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Image and Concept: Mythopoetic Roots of Literature

Olga Freidenberg

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I shall have to begin with the same thing: the prison-like conditions in which this work was written.

I do not have the right of access to scholarly books. Therefore I have written from memory. I have been isolated from scholarly thought. My pupils and my friends have turned away, my classroom has been taken from me.

Under such conditions I decided to synthesize my thirty-seven year experience in research and fall silent.

Passer-by! Pause at this work and pray for scholarship!

Olga Freidenberg
20.03.1954

1

Explanation of the Theme

Everyone knows how awkward and artificial titles, those archaic attributes of books, can be. I should have given this book a different title, one closer to its theme and content. The book, after all, is intended to point out the peculiarities of the ancient literary image and then to pose the question of the aesthetic significance of the ancient concept, or, to be more precise, of those features that make it a literary form. But I have avoided pretentious titles, choosing instead to explain separately everything I wanted to put into the title.

The most important thing I have to say is that this work is an experiment in historical aesthetics. Its main thesis is that the appearance of ancient poetic categories originates in the appearance of concepts, since the ancient concept is only a form of the image; and in this form of the image the concept has the function of "transferral" [*perenesenie*], translation of concrete meanings of the image into abstract meanings, "transferring" [*perenosnye*: figural, metaphorical] meanings, which gives rise to metaphors and poetic figurality.

Formulating such a problem requires first of all justification. First, concepts are not the subject of aesthetics. Second, they are considered ahistorical. Third, ancient poetry is recognized once and for all as analogous to any European poetry. Fourth, any poetry must be composed of images, but not of concepts.

I must give explanations for all four of these points.

First and foremost, there is a stereotype that a literary critic is allowed to study the problems of the image, but not of the concept, as if the image were the business of aesthetics, and the concept of gnoseology, that is, of philosophy. "Well then, study the history of thought," I was told, "why should you work on literature?" What should one do, however, if it is just these concepts which determine the unique characteristics of literature? "Well then, study organic chemistry," one might say to a physiologist, "why are you working on physiology?"

Precisely ancient literature provides the case in which the peculiarity of the image is created by the concept. But before we speak of this we must show that both concepts and images are not constant, but historically differing phenomena. The mythological image and the poetic image differ sharply. But poetic images too change their structure depending on the historical epoch. And concepts? Concepts too are changeable. They change not only in content (with this all have agreed a long time ago), but also structurally, in their ability to reveal deeper and newer sides and connections of phenomena. This is where the basic problem lies. It is usually said that concepts were inherent in man from the beginning, that posing the question of the historical appearance of concepts would lead us to the false idea of "prelogical thought." And we are terribly afraid of arguing "from labels." But let us leave the term "prelogical" thought alone—we have shown more than once the arbitrary character of this term, which does not at all mean thinking without logic (if it were "pre-formal-logical" everything would be all right).

I consider exploring the problem of the origin and history of concepts not only justifiable, but also important. After all, if we deny the historicity of concepts, we thereby assert them as *a priori*, assert their innateness, their "pre-existence" for human thought. There is no third way. Phenomena either are historical—in which case they appear, change, take on other forms, or they are eternal and *a priori*. Therefore we need a definite answer to this basic question. Yes, there was a time when there were no concepts. Yes, concepts had their moment of origin. They had and have a long and very complicated history. The concept is a historical category like everything created by thought. True, we must agree on one thing. Science does not use philosophical terms in their everyday sense ("materialist" = lover of profit, "idealist" = dreamer, "concept" = summary idea). Of course man has always had "concepts" in the usual sense (summary ideas).

But scientifically the term "concept" signifies the abstract way of thought. Man began to think abstractly no earlier than the appearance of class society, and the prerequisites for such thinking appeared no earlier than the period of dissolution of clan-tribal society.

But we are most unaccustomed to speaking about the aesthetic significance of the concept. The opinion has become firmly established in criticism that poetry is everywhere and at all times due to thinking in images, while prose (particularly practical prose) is due to conceptual thought. Image and concept are usually opposed. This is to say nothing of the fact that "concept" and "image" are taken as ahistorical, as permanent categories with no specific historical character.

This principle prevails among Classical philologists in particular. Ancient concepts are considered complete, poetic images analogous to modern poetry. For example, the ancient metaphor is understood exactly as is the metaphor in modern European poetry—as a phenomenon of literary style, as a trope with its complete figurality of meanings, even with their symbolism.[1] But the later trope functions within a conceptual system and has the character of a separate "figure," while the Greek metaphor has no stylistic function and appears freely in a general figural context.

I must point out that our textbooks give Classical literature short shrift. On the one hand, it is considered completely the same kind of artistic literature as they think any literature had to be and always was. Created in an age of developed concepts, such a literature differs from ours only in its themes and in a degree of incompleteness. On the other hand, however, Classical literature is also considered religious, no less so than that of the ancient East. The modernizers have also made Greece and Rome into states of the modern type; in speaking of the Classical period they paint a ready-made picture of democracy or monarchy, republic or empire with our contemporary forms of class struggle. Such a society also has conceptual thought, like we do in the 20th century (in this respect the modernizers are consistent). Hence the completely incorrect understanding of Classical literature, one that distorts its historical peculiarity. It is examined from the point of view of the end of the history of consciousness; it is forced and deformed; it is seen, like the moon, only on the surface. And this is done most of all by those who shout loudest about the specific nature of Classical literature. They maintain that the best way to dissect the specific character of a phenomenon is

to take the fact in its readymade form, as something which begins and ends with itself, with no connections and relations, and from the position of finished conceptual judgments maximally contemporary with our own. They are belligerently certain that the specific nature of Classical literature can be known through the existing readymade phenomenon and that they are fighting against formalism. These good folk imagine that rock salt differs from water in that one is water and the other rock salt, and anyone who does a chemical analysis is accused of "ism" and of ignoring the facts (*spetsifika*).

The concept of the polis does not save them either. By polis most understand a peculiar ancient form of state structure, that is, a separate and limited city-state which generates such qualities as local patriotism, local citizenship (in actual fact polis collectivism), a certain narrow-mindedness which makes political ideas too stagnant. These theories are now common in Classical philology. Born in the West, they have taken root among us as well, introduced by those who most of all demand "specifics" and the Marxist method.

The polis, they say, is born, flowers, and dies. We can correspondingly allocate the periods of birth (Archaic), flowering (Classical), and degradation (Hellenic) of Greek (and even Roman) literature. But when asked how they explain the polished completeness of these ancient polis forms, these theoreticians answer, "That's exactly the problem, that low socio-political forms can generate high forms of ideology." And they quote Marx.

Here there are two problems. No polis can be used to explain the appearance of poetic categories, and they do appear in the Classical world. One or another form of city structure cannot be a factor in literary thought. Furthermore, not only is the method of the polis theory incorrect, but so is its analysis of the social structure. Birth, flowering, and degradation are relative concepts. In the Archaic period, for example, lyric genres not only appear, but undergo degradation, and the age of Hellenism can in no way be considered degradation with its high forms of culture and with the appearance of independent verbal literature.

