysis, on which the judgment is an instance of the form ‘ $\forall x(\Phi x \supset \Psi x)$ ’. On such a construal, both ‘x is a whale’ and ‘x is a mammal’ are concept-expressions, which occur in the judgment. Since concept-expressions are by nature predicative, both are used predicatively in the judgment, although only one of them functions as the grammatical predicate.

is premised on the Fregean conception of judgment, some version of which the proto-Fregean is committed to ascribing to Kant. But the Fregean conception of judgment is incompatible with the Two Term Model. Thus, if Kant is committed to the Two Term Model of judgment, proto-Fregeanism about intuitions cannot possibly be true.

At this point the proto-Fregean is likely to protest that there are strong indications in Kant that he does not hold the Two Term Model, but rather some, admittedly not fully worked out, version of the Fregean conception. For instance, Kant famously speaks of concepts as predicates of possible judgments (cf. A69/B94), and this seems to suggest that for him, like Frege, concepts are essentially predicative. My response to this objection is that this reading of the passage is not at all compulsory. But I will not be in a position to show this until I present a detailed reading of *Leitfaden I*, where the passage occurs, in §3, below. For now, what I would like to do is to marshal one additional bit of evidence to show that Kant is committed to the Two Term Model.

In the Early Modern period, the Two Term Model was usually spelled out by saying that a judgment is, or involves, a “comparison” of “ideas.”<sup>55</sup> The subject- and predicate-term of a proposition each stand for an idea. To judge is to compare these ideas with regard to their “identity” or “difference,” as well as their “agreement” or “opposition.” Comparison along these dimensions then accounts for the four forms of the square of oppositions; that is, precisely those logical forms that figure in the traditional interpretation of syllogistic inference. If the two ideas are “identical,” where this means that the predicate-concept is true of everything the subject-concept refers to, the judgment is universal; if they are “different”, the judgment is particular.

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<sup>55</sup> A classic statement of this version of the Model is found in the so-called Port-Royal Logic, the 17<sup>th</sup>-century logic textbook written by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole. See Arnauld/Nicole, *Logic or the Art of Thinking*, transl. and ed. by Jill Vance Buroker, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge UP 1996, 82: “After conceiving things by our ideas, we compare these ideas and, finding that some belong together and others do not, we unite or separate them. This is called *affirming* or *denying*, and in general *judging*.”

With regard to quality, the “agreement” of two ideas yields an affirmative judgment, while their “opposition” results in a negative judgment.

The terms I am using here to label the dimensions along which ideas are compared – ‘identity vs. difference’ and ‘agreement vs. opposition’ – are Kant’s own.<sup>56</sup> In the chapter on the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection he explains that the act of judging involves a comparison of concepts along these lines.<sup>57</sup> As his interests in this chapter lie elsewhere, the point is not worked out in any detail. But it is sufficient to show Kant’s allegiance to the Two Term Model of judgment, as contrasted with the Fregean model. To begin with, Kant explicitly says that what is compared are two concepts.<sup>58</sup> This point alone already goes to show that he does not conceive of the fundamental structure of judgment as one of function and argument. Furthermore, the claim that judging essentially involves a comparison of representations is completely traditional. And while the tradition accepts the possibility of comparing a singular representation with a general representation, this is only a special case. It is not essential to the conception itself, and thus does not constitute the fundamental case of judgment. Finally, the particular “concepts of comparison” (A262/B318) Kant lists are geared towards the four forms of the square of oppositions. Again, this shows that singular judgment cannot be the basic case. After all, as far as the square of oppositions is concerned, singular judgment is treated as

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<sup>56</sup> They are not, however, original with Kant. See Gabriel Nuchelmans, *Judgment and Proposition: From Descartes to Kant*, Amsterdam: North-Holland 1983, for an overview of Early Modern conceptions of judgment and the comparison of ideas. What is original with Kant, of course, is his grouping of the concepts of reflection in accordance with the four classes of the Table of Judgments. For discussion see Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 131-166.

<sup>57</sup> “Vor allen objektiven Urteilen vergleichen wie *die Begriffe*, um auf die Einerleiheit [...] zum Behuf der allgemeinen Urteile, oder die Verschiedenheit derselben, zur Erzeugung besonderer, auf die Einstimmung, daraus bejahende, und den Widerstreit, daraus verneinende Urteile werden können, usw., zu kommen” (Prior to all objective judgments we compare *the concepts*, with regard to identity [...] for the sake of universal judgments, or their difference, for the generation of particular ones, with regard to agreement, for affirmative judgments, or opposition, for negative ones etc.) (A262/B317f, my emphasis). – For an interesting disagreement over the significance of the ‘etc.’ see Klaus Reich, *Die Vollständigkeit der Kantischen Urteilstafel*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., Hamburg: Meiner 1986, 80-83 and Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, Princeton: Princeton UP, 131-163.

<sup>58</sup> See preceding footnote.

equivalent to universal judgment.<sup>59</sup> It follows that, since intuition is defined as a singular representation, it cannot be an essential element of Kant's conception of judgment that intuition is a component of judgment.

Once we are clear about the difference between the traditional Aristotelian conception of judgment and the Fregean one, we can begin to see, I think, that the reasons I gave above, in §2.1, in support of the proto-Fregean view of intuitions seem compelling only if one is antecedently committed to reading a Fregean view of judgment into Kant. But once we are open to the possibility that Kant may hold a version of the Two Terms Model, it emerges that the considerations apparently supporting proto-Fregeanism are equally compatible with the traditional view, and, as a consequence, with a rejection of proto-Fregeanism about intuitions. In the remainder of this section, I want to demonstrate that this is so by briefly going over two of the three points I made in support of proto-Fregeanism. I shall postpone discussion of the remaining point, the first in the order of my exposition in §2.1, until later (§3.3), because this point turns on fairly complex exegetical questions pertaining to the first chapter of the *Leitfaden*, which we are not yet in a position to address.

Both points were based on Kant's characterization of intuition as the singular, immediate representation of an object, and his related characterization of concepts as general and mediate. First, since intuitions are singular representations, it seems natural, according to the proto-Fregean, to think of them as playing a role analogous to singular terms. Second, if there are no singular concepts for Kant, but if, at the same time, he recognizes the existence of singular judgments, there must be some other kind of singular representation. Again, intuition would seem to be the obvious candidate.

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<sup>59</sup> See the passage from A71/B96 quoted at the beginning of this section.

But these considerations are not conclusive. To begin with, by itself the characterization of intuition as singular does not, evidently, decide the issue. Intuitions may be singular representations without playing the role of singular terms in judgment. Kant may think of them, for instance, as pre-judgmental perceptions, whose content can be articulated in judgments, but which are not themselves components of judgment. Since perceptions are of individual objects it would still be apt to characterize this kind of representation as singular.<sup>60</sup> Absent a more detailed account of the role of intuition in Kant's epistemology, therefore, the thesis that intuition is singular does not favor proto-Fregeanism over its competitors.

Next, when Kant denies the existence of singular concepts in the *Logik*, he is careful to point out that while there are no singular concepts, there is such a thing as the singular *use* of a concept.<sup>61</sup> By their nature, concepts are general. But they can be used with different quantitative determinations. In accordance with the three quantitative forms of judgment, Kant speaks of the universal, particular, and singular use of concepts. This implies that the fact that there are no individual concepts for Kant does not force us to account for the singularity of a judgment by thinking of its subject-term as a non-conceptual representation. Whatever it is that accounts for the quantity in the use of a concept, it seems that if universal and particular judgments have a concept in the subject-position, then we should expect singular judgments to follow the same pattern. The point of Kant's remark is that differences in quantity among judgments are not

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<sup>60</sup> Taking 'object' in a wide sense, in which it may also refer to states of affairs. For the purposes of this discussion we do not need to decide whether this is Kant's preferred sense of 'object;' cf. footnote 18, above.

