

particular, is also called philosophy—the science that we usually call *rational or intellectual political economy*.^{*}

§ 8

This cognition may be satisfactory enough within its own field. But, *first of all*, another circle of *objects* shows up that are not part of this field: *freedom, spirit, God*. The reason that these are not to be found upon that soil is not because they ought not to belong to experience. It is true that they are not experienced by the senses, but everything that is in consciousness at all is experienced. (This is even a tautological proposition.) The reason is that these objects present themselves directly as infinite with regard to their content.

There is an old saying that is usually (but falsely) attributed to *Aristotle*—as if it were supposed to express the standpoint of his philosophy: "Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu."⁸ (There is nothing in the intellect that has not been in sense-experience.)^a If speculative philosophy refused to admit this principle, that would have to be considered a misunderstanding. But conversely, philosophy will equally affirm: "Nihil est in sensu, quod non fuerit in intellectu"[—]in the most general sense that the *nous*, and more profoundly *the spirit*, is the cause of the world, and more precisely (see § 2) that feelings concerning right, ethical life, and religion are feelings—and hence an experience—of the kind of content that has its root and its seat in thinking alone.

^{*}When referring to the universal principles of political economy, English politicians often use the expression "philosophical principles", even in public speeches. In the House of Commons, on Feb. 2, 1825, Brougham, in his reply to the Speech from the Throne, talked of "the statesman-like and philosophical principles of Free Trade—for they are undoubtedly philosophical—upon the acceptance of which His Majesty has this day congratulated Parliament."—But it is not just this member of the opposition [who talks like that]. The annual dinner of the Shipowner's Society took place the same month, with the prime minister (the Earl of Liverpool) presiding, Lord Canning (the secretary of state) and Sir Charles Long (the paymaster-general of the army) were at his side. Here Lord Canning, in reply to the toast that was drunk to him, said: "a period has lately commenced when Ministers have had it in their power to apply to the state of the country the just maxims of *profound philosophy*."—However great the difference between English and German philosophy may be, it is in any case a matter for rejoicing that the name of philosophy is still honoured in the mouth of an English cabinet minister, while elsewhere it is used only as a nickname and an insult, or as something to be hated.⁷

a. *im Sinne in der Erfahrung*

§ 9

Secondly, subjective reason wants further satisfaction *with regard to form*; this form is *necessity* in general (see § 1). In the kind of science mentioned above [see § 7], the *universal* (the genus, etc.) contained in it is not determined on its own account, nor is it intrinsically^a connected with what is *particular*; but universal and particular are mutually external and contingent, just as much as the particularities that are combined are, on their own account, external to each other and contingent. Moreover, the beginnings are immediate, found, or presupposed. In both respects, the form of necessity fails to get its due. Insofar as it aims at satisfying this need, meditative thinking is the thinking that is philosophical in the proper sense, [i.e., it is] *speculative thinking*. Hence, as a meditation, which in all its *community* with that first [empirically scientific] meditation is at the same time *diverse* from it, philosophical thinking has its own *peculiar forms*, apart from the forms that they have in common. The universal form of it is the *Concept*.

Hence the relationship of speculative science to the other sciences is simply the following: speculative science does not leave the empirical content of the other sciences aside, but recognises and uses it, and in the same way recognises and employs what is universal in these sciences, [i.e.,] the laws, the classifications,^b etc., for its own content; but also it introduces other categories into these universals and gives them currency. So the distinction between speculative and empirical science relates only to this alteration of the categories. Speculative Logic contains the older logic and metaphysics; it preserves the same forms of thought, laws, and objects, but it develops and transforms them with further categories.

What has usually been called a "concept" has to be distinguished from the *Concept* in the speculative sense. The assertion, repeated many thousands of times, until it became a prejudice, that the Infinite cannot be grasped through concepts, is made only in the customary, or one-sided sense.