In our textbooks the polis theory, denying the class struggle, has managed to become mixed with the popular class method. But this has hurt more than it has helped Classical literature. We should have said long ago that ancient classes do not correspond to European classes. All freeborn men are considered one class, while within this class there are moneylenders and there are artists. Ancient slaves

could also be freeborn men who were taken captive. Ancient slaves themselves were made up of yesterday's slave owners and even kings and aristocrats, yesterday's "intelligentsia," but alongside them were debtors, poor, and conquered natives. To unite them in a class opposed, let us say, to the working freeborn is to force the facts. If we consider that there are two classes in Greece, the slave owners and the slaves, then we will not find a class struggle between them. The social struggle takes place not between these two classes, but exclusively between the rich and poor of one and the same free class of slave owners. The view of ancient democracy is also completely incorrect. Greek democracy faces not ahead to constitutional rights and freedom of the individual, but backwards, to the collectivism of the clan and patriarchal communal principles. It could not have been otherwise: the struggle of the old and the new 2000 years before our time had no other course but liberation from clan-tribal "democracy."

I would not have to mention all of this, which has no direct bearing on my topic, were it not for the fact that the modernization of the ancient world as a whole and in all its parts is reflected in all questions of ancient literature. This modernization deprives science of freedom. Modernization keeps crying "bring ancient literature closer to us, show it to us as a literature that is ours, comprehensible to us," as if we cannot comprehend something that has its own character. The artistic nature of ancient literature is not a given but a problem. The connection of Greek literature to cults, as paradoxical as it may seem, does not run counter to its emancipation from religion. Its aestheticism is of a particular type. The greatest riddle is the fact that Greek literature, in spite of its connection with cult, became the first art in the world, that is, managed to set off on the path toward overcoming if not religion itself, then at least subjection to it, and gained independence by means of its aesthetic qualities. Greek literature was created without literary precedents, and therefore without literary traditions—in this lies its theoretical importance. It cannot be discussed as one discusses a continuing literature, although the problem is that it is discussed in exactly that way. For Greece there is a question which cannot be gotten around: how did its first literature appear? This is as fair and appropriate a question for Greece as is the question of its political system.

Before Greek literature there was no literature. That is, not in the Classical world. As far as the ancient East is concerned, there was none there either, though this is immaterial, inasmuch as the "child-

hood" of an emerging society could not take over the readymade patterns of an aging society.

At the same time, Greek literature does not appear out of nowhere, in a vacuum, like the Biblical world. What preceded it?

Scholarly literature has worked out the answer to this question beautifully. True, the field of this question is misnamed: what has up to now been called the history of religion, in the English sense folklore, in the French primitive thinking should be called something completely different. This thinking is not primitive, and this folklore is not yet folklore, and most of all, this religion is not religion at all. But that's not the point. It must be pointed out that science has discovered and studied closely the huge field of pre-Classical semantic material—myths, rites, cults, semanticized things, and verbal forms. **(I use the term "semantics" throughout the whole book to mean only the mythological semantic system.) What is all this? Is it really the case that all this exists in itself, and Greek literature, consisting of a stack of writers' works, exists in itself? Is it really the case that ancient slave-owners liked to use folk works as Pushkin liked to use Arina Rodionovna's folktales? Must we imagine that Greek literature also had nothing to do with semanticized things as, let us say, Dostoevsky did with mirrored dressers or Romain Rolland did with department stores?

Why did Classical drama come out of cult? And if drama absolutely had to come out of cult and become tragedy, then why did tragedy appear only among the Greeks, when all the ancient peoples had cults? Why is it that not one folk theater had tragedies, but all presented only comedies? If "tragedy comes out of cult, and comedy out of life itself," then that must mean that not one people ever had cults, and folk life was characterized by irrepressible gaiety and playful experiences. Comparison of performances occurring in the Classical world beyond the bounds of art (in religion, in everyday life, in science, in custom, in law, etc.) to those contained in art itself shows their homogeneity, with, however, the single difference that in art they take on a new artistic quality.

But what makes up the poetic composition of Classical literature is only half of the problem. There is, however, another half: if Classical poetic categories are the same as mythological images, then what made them poetic and what shows their poeticism? One problem cannot be separated from the other. The study of Classical literature can set itself various goals.

But one must always remember that the Classical literary process consisted of the artistic re-creation of images that had not been artistic before. Metaphorization, objectively created by the birth of concepts, lays the groundwork for this process.

Classical literature without question requires a different method from that applied to literature that has already "become." The one-track way is completely inapplicable. It is an absolute mistake to study it as something readymade in form, something logical and well known. Because of its uniqueness one cannot examine the system of Classical art from the positions of our contemporary conceptual thinking. I would even go so far as to say that one cannot apply so called "development" to Greek literature: in Greek literature concept rests on image and they must be studied together. Image and concept in Greek literature are not two pieces of clothing, inner and outer, but a single semantic whole that can be dissected only by science.

I maintain that the analogical method distorts our understanding of the very essence of Classical literature. I maintain that it must be taken from both sides, including its semantics, because semantics is precisely the element of concreteness that is subjected to recreation in the artistic consciousness. The Classical concept is formally constructed according to the semantics of the image, and if we ignore semantics, we ascribe to the Classical world our formal-logical thinking. Nevertheless I would very much like to stress that this double analysis must be done only in the case of Classical (Greek) literature, and by no means of post-Classical—not Pushkin and Goethe, not even Derzhavin or Lomonosov,—it is ridiculous even to have to mention the anecdotal examples by which some try to discredit the semantic method. But a universal method is a fiction of metaphysics. To analyze in the same way Sophocles and Byron (I am not speaking of the thematic content which, thank God, no one claims is identical) is tantamount to dressing Phaedra and Hippolytus in French court costume as was done in the age of Louis XIV. And this is exactly what is done by those who cry loudest about "specifics" and call themselves Marxists. The only thing they see "specifics" in is the differences between writers' thematics and the complete absence of any kind of regularities.

Classical literature is still in the process of becoming. Its course is determined by the relation between old image-thought and new conceptual thought. One and the same semantic material, depending on the age, could turn into any genre, depending on the charac-

ter of concepts. This character determines not only the genres of Classical literature, but also the literary means employed within the genres. And therefore the problem of the concept constitutes in this case an integral object of aesthetics.

I have yet to discuss the factual contents of this book. I would like to stress most of all those chapters in which I give my understanding of the Greek tragedy. In my analysis of tragedy I avail myself of every opportunity to show its origins not from cult, but from *balagan*; inasmuch as this idea is presented for the first time in scholarly literature, I was obliged to be rather persistent in my selection of material proof.

It may appear that the intervening four chapters have no direct bearing on tragedy, but in fact they too are necessary. They point out the features that appear and disappear, take on various aspects, and seem about to take shape when they vanish. Phenomena in these intermediate chapters date from various periods, some even later than tragedy, but the elements they express are present in tragedy either overtly or covertly; they are effective in tragedy. These phenomena contain elements of tragedy in other forms and other combinations. In other words, the formants of tragedy are not archetypes and not "givens," but moveable parts of a semantic system which are capable of being recreated. Internal connections link precisely different things (lyric, philosophy, comedy, tragedy). I would like to show these various phenomena exactly because it is in them that the formants of tragedy pop up here and there, formants that have nothing in common with tragedy until a certain time.

The same semantic inventory of images we find in tragedy appears before our eyes taking different shape in different texts and in various forms. The historical age changes not only the content of the concept, but also its structure. It was the historical conditions of the Classical world that made artistic concepts structurally dependent on mythological images.