<sup>61</sup> "Es ist eine bloße Tautologie, von allgemeinen oder gemeinsamen Begriffen zu reden – ein Fehler, der sich auf eine unrichtige Einteilung der Begriffe in *allgemeine*, *besondere* und *einzelne* gründet. Nicht die Begriffe selbst – nur *ihr Gebrauch* kann so eingeteilt werden" (It is a mere tautology to talk about universal [general], or common concepts – a mistake, which rests on the incorrect division of concepts into *universal*, *particular* and *singular* ones. Not the concepts themselves – only *their use* can be divided up in this way) (*Logik*, §1, note 2).

accounted for by the generality, or lack thereof, of the representations that compose them, that is, the subject- and predicate-terms.<sup>62</sup>

As a result, the second and third of the three considerations I offered in favor of the proto-Fregean reading prove not to be conclusive. Neither does the first, which I discuss in the next section. Each is compatible with what I take to be Kant's version of the Two Term Model of judgment, viz. the view that judgment is a relation between two concepts. Since concepts, for Kant, are by their nature general, it has not been shown that intuitions must be conceived as components of judgment. *A fortiori*, it has not been shown that intuitions are analogues of singular terms.

### 3. Kant's Theory of Judgment in the *Leitfaden*

What I call the Unity Problem is the problem of how one and the same faculty, the understanding, can be responsible for two distinct types of act, judgment and sensible synthesis. This problem is pressing because Kant appears to define the understanding as a capacity for judgment. And it is hard to see how such a capacity can also be a capacity for sensible synthesis, which, as I argued in the Introduction, is distinct from judgment. I proposed to address this problem by arguing that Kant provides a different, and more fundamental, characterization of the understanding, which makes it possible to comprehend its unity because it allows us to understand judgment and sensible synthesis as different species of the same genus. An argument

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<sup>62</sup> This point is supported by the best account of singular judgment in Kant I know of, which is the one given by Tobias Rosefeldt, *Das logische Ich: Kant über den Gehalt des Begriffes von sich selbst*, Berlin/Wien: Philo 2000, 108-119. In a nutshell, Rosefeldt suggests that for Kant there are two ways in which a concept may be given a singular use. First, a concept may be treated by convention as if it were a singular representation and thus uniquely picked out an individual object, even though strictly speaking it is not. Second, a concept may be connected to an current intuition, that is, to a perceptual context. The thinker refers to an individual object by thinking of it as 'the F that I am currently intuiting,' where 'F' stands for the concept that is being given a singular use. For another useful discussion of the issue, equally supportive of my point, see Manley Thompson, "Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology," *Review of Metaphysics* 26 (1972), 314-343.

of this shape requires an account, first, of judgment; second, of sensible synthesis; and third, of their relation. Because sensible synthesis concerns intuition, an account of the relation between judgment and sensible synthesis calls for discussion of the relation between judgment and intuition. The task of the present chapter is to lay the ground for an account of judgment, which takes into consideration its relation to intuition, and thus addresses both the first and the third of the three tasks just mentioned.

I set forth the account in Chapter Two. In the present chapter I lay the ground for it by identifying reasons for rejecting a family of views of the relation between judgment and intuition, which at the opening of §2 I identified as Component Views of intuition. Proto-Fregeanism is a prominent instance of a Component View. More specifically, proto-Fregeanism constitutes what I call the Simple Component View, to be distinguished from the Complex Component View, which will be discussed in §4 below.

In the preceding section we saw that two of the three considerations advanced in support of proto-Fregeanism are inconclusive. I also gave reasons for thinking that Kant's conception of judgment is informed by the traditional logic of terms and is therefore fundamentally at odds with the Fregean conception of judgment that is part and parcel of the proto-Fregean view. Specifically, we saw that Kant thinks of judgment paradigmatically as a relation among two concepts; and that this is incompatible with a Fregean function-argument conception.

In the following I shall provide further support for this contention by giving a close reading of *Leitfaden I*, which contains, in very condensed form, a statement of Kant's theory of judgment.<sup>63</sup> This puts me in a position to address head-on the remaining consideration apparently favoring proto-Fregeanism, which appealed to some of the passages from *Leitfaden I* to be

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<sup>63</sup> A complete account of Kant's theory of judgment would have to address §19 of the B-Deduction, where Kant explains what makes judgment objectively valid. But this issue is not directly relevant to our present concerns. I discuss §19 in Chapter Four.

discussed now.<sup>64</sup> By showing that, in fact, these passages do not provide any support to proto-Fregeanism I conclude my discussion of this view.

Besides supporting my case against proto-Fregeanism, giving a detailed interpretation of *Leitfaden I* serves two additional purposes. First, the Judgment Thesis, that is, the seeming definition of the understanding as a capacity to judge, is stated, and argued for, in this part of the text. Since Kant's apparent commitment to this thesis is part of what makes the Unity Problem urgent, taking a close look at it will also contribute to my solution of the Unity Problem. Second, getting a grip on the rather dense statement of his theory of judgment, which Kant gives in *Leitfaden I*, will prepare the ground for developing a positive account of the relation between judgment and intuition, which is the task of Chapter Two.

The discussion of *Leitfaden I* breaks down into three parts. In §3.1 I situate the section in the context of the *Leitfaden* as a whole. This will provide the needed background for a close look at the text, which takes up the following two sections. In §3.2 I explore the relation between, on the one hand, the claim that concepts relate to objects mediately, and, on the other, the claim that concepts can only be used in judgment. In §3.3 I discuss the Judgment Thesis, the thesis that the understanding is a capacity to judge.

### 3.1 The Task of the *Leitfaden*

I want to begin by situating *Leitfaden I* in the overall context of the Transcendental Analytic. Kant's goal is to explain the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. The Analytic as a whole is divided into two parts, the Analytic of Concepts and the Analytic of Principles. In the former Kant aims to show that there are pure concepts which apply a priori to objects of sensible intuition. In the latter he relates these concepts to the sensible conditions on cognition, which

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<sup>64</sup> See pp.18-20 in §2.1, above.

were identified in the Transcendental Aesthetic, and derives a number of synthetic a priori judgments, the Pure Principles of the Understanding.

The Analytic of Concepts in turn is divided into two parts, the Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding (*Leitfaden der Entdeckung aller reinen Verstandesbegriffe*), or *Leitfaden*, for short, and the Transcendental Deduction. The *Leitfaden* is also frequently referred to as the Metaphysical Deduction of the pure concepts, in accordance with a remark of Kant's at B159. The task of the *Leitfaden* is to show that there are pure concepts of the understanding, and to identify these. By contrast, the task of the Transcendental Deduction is to demonstrate that these concepts have objective validity; that is, that they apply to sensible objects. What this distinction, between showing that there are pure concepts, on the one hand, and showing that they are objectively valid, on the other, amounts to need not concern us for now.<sup>65</sup> It is sufficient for us to know that the task of the *Leitfaden* is to identify the pure concepts of the understanding, or categories.

The strategy Kant adopts in pursuit of this goal was already discussed in the Introduction. Let me briefly rehearse the central features. Kant starts with the idea that there are two distinct kinds of exercise of the understanding, what he calls its logical use and its real use.<sup>66</sup> The real use of the understanding involves the pure concepts. More precisely, it involves them in such a way that to identify the forms of the understanding's real use *is* to identify the pure concepts. Now, the central feature of the strategy Kant pursues in the *Leitfaden* is the idea that the forms of the

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<sup>65</sup> I discuss this distinction in §3.2 of Chapter Two.

<sup>66</sup> Kant does not characterize the distinction in these terms in the *Leitfaden*. While he uses the term 'logical use' in the title of the first chapter of the *Leitfaden* ("On the Logical Use of the Understanding in General" [A67/B92]), he does not use the term 'real use.' But it is clear that this is what he has in mind, as is confirmed by a passage from the parallel section at the opening of the Transcendental Dialectic: "Es gibt von ihr [scil. der Vernunft, T.L.], *wie von dem Verstande*, einen bloß formalen, d.i. *logischen Gebrauch*, da die Vernunft von allem Inhalte der Erkenntnis abstrahiert, aber auch einen *realen*, da sie selbst den Ursprung gewisser Begriffe und Grundsätze enthält [...]" (*Just as in the case of the understanding*, there is a purely formal, that is, *logical use* of reason, in which it abstracts from all content of cognition, but also a *real one*, in which reason itself contains the origin of certain concepts and principles.) (A299/B355, my emphasis); cf. my discussion of this passage in the Introduction, §5.

understanding's logical use allow one to identify the forms of its real use. The former thus serve as a "guiding thread" – which is what the German word 'Leitfaden' means – to the latter. Hence the title of the section.<sup>67</sup>

Executing this strategy imposes a two-fold task on the *Leitfaden*. First, Kant has to identify the forms of the understanding's logical use. Second, he must derive from these the forms of the understanding's real use, and thereby identify the pure concepts of the understanding. The first task is carried out in the first two chapters of the *Leitfaden*, while the second is undertaken in its final chapter, *Leitfaden III*.