§ 10

This thinking itself in the philosophical mode of cognition needs to be grasped in its necessity, as well as justified in respect of its ability to become cognizant of the absolute objects. But any insight of this kind is

a. *für sich*

b. die Gattungen

itself philosophical cognition, and therefore it can only fall *within* philosophy. So any *preliminary* explanation would have to be an unphilosophical one, and it could not be more than a tissue of presuppositions, assurances, and argumentations, i.e., of contingent assertions, against which the opposite assurances could be made with the same right.

One of the main points of view in the *Critical Philosophy* is the following: before we embark upon the cognition of God, or of the essence of things, etc., we should first investigate our *faculty of cognition* itself, to see whether it is capable of achieving this. We should first get to know about the *instrument*, before undertaking the task that is supposed to be accomplished by means of it; for, otherwise, if the instrument is inadequate, then all further effort would have been expended in vain.⁹—[This thought seemed to be so *plausible* that it has elicited the greatest admiration and assent; and it led our cognition, from its concern with *ob-jects* and its dealings with them, back to itself, back to the formal aspect [of cognition itself]. But if we are not going to deceive ourselves with words, then it is obvious that other instruments can, of course, be investigated and judged in other ways than through the undertaking of the peculiar task for which they are meant to be used. But the investigation of cognition cannot take place in any other way than *cognitively*; in the case of this so-called tool, the "investigation" of it means nothing, but the cognition of it. But to want to have cognition *before* we have any is as absurd as the wise resolve of Scholasticus to learn to *swim before he ventured into the water*.¹⁰

Reinhold, who recognised the confusion that prevails in beginnings of this kind, has proposed as the remedy for it, that we should commence provisionally with a *hypothetical* and *problematic* philosophising, and continue with this—Heaven knows how—until somehow we happen, further along this road, to reach the *original truth*.⁶ When we look at it more closely, we can see that it leads to the usual procedure, namely the analysis of an empirical foundation, or of a provisional assumption that has been transformed into a definition. We should not overlook the correct consciousness involved in Reinhold's proposal that the usual course of presuppositions and provisional statements is a hypothetical and problematic procedure. But his correct insight does not alter the way that this procedure is constituted; on the contrary, it directly expresses the inadequacy of it.¹¹

a. Arbeit

b. das Umrathre

§ 11

The need for philosophy can be determined more precisely in the following manner. As feeling and intuition the spirit has what is sensible for its object; as fantasy, it has images; and as will, purposes, etc. But the spirit needs also, in *antithesis to*, or merely in *distinction from these forms* of its thereness and of its objects, to give satisfaction to its highest inwardness, to *thinking*, and to make thinking into its object. In this way, spirit comes to itself, in the deepest sense of the word; for its principle, its unadulterated selfhood, is thinking. But when it goes about its business in this way, what happens is that thinking gets entangled in contradictions; that is to say, it loses itself in the fixed nonidentity between thoughts; and therefore it does not reach itself, but rather stays stuck in its counterpart [in the world of objects]. The higher need goes against this result reached by a thinking that belongs to the understanding alone; it is grounded in the fact that thinking will not give up, but remains faithful to itself even in this conscious loss of its being at home with itself, "so that it *may overcome*,"¹² and may accomplish in thinking itself the resolution of its own contradictions.

The insight that the very nature of thinking is the dialectic, that, as understanding, it must fall into the negative of itself, into contradictions, is an aspect of capital importance in the Logic. When thinking despairs of being able to bring about, *from its own resources*,² the resolution of the contradiction in which it has put itself, then it returns to the solutions and appeasements in which the spirit has participated in its other modes and forms. But it was not necessary to let this return degenerate into *misology*, an experience which *Plato* already confronted;¹³ thinking does not need to conduct itself polemically against itself, which is what happens when a so-called *immediate knowing* is asserted to be the *exclusive* form of the consciousness of truth.

§ 12

The *coming into being* of philosophy out of the need that has been mentioned has *experience*, the immediate and argumentative consciousness, as its *starting point*. With these needs as its stimulus, thinking conducts itself essentially so as to *raise* itself above the natural, sensible, and argumentative consciousness into its own unadulterated element; and it gives itself initially a self-distancing *negative relationship* to this beginning. Thus,

a. aus sich