19 Aug. 1954

2

Metaphor

1

Ancient Greek literature is significant for theory because it was the first in the history of world literatures to become art. But this literature was far from having the finished forms that were later ascribed to it. In Greece the literary system is only beginning to take shape. All the imagery contained in ancient literature had behind it more than a thousand years of existence as preliterary imagery. But it was in Greek literature that this imagery first began to acquire aesthetic qualities, and that which had had no poetic function before Greek literature now began to take on the lines of poetic forms. This changed the whole character of Greek literature, and "the genetics of aesthetics" (the peculiarities evoked by the birth of the literary function) became the basis of its peculiarity.[1]

We call the ancient verbal "muse" art literature only by convention. When we analyze this "literature" we find in it an entire system of thought which no longer has active meaning for it, but which at the same time cannot be extracted without destroying the literature. To put it more strongly, Greek literature owes its existence and its organic chemistry to this system of thought which is already inactive. The new system of thought grew up out of it directly and was directly dependent on it, so that unlike all other,

later literatures, the whole of Greek literature was a whole at once dual and single.

This semantically inactive system of thought is simple to point to and label: it represents mythological imagery. Its nature is concreteness.

Extensive scholarly literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that ancient abstract concepts, in spite of their novelty and restructuring of meanings, not only derived from concrete images, but even continued to preserve these images within themselves and to be supported by their semantics. Mythological images began to disappear not because people stopped believing in myths, but because within the very image that reflected the structure of human consciousness a rift appeared between what the image was intended to communicate and the means of its communication. In this regard the history of ancient ideologies is the history of overcoming the concrete-image element. Greece begins this process; Rome finishes it.

The new form of thought, which was born directly from mythological image, is characterized by abstraction. It is thinking in concepts.

Mythological image (concrete sense-thinking) and concept (abstract thinking) are two methods of perceiving the world which are historically distinct and can be dated. The image, like the concept, is a logical cognitive category; but its essence lies in the fact that mythological image thought does not separate the knower from the known, the phenomenon (object) from its properties (symptoms), the represented from the representing. These two methods of cognition were distinguished by the Greeks themselves. One, corresponding to the concrete image, they called τὸ αἰσθητόν or τὸ ὁρατόν (that which is known by the sense organs, particularly by sight); the other, corresponding to the abstract concept, they called τὸ νοητόν (known by speculation). Concrete thinking later came to be called sense or emotional thinking (for example, in Marxist logic, unfamiliar with the achievements of the new science of primitive thought, ethnography, and scientific folklore study). But this is an unfortunate mistake. Emotional thinking is an incorrect, unscientific term. And concrete subject-object thinking is also logical, and it is not evoked by any "emotions": the distinction between "reason," "will," and "feeling" is a very old one.[2] The Greeks were correct in distinguishing between two methods of perceiving the world. But we must add to this that the basis of νοητόν (speculation) was also perception of

the sensible world, and cognition by the sense organs (αἰσθητόν) always represented semantics, that is, thought. The difference between image and concept is the difference between concrete and abstract thought. With this reservation, the distinction drawn by the Greeks remains in force.

Although mythological image and concept are two different means of knowing the world, at a certain historical stage they mutually conditioned one another. Classical antiquity was the epoch in which concepts began to arise, to spring up and to grow. But here we see no "fully hatched," purely abstract concepts, which might have followed had sensual images died away. Quite the contrary, all the material from Greece shows that the original concepts arose not in the form of abstract categories which had overcome the sensuality of the mythological image, but exactly the opposite—in the form of those selfsame sensual categories which had only changed their function. I do not know how the process of the formation of concepts took place in the ancient East, but in Greece concepts were born as a form of the image, and their abstraction contained within it concreteness, which had yet to be removed. Coming into being as it did immediately from the sensual (more than that, even from the visual) image, the ancient concept represented the same concrete image, but in a new essence—an abstract one.

At this moment of the appearance of the νοητόν out of the ὁρατόν, at this moment of their contradictory symbiosis, that is, in the cognition of the abstract through the sensual, at this moment the literary image was born as well; it would be more precise to say that ancient concepts appeared in the categories of literary images.

But what does it mean that ancient concepts came into being as images with an abstract function? I have in mind the metaphor and its figurative meanings. Ancient concepts took shape in the form of metaphors—as figurative, abstract meanings of concrete meanings. But the metaphor was not a given quantity and did not take shape immediately. It had its own process of coming into being and historical evolution, the beginning of which took place precisely in Classical antiquity. Its figurality began in the archaic period in Greece with the transferral of concrete to abstract meanings, and was still being completed in the more recent times of conceptual "figurality."

But all ancient concrete images represented a compact semantic system. Where did this system go with the formation of concepts?

The point is that it did not go anywhere at all. It remained untouched. The former mythological semantics of the images acquired an abstract meaning, but this abstract meaning was suggested by the mythological semantics which acted as material for the abstraction. At the same time, the abstract meaning gave these semantics a completely new character in regard to meaning. This is why we come across these semantics in all ancient concepts with a greater or lesser predominance of meaning.

Characteristic of the mythological image was ~~the lack of quality of representations~~, so-called polysemantism, the semantic identity of images.[3] This phenomenon has been explained by the continuity of subject and object,[4] of the world that is known and the man who knows it. Concrete thought, ~~evoked by~~ a mythological perception of the world, was such that man could conceive of objects and phenomena only in their individuality, without generalization, and in their external physical presence, without entering into their qualities. We call such mythological representations "images" precisely because of their concreteness (object-ness), as opposed to concepts which "abstract" or pull away the quality of the objects from the objects themselves, thereby giving objects a speculative character.

In earlier mythological thought the "property" of an object was thought of as a living being, a double of the object (in the words of Potebnia, the symptom was thought of together with the substance[5]). Mythologically, the world was represented as divided into identical doubles, of which one had the "property" and the other did not. These images served to express man's most basic, but also most summary representations of the alternation of life and death. The "property" corresponded to authenticity, to a certain essence which lay at the root of the object, that is, to life; the double without the "property," on the other hand, was only an external "likeness" of the authentic and signified the image, that is, death.

The prerequisites for such a world view were brought on by gnoseological causes—the absence of qualitative determinants, the summarity and identity of representations. Summarity and identity forced people to divide the world into pairs of phenomena which had something in common—life and death, warmth and cold, light and darkness, and so on. These were personified in two beings that were "like" each other. One of them (the positive principle) represented the "property," and the other being (the negative principle)—only its concrete "likeness," external appearance without the "property."

Such a division into two identical and equally concrete principles was subjected to conceptual reworking. The point is that in the formation of concepts the differentiation of the subject from the object played a decisive cognitive role. This differentiation slid apart and transformed the vision of the world, separated the knowing man from known reality, introduced a distinction between active principles and those subject to action (active from passive, things from their properties, result from cause). As soon as "I" was separated from "not-I," objects lost their former "property," which had apparently been inherent in them substantially, and the doubles were disconnected. Concept turned the property of an object into a speculative category. Abstracting the features of the object from the object itself and comparing these features, it introduced alongside identification and similarity the new category of differentiation. The doubles—things, elements, and beings received a separate abstract quality and a divided existence, having fallen apart both among themselves and internally. Thus already in the oldest epic, in Homer, the former hero-doubles have become different beings. Homer does not yet have ~~conceptually~~ forces of nature such as "water," "fire," "trees," "animals," but still has concrete individual (~~instantaneous~~) Poseidons, Hephaistuses, Aphrodites, and Heras; yet Achilles and Patroclus are already separated and qualitatively different, and Hector is different from Apollo, Penelope from Athena, Odysseus from Antinous. Just so in the folk puppet theater (*balagan*) one can sense the division into things and beings which are "like" one another, which provoke by their "external similarity" two sets of similar events. This is a result of the conceptual reworking of the old images.