The forms of the logical use of the understanding are the logical forms of judgment, as catalogued in the Table of Judgments at A70/B95. In the first chapter of the *Leitfaden*, Kant seeks to entitle himself to this claim by arguing that a judgment is a "function of unity" among representations (A69/B94); that the understanding, as regards its logical use, is a capacity for judgment; and that, therefore, an inventory of the ways in which judgment unifies representations is an inventory of the forms of the understanding in its logical use.

My discussion of *Leitfaden I* proceeds in two steps, one for each of the two premises of the argument just sketched. First, in §3.2, I shall consider Kant's justification of the premise that judgments are functions of unity among representations. This will involve discussion of the claim that concepts are mediate representations of objects, which can only be used in judgment. Second, in §3.3, I shall discuss Kant's attempt to vindicate the Judgment Thesis. This will

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<sup>67</sup> In the first part of the Transcendental Dialectic Kant gives a concise summary of the *Leitfaden*-strategy: "Die transzendente Analytik gab uns ein Beispiel, wie die bloße logische Form unserer Erkenntnis den Ursprung von reinen Begriffen a priori enthalten könne, welche vor aller Erfahrung Gegenstände vorstellen, oder vielmehr die synthetische Einheit anzeigen, welche allein eine empirische Erkenntnis von Gegenständen möglich macht. Die Form der Urteile (in einen Begriff von der Synthesis der Anschauungen verwandelt) brachte Kategorien hervor, welche allen Verstandesgebrauch in der Erfahrung leiten." (The transcendental analytic gave us an example of how the mere logical form of our cognition can contain a priori the origin of pure concepts, which prior to all experience represent objects, or rather indicate the synthetic unity, which alone makes possible empirical cognition of objects. The form of judgments (transformed into a concept of the synthesis of intuitions) gave rise to categories, which guide all use of the understanding in experience.) (A321/B377f.).

involve close consideration of the thesis, appealed to by proto-Fregeans, that concepts are predicates of possible judgments.

Before I turn to the text, however, one more prefatory remark is in order. My debate with proto-Fregeanism concerns Kant's view of what the basic structure of judgment is; whether, in the basic case, a judgment is composed of an intuition and a concept, or rather of two concepts. Although I have argued that the latter alternative is the correct one, and have suggested that for Kant even singular judgments exhibit this structure, I do not want to rule out the possibility that Kant recognizes judgments of the kind the proto-Fregean takes as fundamental. For all I know, that is, he may accept that there are judgments whose subject-term is, or expresses, an intuition. I claim only, first, that we have not encountered any evidence of this in the texts so far considered; and second, that such judgments do not bear on the Unity Problem. But this is not, obviously, the same as to rule out the very possibility of such judgments.

The reason I bring up this issue is that I will have occasion to speak of judgments of this kind in the discussion of *Leitfaden I*, if only by way of contrast with what I take to be Kant's actual view. And this makes it convenient to adopt a terminological convention, which the following consideration will serve to introduce. The Analytic of Concepts – that is, that part of the Transcendental Logic which comprises the *Leitfaden* and the Transcendental Deduction – is intended to provide an analysis of the faculty of understanding.<sup>68</sup> In accordance with Kant's method of isolating faculties, the understanding is here considered by itself, and it is asked what is constitutive of it as the capacity it is.<sup>69</sup> Now, as Michael Wolff has argued, the theory of judgment that is sketched in the course of this investigation should be seen as bearing only on

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<sup>68</sup> Kant memorably speaks of “the hitherto scarcely attempted dissection of the capacity of understanding itself” (A65/B90).

<sup>69</sup> Cf. the methodological remarks at A21f/B35f and A51f/B75f.

those judgments, for which the faculty of understanding is solely responsible.<sup>70</sup> This leaves open the possibility that there may be judgments, for which the understanding is not solely responsible, and which accordingly do not fall within the scope of the theory of judgment advanced in the *Analytic of Concepts*. Following Wolff, I will sometimes speak of judgments that do fall within the scope of this theory as ‘judgments of the understanding’ or ‘*iudicia logica*.’<sup>71</sup> This will allow me to distinguish between the kinds of judgments to which the *Leitfaden*’s theory applies and those to which it may not apply without being committed to denying the possibility of the latter.

I hasten to add that when I speak of the understanding’s being solely responsible I do not mean to rule out any kind of dependence on sensibility. What I mean is, rather, that the judgmental acts in question do not require concurrent exercises of sensibility.<sup>72</sup> This is compatible with recognizing that there are sensible conditions, which bear on the objective validity of these acts. The important point is that sensibility plays no part in the formation of judgments of the understanding.

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<sup>70</sup> See Michael Wolff, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel: Mit einem Essay über Freges Begriffsschrift*, Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann 1995, 85-87. Reinhard Brandt makes the same point in *Die Urteilstafel: Kritik der reinen Vernunft A67-76; B92-101*, Hamburg: Meiner 1991, 64f.

<sup>71</sup> As Wolff points out, the Latin term is traditional and is, for instance, used in Meier’s *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre* (see §252, Ak. XVI, 624f), the logic textbook from which Kant lectured. Judgments of the understanding are “logical judgments” in the sense in which an investigation of the capacity to think is, in Kant’s terminology, a logic – as contrasted with an aesthetic (cf. above, §1.2, fn. 30). There is no implication here that there could be something like an illogical judgment. What is implied is the possibility of something like an aesthetic judgment, in the sense of a judgment that essentially involves perception. Demonstrative judgments might be of this kind. In this connection, we should note that in the *Critique of Judgment* Kant frequently speaks of logical judgments, in order to contrast them with aesthetic judgments. Logical judgments purport to be cognitions of objects. In a logical judgment, representations are related to an object, in order to determine the object as being such-and-such. By contrast, an aesthetic judgment expresses the relation of a representation of the object to the subject, and its feelings of pleasure and pain. See e.g. *KU*, §§1, 6.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. the distinction between act-dependence and capacity-dependence in §1 of the Introduction. In terms of this distinction, to say that the understanding is solely responsible for certain judgments is to say that the formation of these judgments is at most capacity-dependent on sensibility, but certainly not act-dependent.

### 3.2 Judgment as the Non-Immediate Representation of an Object

Let us turn, then, to the text of *Leitfaden I*. Kant begins by asserting that the understanding is a capacity for non-sensible cognition.<sup>73</sup> From this claim he derives, in a first step, the proposition that the understanding is a capacity for cognition through concepts. The argument proceeds by elimination from the premise that there are only two kinds of cognition, cognition through intuitions, and cognition through concepts. Since only sensibility furnishes intuitions, and the understanding is a distinct capacity from sensibility, the understanding must be a capacity for cognition through concepts. My focus in this section and the next will be on how Kant moves from here to the Judgment Thesis, the thesis that the understanding is fundamentally a capacity to judge. Following an intermediate step, in which Kant seeks to establish that concepts require spontaneity,<sup>74</sup> the argument continues as follows:

[1] Von diesen Begriffen kann nun der Verstand keinen andern Gebrauch machen, als daß er dadurch urteilt. [2] Da keine Vorstellung unmittelbar auf den Gegenstand geht, als bloß die Anschauung, so wird ein Begriff niemals auf einen Gegenstand unmittelbar bezogen, sondern auf irgend eine andre Vorstellung von demselben (sie sei Anschauung oder selbst schon Begriff) bezogen. [3] Das Urteil ist also die mittelbare Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes, mithin die Vorstellung einer Vorstellung desselben.

[1] Now the only use which the understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them. [2] Since no representation, save when it is an intuition, is in immediate relation to an object, no concept is ever related to an object immediately, but to some other representation of it, be that other representation an intuition, or itself a concept. [3]

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<sup>73</sup> “Der Verstand wurde oben bloß negativ erklärt: durch ein nichtsinnliches Erkenntnisvermögen” (Above the understanding was defined only negatively: as a non-sensible faculty for cognition) (A67/B92). As some commentators have noted, it is not clear which passage Kant is referring to, since the text of the *Critique* up to this point does not contain a characterization of the understanding as a non-sensible faculty of cognition (see the remarks by Benno Erdmann, who edited the *Critique* for the Academy edition, at Ak. III, 587; cf. also the comments in Wolff, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel*, 53-55). The two places at which he gives general characterizations of sensibility and understanding, the opening of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the opening of the Transcendental Logic, both provide more substantive characterizations. These do, however, certainly imply that the understanding is a non-sensible capacity for cognition.

<sup>74</sup> Roughly, Kant’s argument is that because the idea of a concept is tied to the notion of “ordering several representations under a common one” (A68/B93), cognition through concepts is spontaneous, as opposed to receptive. It requires the exercise of the mind’s active powers, rather than the actualization of its capacity to be affected by the presence of objects. This claim bears on Kant’s view that the understanding comprises “functions of unity” (ibid.). But it does not contribute to the argument that is my main concern, i.e. the move from ‘The understanding is a capacity for cognition through concepts’ to ‘The understanding is a capacity to judge.’

Judgment is therefore the mediate cognition of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it. (A68/B93)

I take it that Kant does two things here. First, he gives a reason for the claim that the only use of concepts is in judgment. Second, he provides a characterization of judgment in terms of the contrast between the mediate and immediate relation of a representation to its object. I want to discuss these points in turn.

Intuition relates to its object immediately. It does so because it is object-dependent, which means that the having of an intuition requires the presence of its object, because intuitions exist only as a result of objects affecting the mind. By contrast, a concept does not relate to its object immediately. Concepts are not object-dependent in this sense. Among other things, this means that a concept relates to its object not directly, but via another representation, which is what Kant says in the second sentence.<sup>75</sup>

To relate a concept to another representation is, at least in the present context, to form a judgment.<sup>76</sup> Although Kant does not explicitly say so at this point, it is clear that he is committed to this claim.<sup>77</sup> If we add it to the passage, it supplies the missing premise for an argument that would justify the thesis that concepts can only be used in judgment. Note that, although this argument may appear to be circular, it is in fact not. Clearly, the claim that relating a concept to another representation amounts to making a judgment does not presuppose that this is the *only* use to which concepts can be put. The structure of the passage, then, is this: Sentence [2]

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<sup>75</sup> This makes it hard to give a sense to the phrase ‘relate to an object’ which is wide enough to apply univocally both to the immediate object-relating of intuitions, and to the mediate object-relating of concepts. What we should say, I think, is that, generically, for a representation to relate to objects is for it to satisfy the conditions on cognition, in the sense discussed in §1.2, above. With regard to concepts this entails that a concept relates to an object if and only if it can figure in judgments that are true or false of objects.

<sup>76</sup> This is so if the goal is cognition. Kant recognizes associative connections between concepts, which do not take the form of judgment. But neither do they amount to “cognition through concepts.” Cf. B139f.

<sup>77</sup> See e.g. *Reflexion* 3045 (Ak. XVI, 630): “Ein Begriff hat vermöge seiner Gemeingültigkeit die function eines Urtheils. Er bezieht sich auf andere Begriffe *potentialiter*. Die Wirkliche Beziehung eines Begriffs auf andere als ein Mittel ihrer Erkenntnis ist das Urtheil.” (In virtue of its general validity a concept has the function of a judgment. It relates to other concepts *potentialiter*. The actual relation of a concept to others, as a means of cognizing them, is the judgment).

supplies an enthymematic argument for the thesis announced in [1], and sentence [3] derives a further conclusion from [2].

Kant tells us, in sentence [2], that a concept relates to its object mediately by relating to the object either (a) by way of an intuition or (b) by way of another concept. The first alternative is not a viable option for the purpose of *Leitfaden I*. Since intuition is object-dependent, a type of mediate cognition in which a concept is related to an intuition and thereby to an object, would be object-dependent as well. For the relating of a concept to an intuition obviously requires the actuality of the intuition, hence the presence of its object. In effect, this would not amount to a kind of cognition that deserves the title ‘non-sensible’. Therefore, if option (b) is not dependent on affection in this way, it should serve as the paradigm for non-sensible cognition, that is, for judgments of the understanding. Consider, then, option (b).<sup>78</sup>

Option (b) accommodates the mediacy of concepts by relating a concept *F* not to an intuition, but to some other concept *G*. Of course, on this alternative, too, some kind of relation to intuition has to be part of the picture, for ultimately relation to an object always depends on intuition.<sup>79</sup> But here the relation to intuition comes, as it were, further down the line. The point of this option is that what the concept is directly related to is another concept, as opposed to an intuition. More precisely, the concept is not directly related to an *actual* intuition. However, in virtue of being related to another concept, it is related to *possible* intuitions, since every concept can go proxy for the intuitions that fall under it.

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<sup>78</sup> It might be objected that relation to *possible* intuition is sufficient. But this objection misfires. In the absence of any other representation, there would be no way of identifying *which* possible intuitions the concept is supposed to relate to. If the relation is to intuition alone, only actual intuition will do. This point will become clearer shortly.

<sup>79</sup> “Alles Denken aber muß sich, es sei geradezu (*directe*), oder im Umschweife (*indirecte*), zuletzt auf Anschauungen, mithin, bei uns, auf Sinnlichkeit beziehen, weil uns auf andere Weise kein Gegenstand gegeben werden kann” (But all thought, whether straightaway (*directe*) or through a detour (*indirecte*), must ultimately be related to intuitions, thus, in our case, to sensibility, since there is no other way in which objects can be given to us) (A19/B33).

Let me try to make this clearer. Take the judgment ‘All  $G$  are  $F$ ’. Here, a concept  $F$  is being related to objects by being related to another concept,  $G$ . But  $G$ , in virtue of being a concept, hence a general representation, subsumes under it intuitions of  $G$ s. Thus, the concept may be regarded as going proxy for the intuitions that fall under it. Therefore, the predicate-concept  $F$  can be said to relate to objects by way of the *possible* intuitions represented by the subject-concept. If this is right, relation of the concept  $F$  to an object is still secured, ultimately, by way of its relation to intuitions. But on this alternative, its relation to intuition is, as we might put it, itself mediated by another concept. And this makes the cognition independent actual intuition, and thus of any immediate perceptual context. The cognition becomes situation-independent.

The point of option (b), then, is that cognition through judgments is non-sensible, and thus situation-independent, because in judgment the object is cognized, not through actual intuitions, but through the conceptual representation of possible intuitions. I take it that this is what Kant means when he concludes, in sentence [3], that judgment is “the representation of a representation” of the object.<sup>80</sup>

The example Kant goes on to give supports this analysis. Here is the text:

[4] In jedem Urteil ist ein Begriff, der für viele gilt, und unter diesem Vielen auch eine gegebene Vorstellung begreift, welche letztere denn auf den Gegenstand unmittelbar bezogen wird. [5] So bezieht sich z. B. in dem Urteile: alle Körper sind teilbar, der Begriff des Teilbaren auf verschiedene andere Begriffe; unter diesen aber wird er hier besonders auf den Begriff des Körpers bezogen; dieser aber auf gewisse uns vorkommende Erscheinungen. [6] Also werden diese Gegenstände durch den Begriff der Teilbarkeit mittelbar vorgestellt. [7] Alle Urteile sind demnach Funktionen der Einheit unter unseren Vorstellungen, da nämlich statt einer unmittelbaren Vorstellung eine

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<sup>80</sup> Heidegger nicely captures this point in his 1927/28 lectures on the *Critique* published as *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*: “Als mittelbare Vorstellungen sind die Begriffe nicht direkt auf das Seiende bezogen, sondern auf dieses, sofern es schon durch die unmittelbaren Vorstellungen, durch Anschauungen gegeben ist. Das begriffliche Vorstellen ist demnach ein auf Vorstellungen bezogenes Vorstellen – das *Vorstellen einer Vorstellung*” (Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. Ingrid Görland, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., Frankfurt/M.: Klostermann 1995, 171).

höhere, die diese und mehrere unter sich begreift, zur Erkenntnis des Gegenstandes gebraucht, und viel mögliche Erkenntnisse dadurch in einer zusammengezogen werden.