The separation of subject from object was a lengthy process, which continued into the beginning of Classical antiquity. First it took the form of perception of the subject in the categories of the object and of transferral of the object onto the subject. The object continued to retain its concreteness (the mythic world), and the subject was new, not completely discovered, and it was being modeled on the object. Ancient consciousness understood itself through "not-I" for a long time, and this was the cognitive basis for the formation of religion. Ancient man thought pantheistically, understanding even his own personal life as a manifestation of the divine will. When he composed songs, he ascribed their composition to the gods. Expressing his emotional states in lyric, he sang himself by means of showing

the states of others and introduced for this purpose mythological characters. He created a special genre—tragedy—by means of which he could expound his views without ever revealing his physical presence. Such a world view was particularly in evidence in the archaic period in Greece, when the leading arts were architecture and sculpture. This epoch created dwellings of the gods and statues of the gods. Man did not see himself. The subjective could be understood only through the objective. And therefore, in essence, all Greek art was "human." Whatever it might try to depict, in it, through the objective, was born man.

2

If concepts had replaced already obsolete mythological images, if there had been first images and then concepts, we would have before us such abstract thought as could only appear in recent centuries. The history of cognition, however, was different. Classical antiquity shows us that the content of the old mythological images turned into the texture of the newly arisen concepts.[6] That the image did not disappear, but remained inside the concept, formally untouched and with its concreteness not completely eliminated, shows that early Classical concepts were actually images which had only changed their function. This also explains the fact that the new conceptual phenomena were named with the old image lexicon, that is, that the abstract was denoted by the concrete (for example, law by "pasture,[7]" suffering by "labor pains,[8]" *et al.*). The mythological perception of phenomena in the form of two identical opposites is preserved in the concept only in the structural side of its semantics. But its cognitive content changes. Concept breaks up these two identities, leaving behind only an external community, but it introduces the qualitative opposition of the authentic to the illusory. Phenomena begin to be divided into those which really exist and those which are externally "likened" to the real—phenomena whose existence is illusion. In ancient understanding, all "illusion" is not a mere mirage, but the external aspect of that which really exists, a formal variant or allomorph of the same reality (speaking in our modern times). But that is not all. That which "seems" is a copy of the "authentic"—a cast—based on a complete "similarity" with reality. With the dominance of concrete concepts, early Classical thought

attributed all illusion to the world of space. Just such a copy-likeness, such an illusion of reality was the Classical "image" (εἰκών, εἴδωλον, *imago*). Such an image was founded on the idea of "imitation" (*mimesis*), understood as concrete and not illusory imitation, an imitation of reality in reality (cp. the ancient Indians' "Samsara world," where illusions reigned—mirages and evil opposed to the world of truth and good). The theory of external reflections and copies occupied a large place in antiquity. The object prevailed over the subject, making the entire area of human action a gnoseological microcosm, illusory in essence, but "imitating" the authentic macrocosm. Mimesis also overcame the dualism which was so strong among many of the peoples of the ancient East who had not created their own literary systems. The antinomies of existence and nonexistence, of good and evil, of truth and fiction were gnoseologically reconciled in Classical antiquity in the theory of mimesis. The world had "essence" and "appearance." Appearance was the "image." The fact that it was not created by human free invention, but had a full external expression of authentic essence made it subordinate to the "truth," made it an aspect of the truth; and together with the truth it composed a single indivisible whole.

The growth of concepts and the strengthening of abstraction, which overcame the concreteness of mythological thought, led to important changes in the conception of illusion. Alongside the former antithesis of "essence" and "appearance" there appeared a conscious distinction between the world of space and the world of thought. Now the "illusory" took on new features: not only was it opposed to "authenticity," but it also became a category of imagination, appearance to the mind. The path of such recognition, however, was difficult and long. While it was still being perfected in the aesthetic theories of antiquity, literature came to it in practice. Classical antiquity, by the way, never worked out a term "illusion" which would show its new features (to the Romans "illusion" meant ridicule,[9] with the Greeks it was replaced by "deceit[10]"); imagination itself was long understood in the concrete sense as an "imprint" in the soul.[11]

In the artistic consciousness mimesis took on a new nature. From imitation of reality in reality (in actual fact) it became imitation of reality in imagination, that is, an illusory reflection of real phenomena. But here we need to make a significant reservation. The Classical ideas of the real and the illusory were directly opposite to

ours both gnoseologically and in the content of these ideas: antiquity took as authentic what we consider nonexistent, and what is for us real it attributed to the world of spatial "appearance."[12] It considered nonexistence real; existence, a "copy," an illusion of the real (nonexistence). In our terms, the ancient literary image was an illusion of reality, but from the ancient point of view, it was an illusion of an illusion: the real world, the world of the microcosm, was considered only a "likeness," an "imitation," a sensory "image" of the authentic macrocosm, the other world that was perceived by speculation. And Plato was completely consistent in finding a basis for this "popular" view when in his theory of the literary image art is "the image of an image" or "an imitation of imitation." I should say here that because of the particular ancient understanding of "realism" we cannot pose the question of realism in Classical antiquity without confusion, just as we cannot pose the connected question of its materialism or idealism. Ancient cognitive "biune monism" made idealism materialistic and materialism idealistic.[13] Thus from the historical point of view the strongly antirealistic conception of the Classical period is actually an early form of realism. After all, the ancient "image" objectively corresponded to the whole world of reality, no matter that the Greeks explained reality itself as a kind of "illusion." Everything that went beyond the bounds of "speculation" (νοητόν) was not opposed to living truth, but strove to "imitate" it. And although ancient theoretical thought denied reality, literary practice was sustained only by reality. Though hostile to realism, ancient art was at the highest level of realism possible for its age. We, however, are forced to speak about Classical antiquity in the language of abstract concepts; what we describe in this language does not coincide with the contents of Classical images, which are still only becoming concepts, concepts with a concreteness that has yet to be overcome. Our language smooths over and levels out the specific character of ancient ideas. But these problems are even greater when our terms turn out to be opposite to the ancient ones in content. Objectively, the task of the Classical literary image is to be, in illusory recreation, true to reality. It is the creative principle, not only "miming" the original that lies before it, but recreating anew all its visible forms in speculative refraction.

In the Classical artistic consciousness all forms of "appearance" are represented as illusory. The very category of illusion is still naive, with a strong shading of uneliminated concreteness. The

unreliability characteristic of imagination becomes the basic feature of illusion.

With the appearance of artistic thinking there begins the construction of the "image" of the world, already consciously illusory in its nature. It corresponds in the imagination to all the visible forms of reality. The more ancient the art is, the more the "image" is tied to its original and the more thoroughly it attempts to imitate it. The plastic arts are born as mimesis of the human body; epic goes even further in this respect: in it the "image" is even closer to the visual, object reality. On the other hand, the later the age, the deeper the conceptual distancing of the "image" from the "literal" original that it imitates. In the mature Classical art of Greece—in tragedy—the comparison of the "image" is directed not towards "copying" reality (therefore it is not "realistic" as Homeric epic was), but towards representing in phenomena precisely their hidden side, that invisible to sight. Concepts require a selection of features, abstraction from object-ness; concepts provoke generalization and qualitative evaluation; in the Classical period in Greece—in tragedy—the literary image uses the concrete visible forms of external reality only as material for the abstract problems of ethics and for poetic figurality. The image ceases to strive for precision of that which it conveys and puts the interpretive meaning foremost. It "says differently" [*ino-skazat', allo-agoreuein*] what it sees and conveys concreteness in such a way that it turns into a metaphor of itself, that is, into a kind of concreteness that is an abstracted and generalized new meaning.