[4] In every judgment there is a concept which holds of many representations, and among them of a given representation that is immediately related to an object. [5] Thus in the judgment, ‘all bodies are divisible,’ the concept of the divisible applies to various other concepts, but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept again to certain appearances that present themselves to us. [6] These objects, therefore, are mediately represented through the concept of divisibility. [7] Accordingly, all judgments are functions of unity among our representations; instead of an immediate representation, a higher representation, which comprises the immediate representation and various others, is used in cognizing the object, and thereby many possible cognitions are collected in a single one. (A68f/B93f)

Sentence [4] describes a general schema for judgments of the understanding. As the following sentence makes clear, Kant is talking about the predicate-concept in a judgment. The predicate, he says, “holds of many,” and among these also of a given representation, which is immediately related to the object. Kant’s talk of immediate object-relatedness must mean that the reference here is to intuition.<sup>81</sup> The example that follows in sentence [5] confirms this, and at the same time makes clear that the predicate-concept relates to the “given representation” by way of another representation, viz. the subject-concept, as the following analysis makes clear.

Kant begins his discussion of the example ‘All bodies are divisible’ by pointing out, in sentence [5], that the predicate-concept holds of many subordinate concepts. This is simply a point about the nature of concepts as *repraesentationes generales*, given Kant’s intensional conception of logic, according to which the extension of a concept comprises lower concepts as

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<sup>81</sup> Some commentators disagree and argue that, rather, the representation which relates to the object immediately, just like the “immediate representation” referred to in [7], is a concept; see Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 88n15; H. J. Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience*, London: Allen and Unwin 1936, vol. I, 253; Wolff, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel*, 79-82. These commentators then introduce a sense of ‘immediate’ which pertains specifically to concepts, and identifies a distinct relation from the immediate relation an intuition bears to its object. It seems to me that such a view rests on a misunderstanding of the fact that by characterizing intuition as immediate Kant is talking about its object-dependence. Concepts in Kant’s sense are not object-dependent, and as I shall argue, this difference between intuitions and concepts is all-important. But if this is right, there is no logical space, by Kant’s lights, for a kind of immediacy which pertains specifically to concepts. Moreover, as my analysis will show, the text certainly does not force us to introduce such a notion.

well as objects.<sup>82</sup> Next, he says that to make the judgment ‘All bodies are divisible,’ is to relate one concept to another, viz. the predicate ‘divisible’ to the subject ‘body.’ The final clause of [5] then contains the point that the subject-concept is related to “certain intuitions,” – namely, all those intuitions that are contained under the concept ‘body’.<sup>83</sup>

In the next sentence, [6], a conclusion is drawn: “These objects, therefore, are mediately represented through the concept of divisibility”. The example thus shows us what it means to say that the concept ‘divisibility’ stands in a mediate relation to objects. The significance of this point, however, is not limited to the example, but meant to be perfectly general. This is evident from sentence [7], which draws a further conclusion and presents it as applying to all judgments. I suggest that we consider [6] and [7] jointly. [6] tells us that in the judgment at hand the predicate-concept ‘divisibility’ serves to represent a multiplicity of objects: it represents “these objects” – viz. the objects that can be given to the mind through intuitions which fall under the subject-concept ‘body.’ Sentence [7], with its talk of unity and multiplicity, makes clear that the plural of the phrase ‘these objects’ in [6] is important. That is, it matters that [6] speaks of a multiplicity of objects, hence a multiplicity of intuitions, as opposed to a single object. It matters, because Kant goes on, in sentence [7], to draw the conclusion that the mediate representation of objects in judgment serves to generate unity among our representations. In particular, unity is generated by (i) using a “higher representation” in place of an immediate one, and thereby (ii) “[drawing] together many possible cognitions into a single [actual] one.”

I think we can interpret the first point in two different ways, depending on what we take the phrase ‘higher representation’ to refer to. On the first alternative (i.a), the phrase is taken to

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<sup>82</sup> See Schulthess, *Relation und Funktion*, 112-117, for discussion.

<sup>83</sup> I take it that in a context like this, where the nature of intuition is not explicitly discussed, ‘appearance’ and ‘intuition’ are often used equivalently. In any case, Kant’s own copy of the A-edition replaces ‘Erscheinungen’ with ‘Anschauungen’. See *KrV*, ed. Timmermann, p.146; *CPR*, ed. Guyer/Wood, p.205.

refer to the predicate concept, i.e. ‘divisibility’. On this alternative, the contrast Kant draws is between sensible cognition, on the one hand, and discursive cognition, on the other; between cognition through intuitions and cognition through concepts. Thus, the claim is that instead of cognizing the object through intuition, we cognize it through concepts, and cognition through concepts takes the form of judgment. In terms of the example, we cognize the object through the concept ‘divisibility’, and to do so is to make a judgment in which this concept functions as the predicate.

On the second alternative (i.b), the referent of ‘higher representation’ is not the predicate-concept, but the subject-concept, i.e. ‘body’. The contrast drawn is not between intuition and judgment, but between two kinds of judgment. On this reading, the claim picks up on the alternative between two ways of relating a concept to another representation offered in sentence [2], i.e. the alternative of relating it to an intuition and relating it to another concept. So on this reading the claim made in [7] is that only those judgments are functions of unity among our representations, in which a concept is related to another concept, as opposed to an intuition.

I think that, for all intents and purposes, both alternatives come to the same. In both cases, the contrast that matters is between situation-dependent cognition, on the one hand, and cognition that is not situation-dependent, on the other. The difference lies in what situation-dependent cognition is construed as. On the first alternative, it is intuition *simpliciter*, on the second it is intuition-involving judgment. But in both cases the contrast is with judgments consisting of general representations, that is, concepts; what above I called judgments of the understanding. What is more, in both cases the point about such judgments is the same. It is that they serve to “draw together many possible cognitions into a single one.”<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Alternative (i.a) seems to me to fit the text better. For it allows us to read the talk of ‘alle Urteile’ as being indeed about all judgments, since this alternative is compatible with the view that all judgments are necessarily concept-

How do they do that? Recall my discussion above, of the difference between relating a concept to an object via an intuition, and relating it to an object via another concept. In the second case, I said, we can think of the subject-concept of the resulting judgment as going proxy for a multiplicity of possible intuitions, viz. those intuitions which instantiate the subject-concept. So it is plausible to describe the judgment as “drawing together” these possible intuitions. Now, to classify an actual intuition as instantiating the concept ‘body’ is to make a judgment of the form ‘This is a body.’<sup>85</sup> Such a judgment could serve as the minor premise in a syllogism whose major premise is the original judgment (‘All bodies are divisible’). We can then think of the “many possible cognitions” that are drawn into a single one as the conclusions of all these syllogisms, thus: ‘This is divisible,’ ‘That is divisible,’ and ‘That other thing is divisible’.<sup>86</sup>

Kant’s discussion of the example thus bears out the analysis I gave of sentences [1]-[3], above, the result of which was that a concept relates to objects mediately because it relates to them by way of possible intuitions. And this means that it relates to objects by being predicated of another concept in a judgment. We may conclude that the salient reason why judgments of the understanding can be described as “functions of unity among our representations” is that they have a general representation in the subject-position. Because of this such judgments can, in some cases, function as the major premise of a categorical syllogism.<sup>87</sup> And it is through this that “many possible cognitions are drawn together into a single [actual] one.” Note that judgments

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concept combinations. On alternative (i.b), we would have to read ‘alle Urteile’ with a qualifier, e.g. ‘alle *Verstandesurteile*’; the only advantage of this alternative is that it allows for a nice connection with sentence [2] and what seems like a natural reading of that sentence.

<sup>85</sup> As before, I am construing ‘intuition’ here as meaning ‘intuited object’. If instead one wanted to stick to the act-sense of ‘intuition’, one would have to say that the demonstrative judgment refers to the object given through the intuition.

<sup>86</sup> Of course, particular or universal judgments would serve just as well as minor premises. Thus, ‘Some animals are bodies’, or ‘All animals are bodies’. The point is the same. After all, for Kant the extension of a concept comprises subordinate concepts just as much as objects that fall under it. Therefore, we can equally think of the subject-concept of our judgment as going proxy for the concepts contained under it – as Kant himself does a few lines further down, when he continues his discussion of the example (see the discussion of the passage in §3.3, below).

<sup>87</sup> They can function as the major premise of a categorical syllogism only in some cases, because the major premise must be universal in quantity. So only universal judgments will be able to play this role.

whose subject-term is an intuition would fail on this score. They would unify our representations only in a derivative way, viz. by interacting with judgments of the understanding. Absent judgments of the understanding, such judgments would not unify our representations at all; or would unify them only in a very weak sense: All we could ever say is ‘this is *F*’, ‘that is *F*’, ‘this other thing is *F*’. But we would *not* be able to say ‘These three things are all of them *F*’. For that would require a concept as the subject-term; it would require a judgment of the form ‘All-of-these/some/all *G*s are *F*’.<sup>88</sup>

If the discussion so far is on target, it shows that the proto-Fregean construal of Kant’s theory of judgment, at least to the extent it is developed in *Leitfaden I*, is false. But this means that we already have reason to believe that the proto-Fregean interpretation of Kant’s thesis that concepts are predicates of possible judgments, which is advanced towards the end of *Leitfaden I* and which seemed to support the proto-Fregean case, is equally false. I discuss this thesis in the following section, where I consider the remainder of *Leitfaden I*. The focus of this portion of the text and, accordingly, of my discussion lies on the Judgment Thesis, the thesis that the understanding is a capacity to judge.

### 3.3 The Judgment Thesis

Having stated that judgments are functions of unity among our representations Kant goes on to say:

[8] Wir können aber alle Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urteile zurückführen, so daß der *Verstand* überhaupt als ein *Vermögen zu urteilen* vorgestellt werden kann. [9] Denn er ist nach dem obigen ein Vermögen zu denken. [10] Denken ist das Erkenntnis durch

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<sup>88</sup> Therefore, an interpretation like Allison’s must be rejected. On Allison’s view, the judgment ‘All bodies are divisible’ unifies cognitions because it classifies bodies as belonging to the same class as other divisible things (e.g. lines); cf. Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism.*, 85: “The collection or unification effected by this particular judgment is of the *x*’s thought through the concept ‘body’ with other *x*’s that may be thought through the concept ‘divisibility’.” At best, this interpretation is seriously incomplete.

Begriffe. [11] Begriffe aber beziehen sich, als Prädikate möglicher Urteile, auf irgendeine Vorstellung von einem noch unbestimmten Gegenstande. [12] So bedeutet der Begriff des Körpers etwas, z. B. Metall, was durch jenen Begriff erkannt werden kann. [13] Er ist also nur dadurch Begriff, daß unter ihm andere Vorstellungen enthalten sind, vermitteltst deren er sich auf Gegenstände beziehen kann. [14] Er ist also das Prädikat zu einem möglichen Urteile, z. B. ein jedes Metall ist ein Körper.

[8] Now, we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments, and the *understanding* may therefore be represented as a *faculty of judgment*. [9] For, as stated above, the understanding is a faculty of thought. [10] Thought is cognition by means of concepts. [11] But concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, relate to some representation of an as yet undetermined object. [12] Thus the concept of body means something, for instance, metal, which can be cognized by means of that concept. [13] It is therefore a concept solely in virtue of its comprehending other representations, by means of which it can relate to objects. [14] It is therefore the predicate of a possible judgment, for instance, ‘every metal is a body.’ (A68f/B93f)

Sentence [8] states the Judgment Thesis, and sentences [9]-[14] contain an argument, as well as an example, intended to justify the Thesis, as is indicated by the fact that Kant starts [9] with ‘Denn’. The argument seems to be this: We start from the premise that the understanding is a capacity for thought, which is, I take it, equivalent to the claim that the understanding is a capacity for non-sensible cognition.<sup>89</sup> Thought, according to [10], is cognition through concepts. And cognition through concepts is, as [11] implicitly reminds us, cognition through predicates of judgments. But this means that the kind of cognition that the understanding affords takes the form of judgments. Therefore, all “acts of the understanding” – in other words, all actualizations of the capacity for cognition through concepts – can be “traced back to” judgments. Kant is simply repeating here what has already been established in the first half of the section.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Kant says that “according to the above” the understanding is a capacity for thought. It is interesting to note, however, that, although the understanding was characterized as a capacity for thought at the opening of the *Transcendental Logic* (cf. A50/B74), this characterization does not occur in *Leitfaden I*. Rather, in the *Leitfaden* Kant starts from the characterization of it as a capacity for non-sensible cognition. He then argues that non-sensible cognition is cognition through concepts, and that concepts “rest on the spontaneity of thought” (A68/B93). It seems, then that, if ‘the above’ is meant to refer to the preceding parts of *Leitfaden I*, the characterization of the understanding as a capacity for thought is contained in “the above” only insofar as the reader infers it from what Kant actually says.

<sup>90</sup> Several commentators take Kant to be using the term ‘understanding’ in its wide sense here, in which it encompasses the understanding in the narrow sense, the power of judgment (*Urteilstkraft*) and reason (cf. A130f/B169 and *Anthropology*, §40, Ak. VII, 196f). In line with this, they take the phrase ‘all acts of the

In [12]-[14], he goes on to make explicit another point that was already implicit in the discussion of the example ‘All bodies are divisible’. He points out that for the subject-term ‘body’ to be considered a concept, it, too, must be capable of being the predicate of a judgment, as for instance in the judgment ‘Every metal is a body’.<sup>91</sup> To say this is simply to point out what it means to say that a representation is a concept, i.e. a general representation. As we saw in the preceding section, the subject-concept serves to unify cognitions because it contains under it a manifold of other representations (both intuitions and concepts). But if it contains other representations under it, it can be predicated of each of these representations in a judgment. The upshot is that cognition through concepts takes the form of combining concepts in judgment. Bringing up the example a second time serves to drive this point home, because it makes explicit that the subject-term in ‘All bodies are divisible’ is a concept, hence the predicate of a possible judgment, just as much as the predicate-term.

In sum, the argument for the Judgment Thesis is this. We start out with the idea of cognition through concepts, which is the only kind of non-sensible cognition available to a discursive mind. Cognition through concepts takes the form of judgment. As Kant puts it, in a judgment an object is cognized through a concept. This concept, i.e. the concept “through which”

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understanding’ to refer to the three *operationes mentis* distinguished in traditional logic textbooks (see Brandt, *Die Urteilstafel*, 53-55 for references). These are the apprehension of ideas (*apprehensio simplex*), judgment, and inference. That these are what Kant has in mind when says that all acts of the understanding can be traced back to judgment is advocated, e.g., by Brandt, *ibid.*; Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 92f.; and Wolff, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel*, 87-110. Since, as we have already seen, Kant holds that concepts can only be used in judgment, and that inference is a kind of judgment, it is clear that there is a sense in which something along these lines must be right. However, it is hard to reconcile this view with the text. Wolff gives an ingenious reconstruction. But it seems to me that he is reading something into the text, which is just not there.

However, since the issue is not important for my purposes in this chapter, I will not pursue it any further. Rather, I shall concentrate on what can be gleaned from the passage about Kant’s conception of judgment and its components.

<sup>91</sup> It is worth noting that, as Michael Wolff has pointed out, the discussion the example in [12]-[14] refers back to the example given in [5] and [6]. In particular, the phrase ‘durch jenen Begriff’ in [12] must be taken to refer to the concept ‘divisibility’ in [6] because, in contrast to ‘dieses *F*’, a pronominal phrase of the form ‘jenes *F*’ always refers to the penultimate instance of *F*. See Wolff, *Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel*, 97. So what Kant is saying in [12] is that, for instance, metal can be cognized through the concept of divisibility, viz. in a judgment like ‘Every metal is divisible.’

the object is cognized, is the predicate-concept. The role of the subject-concept is to indicate *which* objects are being cognized through the predicate, because the subject-concept indicates through *which* intuitions the predicate relates to objects. It is clear that it cannot relate to objects immediately. No concept can do that. So it has to relate to objects via intuitions. But to be able to determine whether a cognition is true or false, and thus to know its content, we need to know which intuitions the predicate relates to. We have to know, in other words, through which intuitions the object to which the concept relates would be given to the mind. Since intuitions are object-dependent, it is not possible, outside actual perceptual contexts, to indicate the relevant intuitions through ostension. We need a non-situation-dependent way of specifying what the relevant intuitions are. Having a concept in the subject-position of a judgment makes this possible. Cognition through concepts, therefore, is cognition through judgments of the understanding, that is, judgments composed of general terms.