3

This led to the appearance of so-called figurative meanings—to the metaphor. The former identity of meaning of the original and its transmission was replaced by the mere illusion of such identity, with an identity that "seemed" to the imagination. Formally the semantic identity of the original and its transmission remained the same. But in actuality illusion introduced its "as if" into the transmission of the image, and precision turned into ~~conscious~~ unreliability—the same thing in form, but with a new content. Before, for example, "walk around" meant to walk in a circle. When Sophocles' Creon says to the guard that the latter is "walking around,"[14] he does not at all

patent *

* In a metaphor these same words have a figural meaning

have in mind literal circular walking, but something that wittingly has nothing at all in common with the precise direct meaning of his own words. He has in mind exactly their other meaning, which only seems literal, but is in actual fact abstract and generalized, the metaphorical, ~~figurative~~ meaning ("you are walking around and confusing the issue"). And when the guard says to Creon that "the short way became long,"[15] he has in mind both the real road he had to take to the King's palace and the way of doubts, the "way" in the metaphorical sense. In illusory refraction "way," "walking" take on the meaning of "seeming" roads and travels "as if" real, but in fact completely different, only imagined by consciousness, containing in themselves another meaning, not at all literal. The figurative (transferred) meanings were the objective result of "transferring" the semantic features from one object to another, not identical to the first, but only illusorily compared to it.

The transfer of meaning could not have appeared if the concrete and real identity (the "way" really corresponding to the road) had not been forced to change into a seeming and abstract identity (the "way" in the sense of "course of thoughts"). Metaphor appeared on its own as a form of the image in the function of concept. Its appearance required one condition: two identical concrete meanings had to be split up; one of them continued to be concrete, the other became its own transposition to concept.

The Classical period provides just this kind of metaphor. The mythological identity of semantics is here still present; but it is precisely here that the concrete thought begins to move in the direction of the future abstraction. Without having before us semantic identities—without studying mythological semantics—we would never have been able to determine the most characteristic feature of ancient metaphor: the possibility of basing it on two such meanings which are both equal and different ("way" understood concretely and "way" understood figuratively). Eventually all metaphors are characterized by the "figurality" of their meanings, but between Classical and later metaphors there is an essential difference.

The gnoseological premise of ancient figurality is a characteristic feature that distinguishes all ancient figurative meanings: behind ancient transfer of meaning there must lie the former genetic identity of two semantics—the semantics of the object from which the features are "transferred" and the semantics of the other object, to which they are transferred. This former identity already bears a conceptual character of mere seeming illusory identity (~~hidden~~ comparison). This formally continuing identity of the image and the concept which were cognitively different is the distinctive feature of ~~Classical~~ metaphor. The illusion of the apparent meaning had to come out of the correspondence to the real meaning and be its "copy" and "likeness."

Modern metaphor can be created by transferring a feature from any phenomenon onto any other ("iron will"). Our metaphor leaves out the comparative "as" which is always present in it ("a will hard as iron"). Because of the generalizing sense of the metaphor, we can build it as we like without considering the literal meaning of the words ("health to reason!"). But ancient metaphor could say "iron will" or "health to reason" only if "will" and "iron," "health" and "reason" were synonyms. Thus Homer could say "iron sky,[16]" "iron heart,[17]" because the sky, man, and man's heart were represented in myth as iron. Later one synonym, "iron heart," takes on in conceptual thinking the figurative meaning of "unbending," "stern" heart; but "iron sky" remains a mythological image in its direct literal meaning "sky of iron," and in archaic, pre-conceptual epic it does not become a metaphor.

Homer says "salty sea" because for the Greeks "sea" and "salt" are synonyms. But we never come across "salty food;" the pure concept without its image base cannot appear in Homer. One may object that the sea is also salty. We also say "salt tears," and tears really can taste like salt; nevertheless, "salt tears," "white hands," and so on, while corresponding to real features of the objects involved have a "poetic" character; they are figures that derive among the ancient peoples from image tautologies. Similarly the ~~Classical~~ singer says "flame of love," "abyss of grief;" love and flame were identical personifications, the abyss was represented as underworld-suffering. In no way could ancient man have said as we can in Russian "abyss of light," "abyss of happiness," "abyss of beautiful things," and so on ["abyss," "*bezdna*," has the second meaning "multitude" in modern Russian]. Our language and our metaphors are made up of abstract concepts, the ~~Classical~~ words "love," "abyss," "suffering" are in fact concrete, and each continues to be an image personification, although it has taken on a second conceptual (abstract) meaning.* Thus Arrogance was once an agrarian divinity; Aeschylus' metaphor "blooming arrogance bore as its fruit the sheaf of destruction, therefore it was necessary to

* In antiquity figurative meaning can only be constructed on the condition that the tenor and the vehicle are semantically identical.

reap an all-crying harvest"[18] was based on the semantic identity of "arrogance" and such agricultural images as blooming, bearing fruit, sheaf, reap, harvest, which take on in Aeschylus a figurative, abstract meaning. While ancient figurative meanings require like ours the presence of two meanings, one concrete and one abstract—a binary structure, in the ancient period both of these terms nevertheless had to have identical semantics, otherwise figurative meanings were impossible. Behind ancient transfer of meaning lay the identity of two semantics, an identity which derived from thinking in mythological images. Thus Aeschylus' metaphor "to send the eye's enchanting arrow"[19] (to look with passion) is based on the semantic identity of "eye" and "arrow," "enchantment" and "love;" the epithet "enchanting," "bewitching" has the literal meaning of "charm" in the sense of "magic," of that concrete force which was an attribute to Aphrodite (her magic girdle, which enclosed all the charms of love) and which was a "property" of all personifications of the passion of love. But in Aeschylus this mythological image, without changing its semantics, takes on the abstract meaning of a "passionate glance" only likened to the "arrow of an eye." The two semantic meanings, of which one has been turned by conceptual thinking into an "illusion" and the other into a "comparison" to the other, were cast completely objectively in the form of semantic transference. Thus there appeared ~~figurality.~~ allegoricity

It came about when the old image in its untouched form took on yet another, a new meaning. The old image is the mythological concrete image, with its one-dimensional unique time, with frozen space, immobile, without quality, and resultative—finished, without causality and without coming into being. This very image begins to take on a second meaning, an "other" meaning [*allo, inoe*]; it, the same thing, appears in the form of something else with which it merges and from which, in essence, it differs. The other-saying of the image, the figurality of the image has a conceptual character: concreteness takes on abstract features, uniqueness—the features of multiplicity, the lack of quality becomes tinged with sharply delineated, at first monolithic qualities, space opens up, the element of movement from cause to its result is introduced. The former mythological image acquires a second, "other" meaning of itself, of its own semantics. It takes on the function of ~~figurality~~ allegory. But ~~figurative representation~~ of what? Of itself, the image.

the "other-saying"

In fact, in any ~~Classical~~ metaphor, the figurative meaning is tied to the concrete semantics of the mythological image and represents its conceptual duplicate. One of Aeschylus' metaphors (whose age is shown by the use of alliteration) says "let us not experience that which causes great suffering, for which a great sea is ploughed by the sword."[20] The image "plough by the sword" leads to mythology; the semantic identity of the instruments of agriculture and war is well known. The great sea ploughed by the sword is the sea across which Paris sailed with Helen to Troy, the sea of love which started a war among peoples. The mythological images continue to speak their own concrete language. But they also "figure" [*ino-skazuiut*]" themselves, yielding the conceptual meaning "let us avoid the ruinous consequences of love."

ancient

other-saying

~~Classical~~ figurality ("other-saying") consists in the fact that the image, without losing its character (to plough the sea with a sword), acquires a meaning which does not at all correspond to its literal meaning (the destructive results of love). This new meaning begins to communicate the semantics of the image "otherwise," differently, on a completely different mental level—abstractly, as if thought read one thing and said another. For later European figurality, to link two phenomena by analogy it was enough to find one common feature, even a purely abstract one. We say "my friend is my support," meaning that a man can "support" in the abstract sense like a hard physical object. When we say "drown in bliss" we draw an analogy between immersion in the sea and abstract "immersion" in feeling. In our language "fruitless illness," and "fruitless suffering" signify something useless and superfluous. But ancient figurality requires no abstraction; it is not satisfied with analogy of separate conceptual features, but seeks full semantic identity of its two parts. And this is possible only on the basis of mythological images. Where there is no full connecting identity of two meanings, there can be no ancient metaphor. Antiquity could have no metaphors that were abstract or based on broad generalization ("woe from wit," "a great wind drives away clouds"). This predetermines the set of Classical metaphors. They can be only solar, agricultural, and chthonic—nothing else. Put another way, ~~Classical~~ abstraction is still formally connected to the concreteness of the mythological image and in its earliest forms it has the character of transferral, *i. e.* of still incomplete abstraction, of a conditioned, significantly concretized transferral (abstraction of what?—of this given phenomenon).

Ancient

ancient

When Sophocles says "fruitless illness"[21] he follows the mythological images of "fruitlessness" as drought, as death, and of "illness" as an ill-fated woman who cannot have children. It is precisely from this identity of "fruitlessness" and "evil" that ancient thought creates the figure of "death." Without the image of "fruitlessness" such a figure could not appear. If for us these semantics no longer exist, if for us "fruitless" signifies the abstract concept "superfluous," "useless,"—such a figurative meaning cannot appear. On the other hand, the very transferral of the Classical figurality still has an insignificant measure of abstraction when compared to later transferrals! The concreteness of the mythological image is still too close to the figurative meaning which "abstracts" and is "transferred" from the image to the concept. In essence, the early Classical concept differs from the image only in the abstract character of the very semantics the image expresses. Such synonymity of the image and the concept shows that the ancient concept was at certain stages a form of the image.

4

In Classical figurative speech the concept corresponds to the image not only semantically, but strictly formally as well, neither changing it in form nor adding anything to it. When Aeschylus says that his hero "went into the stormy sea,"[22] he does not comment on his thought. The Classical audience, for which "storm" and "stormy raging sea" usually signified "death," creates in its imagination a picture of complete finality. There is no sea anywhere near the hero; he has not gone into anything, and the finality of his position is of a moral and religious character. Nevertheless, the audience, hearing about the sea, thinks about the hero's moral conflict. The image speaks in its own language (of images) without recourse to any concept, and the audience hearing this language creates in its mind something completely different [*inoe*]—a concept abstracted into an idea. The semantics of the image are "transferred" onto the concept. The stormy sea is a moral collision. But what do they have in common? The semantics of raging waters and of inescapable misfortune, the mythological semantics of the "watery abyss" as an image of death. But does this semantic identity really still remain valid for Aeschylus? Does the 5th century audience think that Aeschylus' hero dies in the abyss? Of course not. They understand that the hero

suffers moral, not physical misfortune, and that he has not walked into the stormy sea, but it is "as if" he had walked in. Figurality is achieved by means of illusion "imitating" the formal side of the image and "compared" to the semantics of the image, but its similarity to the image is only "apparent." The difference between the semantics of the image and the semantics of the concept, which rests on the illusion of identity, consists in the transferral of meaning, in the figurality [*inoskazatel'nost'*] of the concept, in the abstract and generalized meaning of the same thing the image speaks of. Classical figurality appears as mimesis of the image, as an illusory form of the image, "seemingly" corresponding to it, but in reality "other" [*inaia*].

The mythological image always means what it says and says only what it means. Concept has a level at which it says something other than what it means and means something other than what it says. On this level concept appears in the form of the metaphor, or rather it is this level which gives rise to the metaphor. Such is the concept in the Classical period, when it has a dual nature—one in form, another in sense. The Classical concept from archaic Greece to late Rome is to overcome this duality by bringing the form and the sense closer together. In this process concrete ideas undergo abstraction.

Transferral or metaphorization is the beginning of this process. Concrete meanings take on figural meaning as well: the concrete meanings of the mythological image become the abstract meanings of the concept. The image meanwhile both remains formally the same and loses its semantic nature. And the concept serves as a new abstract form of the earlier concrete (sense) image. This is the beginning of the appearance of concepts and of the dying out of mythological images.

Figurative meanings! Who could have invented such a semantic obstacle if it had not appeared in human consciousness as the result of gnoseological laws! On the one hand, Classical figurality does not correspond to the authentic meanings of the image. However, its figural meaning is absolutely coordinated with its direct meaning. It preserves absolute conceptual precision of the image semantics, but in translation from the concrete to the abstract.

Figurality has its own history within the Classical period as well. At first its transferral of meanings is not yet figurality, but only "other-saying," with more concreteness than transferral. Here its duality is preserved in its very structure—the image and the concept are separate. The farther one goes, the more the concept and the image merge, the more the concept "transfers," abstracts the seman-

tics of the image, the more obvious the figurality of the sense becomes.

The most ancient and the most concrete modification of figurality is preserved in extended epic similes.[23]

The extended epic simile is a kind of figurative speech in which the two members are still placed next to one another and transferral is achieved literally, by transferring the features of one object onto another by means of visual illusion (for example, Achilles "looks like" a lion in a given situation). What we find in similes, however, is present in the epos itself in episodes in which comparison is not the goal; the gods take on the "appearance" of heroes, so "like" in "appearance" that they are impossible to tell apart. We know that in balagan, which is based on purely visual illusion, heroes and gods "became like" mortals or one another also without any intention of comparison. In both cases we are dealing with literal "likening." As to extended similes, in them concepts are considerably more developed; comparison makes the "likening" even more illusory. Here the visual side of that which "appears" ("like," "seems") has turned into the abstract category of unreliability ("as if"), that is, into the category of recognized illusion. By the way, there was a stage in which this unreliability was literal; the antiquity of these ideas has left its mark in so called negative similes, where instead of illusory identity ("as if") we find negation of the identity postulated. For example, in the *Iliad*:

> The wave of the sea howls not so much at the shore . . .
> Nor so loud is the roar of a blazing fire . . .
> Nor roars the wind so much in the high-haired oaks . . .
> As was the voice of Trojans and Achaeans.[24]

Or:

> Not so spirited is the leopard, nor the lion, not the destructive-minded wild boar . . .
> As the sons of Panthous[25]

The extended simile arises from the former semantic identity of its two members, but in its conceptual form it consists of two identical members of which one was the appearance of the other (seemed like the other); in it the image already had the form "as if" of the concept, but the concept was itself still attached to the image. Such ~~the~~ comparison ~~of the ancient~~ simple, merged metaphor, in which image is concept (e.g. "hail" = precipitation and misfortune).