Notice that this reading is compatible with the view that there may be judgments, in which no subject-concept is needed, because the predicate relates directly to an intuition that is actual; judgments whose linguistic expression would follow the schema ‘This is *F*’.<sup>92</sup> The point of my reading is that this cannot be the general case, and so it cannot serve as the model for judgments of the understanding. Again, the point is that otherwise all judgments would be situation-dependent. Arguably, on such a scenario the very idea of conceptual thought collapses.<sup>93</sup>

Sentence [11] – “But concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, relate to some representation of an as yet undetermined object” – might be taken to encapsulate this very point.

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<sup>92</sup> And, if one follows Sellars, even judgments of this kind will employ a concept in the subject-position, albeit in a special way, viz. in connection with a demonstrative; Sellars indicates this through the hyphenated expression in his schema for such judgments, ‘This-*G* is *F*’; see the first chapter of *Science and Metaphysics*, “Sensibility and Understanding”.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Rödl, *Kategorien des Zeitlichen*, (\*\*\*)).

I want to return to it briefly, because in §2.1, above, this sentence was appealed to in support of proto-Fregeanism. The proto-Fregean takes the phrase ‘representation of an as yet undetermined object’ to refer to intuition, and concludes that the sentence expresses the claim that what it is for a concept to function as a predicate is for it to be predicated of an intuition. I do not think that it is obligatory to read the phrase as referring to intuition. The mistaken impression that it is obligatory is rooted, I think, in a misunderstanding of Kant’s talk of indeterminacy in this passage. Kant says that, qua predicate of a *possible* judgment, a concept relates to *some* representation of an *as yet undetermined* object. I take his point to be the following: While concepts do not relate to objects except through intuition, in the absence of a subject-concept (or, perhaps, an actual intuition) it is not determined *which* intuitions a concept is being related to, and consequently *which* objects it is being related to. This is why he is talking about *possible* judgments. For there to be an actual judgment it has to be determinate what the predicate-concept is being predicated of. Consequently, the sentence would read quite differently if we transposed it into the modality of actuality: “Qua predicate of an actual judgment, a concept relates to a representation that determines which object, or objects, it is being predicated of.” This representation may, in some cases, be an intuition. But in the kind of case Kant is concerned with in the *Leitfaden*, the case that fits the description ‘non-sensible cognition,’ it must be another concept.

By way of concluding this section, let me indicate how the Judgment Thesis fits into Kant’s overall argument in the *Leitfaden*. Kant has already argued, in the passages discussed in §3.2, that judgments are functions of unity among our representations. He now shows that the understanding is a capacity to judge. This had not been shown before, because the understanding had been defined only as a capacity for cognition through concepts. And while it was argued that

concepts can only be *used* in judgment, this does not yet show that a capacity for cognition through concepts is identical to a capacity to judge. Having argued for this identity-claim, however, Kant can now draw the conclusion that the functions of the understanding can be found if the functions of unity in judgment can be exhibited. And this is the thesis he needs in order to execute the strategy of deriving the categories from the logical forms of judgment.

#### 4. The Complex Component View of Intuition

The interpretation of *Leitfaden I* developed in §3 concludes my discussion of proto-Fregeanism, the view that Kantian intuitions are analogues of singular terms. It has emerged that, as an interpretation of Kant's conception of intuition, this view does not stand up to scrutiny. As a consequence, the relation of intuition to judgment must be conceived differently. At the outset of the discussion of proto-Fregeanism, I suggested that this view is a member of a family of views I called Component Views of intuition. The central characteristic of a Component View is that it regards intuition as a component of judgment. By way of explicating this notion I suggested that intuition functions as a component of judgment if it is essentially a subject of predication. The idea was that we should distinguish as components of a judgment the predicate, and that which the predicate is predicated of.<sup>94</sup> Since an intuition cannot be a predicate, to conceive of intuition as a component of judgment is to conceive of it as a subject of predication.

Proto-Fregeanism is a clear instance of such a view. We can characterize it more accurately by saying that proto-Fregeanism understands predication along Fregean lines and assigns to intuition the role of an analogue of a singular term, an analogue of what Frege would call a name. Although it may seem that this is the only possible way of conceiving of intuition as

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<sup>94</sup> We can then interpret the logical forms of judgment Kant distinguishes as modes of relating these components to each other

a subject of predication, there is, in fact, another way. We should therefore distinguish between two species of Component Views. One is proto-Fregeanism, the other is what I want to call the Complex Component View (CCV).<sup>95</sup> This view forms the topic of the present section.

On the CCV, intuition does not enter judgment directly, as a subject of predication in its own right. Rather, it enters judgment as part of what we might call an intuition-concept compound. The chief advocate of this view is Henry Allison, and it is on his elaboration of it that I shall focus.

But before I characterize the CCV more fully, I want to point out that the reason why this view is relevant to my concerns in this chapter is that it might be thought to escape the objections I have raised for proto-Fregeanism, and yet treat intuition as a component of judgment. Since my goal in this chapter is to argue that intuition should not be conceived as a component of judgment at all, hence that no kind of Component View is acceptable, I need to discuss the CCV and show that it, too, fails as an interpretation of Kant's view. Since it is hard to see how there could be any other species of Component View besides proto-Fregeanism and the CCV, we can safely assume, I think, that the Component approach needs to be abandoned if it can be shown that, just like proto-Fregeanism, the CCV is false.

Let me now try to characterize the CCV, as developed by Allison, in greater detail. To begin with, Allison recognizes that Kant's basic model of judgment is a version of the Two Term Model. To this extent, he shares my misgivings about proto-Fregeanism. On Allison's view, then, Kant thinks of judgment as composed, in the fundamental case, of two concepts, the subject and the predicate. As a consequence, intuition does not enter into judgment directly, where this means that there is no identifiable component of a judgment that is an intuition all by itself.

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<sup>95</sup> In contrast to which we might call proto-Fregeanism the Simple Component View. The rationale for these labels will emerge shortly.

Besides acknowledging that Kant's basic model of judgment is a version of the Two Term Model, however, Allison has another reason for denying that intuition enters into judgment in the way the proto-Fregean envisages. Allison interprets Kant's slogan that intuitions without concepts are blind as giving expression to what he calls Kant's "Discursivity Thesis". The Discursivity Thesis implies that an intuition is the singular representation of an object only if it is "conceptualized." I will say more about exactly what this means in a moment. For now we can note that a proto-Fregean intuition is precisely not conceptualized. For the proto-Fregean, an intuition is, as such, the singular representation of an object, which is thus in a position to play the role of a singular term in judgment. By Allison's lights, however, this constitutes a violation of the Discursivity Thesis.

To conform to the demands of the Discursivity Thesis, Allison holds, one needs to draw a distinction between different kinds of intuition in Kant, each of which plays a different role in Kant's theory. Here is how Allison characterizes the two roles, on which the distinction is based:

"[...] according to [the Discursivity Thesis], sensible intuition provides the mind only with the raw data for conceptualization, not the determinate cognition of objects. As discursive, such cognition requires not merely that the data be given in intuition but also that they be taken under some general description or 'recognized in a concept.' Only then can we speak of the 'representation of an object.'<sup>96</sup>

Because cognition is discursive, the passage says, an intuition that consists merely of "raw data" does not amount to cognition, and this means that it does not amount to the singular representation of an object. For an intuition to be the singular representation of an object, it needs to involve a discursive element. This means that it must be "recognized in a concept," where this consists in the intuition's being, as Allison usually puts it, "conceptualized." Accordingly, Allison goes on to suggest, we must distinguish between raw-data intuitions, on the one hand,

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<sup>96</sup> Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*, 2<sup>nd</sup>, revised and enlarged ed., New Haven: Yale UP 2004, 81.

and intuitions qua singular representations of objects, on the other. Each constitutes a distinct kind of intuition. He calls the first indeterminate or unconceptualized intuition, and the second determinate or conceptualized intuition.<sup>97</sup>

What matters for our purposes is not this distinction in its own right, but rather how Allison conceives of the “conceptualization” of the raw-data intuitions, and how his acceptance of the Discursivity Thesis leads him to construe Kant’s theory of judgment. Since, according to Allison, all acts of conceptualization are acts of judgment, the conceptualizing, or determining, of raw-data intuitions, which results in an intuition that is the singular representation of an object, is an act of judgment. However, this act involves only the subject-concept of a judgment, not its predicate-concept. Predicating the predicate-concept of the subject-concept is a further step. On Allison’s view, a judgment thus involves two acts of subsumption, or conceptual determination: first, a raw-data intuition is brought under the subject-concept and thereby turned into the representation of an object; second, this intuition-under-a-concept is then further determined by being subsumed under the predicate-concept. Using the letter ‘x’ to stand for the object given through the intuition, Allison gives expression to this view in the following passage:

In a judgment of the categorical form, this determination [of the raw-data intuition, T.L.] occurs through the subsumption of the intuition of this x under a subject-concept, which, in turn makes possible further subsumption or subordination under additional concepts in the judgment.<sup>98</sup>

On Allison’s view, then, a Kantian judgment involves two acts of subsumption, hence two acts of predication. First, an intuition of the object is subsumed under the subject-concept

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<sup>97</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 82: “[...] it is necessary to distinguish between a determinate or conceptualized and an indeterminate intuition, only the former of which constitutes a *repraesentatio singularis*.” I should add that Allison is not alone in stipulating a such a distinction. A distinction along very similar lines is defended by L.W. Beck; see e.g. Beck, “Did the Sage of Königsberg Have No Dreams”.

<sup>98</sup> Henry Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge UP 2001, 18f; cf. also the discussion of Kant’s example from *Leitfaden I*, ‘All bodies are divisible,’ in *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, 84f., where Allison explicitly says that “the predicate ‘divisibility’ [constitutes] a *second* determination or conceptualization of the object” (*ibid.*, 85, my emphasis).

and thereby rendered into a singular representation of an object; second the subject-concept, and thus the intuition contained under it, is subsumed under the predicate-concept.

As this characterization makes clear, Allison ascribes to Kant a Component View of intuition. If intuition enters judgment by way of being subsumed under a concept, intuition is a subject of predication. And for intuition to be a subject of predication is for it to be a component of judgment, in the sense I introduced above. At the same time, Allison's view is unusual in that he combines a component conception of intuition with the recognition that Kant conceives of judgment fundamentally as a relation among two concepts. Allison manages to combine these two elements because he thinks that a judgment involves two acts of predication; in particular, that the relation of the subject-concept to the intuition, or intuitions, contained under it must be conceived as involving an act of predication.

In what follows, I shall argue that this view of how intuition relates to judgment is false. My argument will be partly based on the reading of *Leitfaden I* presented above, in §3. Since Allison explicitly presents his own view as an interpretation of *Leitfaden I*, an argument showing that Allison misinterprets the text will be sufficient to undermine this view. The argument concerns, in particular, Kant's claim that concepts relate to objects mediately, where this means, at least in part, that they relate to objects through intuitions; as well as the related claim that concepts are predicates of possible judgments. In §3 I argued that these claims need to be understood against the background of the idea that judgment is the form cognition through concepts takes, which is introduced by Kant as a type of non-sensible cognition. For a cognition to be non-sensible is, among other things, for it not to be situation-dependent. An act of non-sensible cognition is thus an act whose occurrence does not depend on affection by the object.

The point that in the *Analytic of Concepts* Kant is concerned, in particular, with judgments of the understanding (*iudicia logica*) was meant to underscore this claim.

Now, Allison endorses the point that the theory of judgment laid out in the *Leitfaden* concerns judgments of the understanding.<sup>99</sup> And this means that his position faces a dilemma. The intuition that, according to Allison, is subsumed under the subject-concept in a judgment must be either an actual or a possible intuition. If it is actual, and if this is part of the basic model of judgment, judgment becomes object-dependent. For if the actual occurrence of some intuition is essential to it, then the judgmental act is dependent on a concurrent affection of sensibility. As I argued in §3.2, if judgment follows this model, it does not merit the label ‘non-sensible;’ nor would it be apt to call judgments of this kind ‘judgments of the understanding.’

This leaves the second horn of the dilemma, on which the intuition in Allison’s model is merely a possible intuition. But if the intuition is merely possible, there is no conceptual space for the special act of predication Allison stipulates, viz. the act he characterizes as the “conceptualization” or “determination” of an intuition and which consists in its being subsumed under the subject-concept of a judgment. To see this consider what it takes to identify an intuition.

Because intuition is object-dependent, intuitions can be identified in only one of two ways. Either the identification is demonstrative. In this case, it depends on the presence of the object, and thus on the intuition’s being actual. Or the identification concerns merely possible intuitions. Clearly, in this case demonstrative identification is not available. But this means that the relevant intuitions must be identified in some other way. And the only alternative is what we might call discursive, or conceptual, identification. On this alternative, possible intuitions are identified by specifying discursively, *which* intuitions are at issue. They are identified by giving

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<sup>99</sup> See Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, 136.

a description these intuitions satisfy. But this is just to give a concept under which they fall.

Identification of possible intuitions, therefore, proceeds by means of concepts.

It follows from this that the only way to predicate a concept of possible intuitions is to predicate this concept *of another concept*.<sup>100</sup> But if this is right, there can be no such thing as an Allisonian “conceptualization” of possible intuitions, in which possible intuitions are subsumed under the subject-concept of a judgment. For this would require that these intuitions be identified non-discursively. And I have just argued that this is impossible. The second horn of our dilemma, then, forces Allison to occupy a position that is inconsistent. I conclude that, if the dilemma is genuine, Allison’s interpretation, and hence the Complex Component View I take it to exemplify, must be rejected.

Allison might try to object that the dilemma just outlined depends on the mistaken assumption that there is such a thing as an intuition’s falling under a concept independently of an actual act of conceptualization. To make this assumption, Allison might say, is to disregard the Discursivity Thesis and thus to fall afoul of Kant’s claim that intuitions without concepts are blind.

Far from pre-empting the dilemma, however, this rejoinder brings out that Allison’s approach to Kant’s theory of judgment is guided by a commitment that is itself problematic. For Allison’s ascription to Kant of the Discursivity Thesis shows that he is committed to a view about sensible synthesis which in the Introduction I labeled Propositionalism. This is the view that the synthesis required for a sensible manifold to be the representation of an object – to be what Allison would call a determinate intuition – takes the form of judgment. In holding that an intuition presents an object to the mind only when subsumed under a concept, or “conceptualized,” Allison evinces a commitment to Propositionalism. And this means that his

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<sup>100</sup> Again, compare the discussion in §3.2, above.

attempt to escape the dilemma depends on the viability of Propositionalism as a view about Kant's theory of sensible synthesis.

I argued in the Introduction, however, that Propositionalism is problematic; that there are good reasons not to ascribe this view to Kant. Rather than rehearsing this argument here, I want simply to note the dependence of Allison's interpretation of Kant's theory of judgment on this position. If Propositionalism is problematic, as I think it is, there is no good reason to think that Allison's interpretation escapes the dilemma I have sketched. I take it, then, that the Complex Component View of the role of intuition should be rejected.

## 5. Conclusion

Above I characterized as a Component View of intuition any view on which the role of intuition in Kant's theory of cognition is that of a subject of predication. I suggested that we should distinguish two versions of such a view. The first is proto-Fregeanism, the view that intuition has a role analogous to that of a singular term. The second is what I called the Complex Component View, whose chief advocate is Allison. I have argued that both kinds of Component View fail. Proto-Fregeanism fails because it reads into Kant, anachronistically, a Fregean theory of judgment and tries to fit his conception of intuition into the mold of this theory. The CCV fails because it does not take into account the implications of, on the one hand, Kant's conception of intuition as object-dependent, and on the other, his construal of judgments of the understanding as a type of non-sensible, and thus non-object-dependent, cognition.

The motivation for considering Component Views of intuition in the first place was that tackling the Unity Problem requires us to give an account of the relation between intuition and judgment. A Component View is a natural candidate for such an account, and is seemingly

supported by the text. The result we have now reached is that Component Views of any stripe must be rejected. Accordingly, intuition must in no way be conceived as a component of judgment. This means that the relation between intuition and judgment must be of a fundamentally different sort. Giving a positive account of this relation is the task of the next chapter.