We are used to pointing out that in extended similes Menelaus, Achilles or some other hero is connected with a lion or another animal, a crowd with waves, sea sand, and so on—passing over the fact that both "lion" and "waves" are connected with heroes, with the crowd, and so on.

Meanwhile, in Homeric simile the explaining object is predetermined by the explained object. The lion which eats the grazing animal explains Menelaus' actions, and the dogs and the shepherds explain the fear of the Trojans.[26] But this is not just any lion ~~whatever~~; it is a specific lion, lion-Menelaus, whose feature is still the semantic connection between the "hero" and his former animal form. Such a "lion" as a concept passes a stage in which it is the given concrete lion in the given single situation described in the simile (this is why it is extended), namely—when the shepherds are driving the flock, when the lion eats one of the flock and all are paralyzed by fear and cannot attack the lion. Such a unique concrete lion, still connected with Menelaus, provides the form which clarifies one distinct feature of Menelaus: the fear inspired in the Trojans. It is not just any lion that characterizes Menelaus, and it is not Menelaus as a whole that is characterized in all of his features. The extended simile shows the limitations of the early concept, which is still "given" and dependent on the image. Figurality is here narrow in scope. It is exhausted by the fact that the meaning of the image (Menelaus) is conveyed by the meaning of the concept (lion). If it were "lion in general," the general concept of any lion, a metaphor with its figural meaning would result ("Menelaus is a lion"). But in simile two different images have one sense; in metaphor one image has two different senses.

Image and concept in the extended simile are equated with the conjunction ὡς ("as if," "like"). The Greek ὡς means "as" not in its abstract conceptual form, but as a concrete image, with the semantics of "likeness," of some unreliability, ~~some seeming~~. In the oldest form of ~~Classical particles~~* and absolute constructions, where there are no comparisons, ὡς expresses not fact, but conjecture. In similes ὡς emphasizes that the vehicle does not at all coincide with the tenor, but only "seems" to do so. Thus "lion" has in simile a figural meaning, in so far as it is not a lion, but Menelaus. In the given instance ὡς emphasizes the illusory nature of the "lion," which is not a lion in reality.

The transfer of meaning from the image to the concept was mediated in the simile by the element of the imaginary [*mnimost'*].

Comparative figurality has the quality of unreliability. "Other saying" here is inauthentic saying, but it is likened [*upodoblennoe*] to the authentic. But metaphor too gives not the true sense of the image, but a seeming sense. "Your lips are a cluster of grapes." This late Classical metaphor is not about real grapes which are sold at the market.[27] The metaphor mentions the "sweet juice" (a kiss), which the lover "presses out." It could have said "lips like grapes," and then a simile would have resulted. In both cases the concept, describing a property of the object, deprives the object of its true properties, ascribing to it what is not present in it. By this "other-saying," by substituting properties of the object the concept defines the quality of the object. It is in this enrichment that the importance of the concept as an illusory form of the image lies. Let us take, for example, the same metaphor "your lips are a cluster of grapes." The mythological image understood this expression literally: in myth the face, lips, an entire human being could be represented as a grapevine—Dionysus and other personifications of agricultural fertility were represented as "grape-faced," "with a grape face." The connection between the ideas "grapes" and "love" can already be seen in Aristophanes,[28] and in later works this complex of agrarian images becomes more syncretic. But concept discards mythological faith. It disproves it precisely by its illusory quality. The lips of the beloved are "not" grapes, and the kiss "not" grape juice. "The sweetness of a kiss" has a figural, abstract meaning. The sense of the image is expanded and generalized. Diversity is introduced into the understanding of the object, but the figural (image) character of the concept strengthens and fixes that which the concept chooses to single out and italicize.

5

The riddle "~~overcame~~" meaning and deceived by it like a circus trick (balagan). The γρῖφος (the Classical form of the riddle) and the trick occupied an equal and prominent place in balagan performance, later in festive (religious) ritual. The riddle, like the metaphor, said one thing and thought another; like the circus trick it tried to palm off an imaginary meaning that it knew did not correspond to the authentic one. But the goal of the riddle was different from that of the metaphor: to "reveal" the hidden authentic meaning

and "recognize" what had been unrecognized. But in its separation of two identical senses into ~~one~~ authentic and ~~one~~ ~~likeness~~ the riddle had something in common with the metaphor and the simile; all the γρῖφος had to do was combine the riddle and its solution with the conjunction "as if" or "like" to become an extended simile. For example, the γρῖφος from "The Sleep" of Alexis:[29] "not mortal and not immortal, but . . . always anew now vanishing, now present, with an invisible face, known to all." The solution: sleep/dream. But if it had said "Sleep is like neither mortal nor immortal . . ." etc. the result would be a simile. ~~On the other hand~~, all an extended simile needs is to be posed as a riddle to turn into a γρῖφος. "Shepherds want to attack a lion that has stolen a cow, but they are afraid."[30] What is it? "The Trojans, afraid to attack Menelaus, who has killed Euphorbus."

In order to become formally a metaphor, it is enough for the riddle to discard question and answer form. In comedy, particularly Middle Comedy, which derives directly from balagan, the actors speak in γρῖφοι, which can be taken for either riddles or metaphors ("nymphic dew-like moisture" = water, "the juice of Bromius-the-spring" = wine, etc.).

Every metaphor contains a simile and a riddle. In Pushkin, for example, the metaphor "early urn"[31] signifies "premature death, death in one's youth." Our metaphor "a blue bird at the window" signifies "happiness is nearby, one needn't seek it far away," etc. This feature is characteristic of Classical metaphor because of its genesis from two identical symbols. "Lips—grapevine" can be expressed as a simile (lips "like" a grapevine) and as a riddle (what are "lips—a grapevine"?—lips for a kiss). Every metaphor contains a riddle because it has to be understood, figured out, because it does not speak in straightforward meanings like the concept, finally, because its language is based on figurality and speaks in a special way: in form it speaks by means of the image, which is expressed in archaic language, but in content it speaks by means of the concept. ~~In Pushkin, for example, the metaphor "early urn" signifies "death at a young age, before one's time."~~ How can an "urn" be "early"? Conceptually it cannot, but as an image it can. The language of Classical metaphor is unique. Based neither exclusively on concepts nor exclusively on images, the language of Classical metaphor is the only example of a historical language of image-based concepts [the R here has the adjective *obraznyi* from *obraz* (image) modifying "concepts"—K.M.].

This is in fact what distinguishes metaphor from riddle. The γρῖφος creates two parallel semantic series and consciously puts one in place of the other. It is by nature question and answer; without the posing and solution of the riddle it turns into a simple simile. Formally the riddle contains everything simile and metaphor contain, with one exception: its goal is not reproduction. It has none of the elements of illusion, which organize the metaphor as well as the simile. It does not create any "picture" ("image"). It is not representational.

The poetry of Classical figurality is being born before our very eyes. Of course the riddle is in form figurative speech (other-saying). But it becomes frozen in folklore without further conceptual development; what develops further in it turns into metaphor, whose figurality consists precisely in the change of meaning. In other words, in riddle two different semantic series signify one and the same thing; in metaphor two identities signify different things.

The Classical metaphor is made into art by its illusoriness, its "mimesis," which reproduces authenticity in an "image." This mimesis makes the artistic material more expressive, gives rise to individual craftsmanship, and reproduces reality in forms that are figural in concept. The mimesis of the Classical "image," which came about as a result of the metaphorization of thought, created a secondary "potential" level of reality—a reality that exists not in real facts, but in the "image."

Later, when abstract thought made some progress, Classical philosophy began to establish what "image" is in relation to "reality," what is "reality," what "appearance." But in the archaic period in Greece, concrete thought created a concrete understanding of the "image," and this understanding took the form of thought in art, rather than theory.

The secondary character of illusion (in respect to reality) led early in the Classical mind to the idea of art as a "copy" (model) of reality made by divine powers, later by the skilled hand of man. There appeared the idea of a concrete object wrought of physical material (stone, wood, clay, metal), which miraculously turned into a "copy" of a living, authentic object. Such an "illusory living" object came to be called a "representation" [*izobrazhenie*], a fabrication, literally—a figure cast in clay or wax, carved from wood or stone, forged of metal, etc. The Greeks called it πλάσμα, the Romans *fictio*, and its semantics can be traced to the cosmic image of "creation." Because of its semantics the Classical "fiction" did not coincide with our idea of

"empty deception." Even the "deception" of Classical balagan had to do with imitation of the authentic, and the "fiction" of art was an "image" of reality.

We find such a "fiction" in the Homeric ecphrasis. This is still a literal "reproduction of a reproduction," a double reproduction, "representation of representation." Ecphrasis describes a work of plastic art—what it depicts and how. The description of this "how" is the very soul of ecphrasis. Beginning with Homer the Classical ecphrasis attempts to show that a dead thing wrought by a skillful artist looks like it is alive. Ecphrasis depicts one thing—the illusory, as another—the real. That which has already been reproduced in the works of potters and sculptors, weavers and smiths it describes, recreating it a second time, "as if" real.

The Classical ecphrasis contains a hidden likening and comparison of dead to living, illusory to authentic. But unlike simile, its "as if" is only visual, not comparative; it is aimed only at communicating the visual illusion.

If similes are known in Greek as εἰκόνες this term of "images" and "representations" ("pictures") is even more applicable to ecphrasis. In fact Classical ecphrases, like similes, are also called εἰκόνες. Later rationalizing thought supposes that ecphrases are called εἰκόνες because they describe paintings, εἰκόνες; in fact, however, ecphrasis describes εἰκόνες, pictures, because it is itself an εἰκών.

Neither similes nor ecphrases have moving plots yet; neither myths nor stories are attached to them. Similes and ecphrases are not narrative. They are only visual.

In both similes and ecphrases the "pictures" are phantom, unreal, though realistic in their depiction. These "pictures" are conceptual comments on the system of mythological images. Thus in similes the developed "picture" serves as a likeness of the mythological (unique) image. Likewise the Homeric ecphrasis describes realistic depiction on mythical objects made in the fire of the god of fire or having a clearly expressed cosmic character, which derives, as I have already said, from the semantics of the "created" and "creating" thing-cosmos, thing-"creation." These things only "seem" in their "external appearance" to be authentic, just as in extended similes one object is "as if" similar to an apparently other one. In both cases the Classical literary image is based on the aesthetics of mimesis as "imitation" of reality, as its "likeness" and "picture." We already find such an understanding of "mimesis" and the very term

"μιμεῖσθαι" in the most archaic "Hymn to Apollo," where it says that the Muses† are a "great miracle." "They can imitate (μιμεῖσθαι) the voices and sounds of all people;" and here the meaning of mimesis as an imitative, complete likeness of reality is revealed: "You would say that each speaks for himself, so harmoniously composed is their (the Muses') beautiful song."[32] This original aesthetics of mimesis is not equivalent to the later views of the Sophists, Plato, or Aristotle, to say nothing of vulgar realism. Every work of art, not only a single discrete image, is called by the Greeks εἰκών, by the Romans *imago, simulacrum* in the Classical sense of a "fiction" which has a complete external similarity with the authentic, that is, what "is created by man" (in myth—created by god) in a clever imitation of life. Ecphrasis always describes a work of art as a "miracle," a "wonder" ("such a wonder is presented," "bronze tires fitted, a wonder to behold"[33] etc.—preserved even in translation). This "wonder" or "marvel-miracle" must be understood in the visual sense (cf. R *chudit'sia, divit'sia* = to look); in Greek "miracle" and "gaze," "spectacle" sound almost the same,[34] which apparently led to the fixed epic expression "wonder to behold," literally "miracle to see";[35] in essence the expression is tautological. As to the content of the "miracle," it is understood differently in the Classical world, as a "mirage" which is always concrete to the point of being physical and has the form of the authentic object.

6

I have already said that similes and ecphrases represent a conceptual addition [*atributsiia*] to the system of mythological images. Thus they prepare the way for the metaphor.

In fact, though they do not yet contain full semantic figurality, similes and ecphrases as a whole enrich the mythological part with concepts and increase the capacity of its meanings, resulting in both a combination of visible objects and the generalization of abstract meanings.

Before acquiring figurality, the metaphor as a conceptual form of the image is prepared for in the epithet. In Classical times not every image could produce a corresponding epithet and not every image could take on the function of epithet. As in the metaphor and the simile, here too identical semantics of the two members, the defining and the defined, are obligatory. I must clarify that every object in the Classical languages originally has its own epithet and never appears without it, just as a simile never appears with only one member. It is wrong to think that only gods have their own epithets. All images have them, including all everyday things. For example:

> Hecamede set up before the two a beautiful table,
> Polished, with a dark blue foot; on it
> A bronze basket of onion, to go with the drink,
> With yellow honey and sacred barley flour;
> Nearby she set a beautiful goblet brought from home by the old man,
> Pierced all around with golden nails.[36]

And especially farther on:

> . . . she grated goat cheese
> With a bronze grater; and sprinkled it with white barley flour.[37]

It would seem that the epithet should establish the distinctive features of the object. In fact Classical epithets were tautological with the semantics of the objects they supposedly defined.[38] It is well known that the poorer an idea is, the larger the circle of phenomena to which it can be applied. The problem apparently lies not in clusters of ideas ("diffuseness"), but in the extreme poverty of features (for example, earth and woman are endowed with only one and the same feature and are therefore identical). It might seem that in such phrases as "immortal god," "starry sky," etc., the epithet communicates a generalized quality of any god or any night sky; in fact we have here tautology, that is, two images joined by common semantics; furthermore, one image has the function of that which is being described, the other, of that which describes (this phenomenon precedes the categories active and passive). The features of "god" and "immortality," of "sky" and "stars" are the same.

The epithet is originally tautological with the object and accompanies it; only in conceptual thought does it begin to designate the distinctive features of the object. Thus Zeus-black-cloud turns into black-clouded Zeus, Achilles-lion, into Achilles with a lion's soul, Hector-fire, into fiery Hector, etc. In Greek πέζα means "foot"; from this root comes the term "table" (τράπεζα), literally "triple (or quadruple) foot." In the above quotation from the Iliad "blue-legged" serves as an epithet of "table," but this epithet represents the noun

† In fact, the Delian Maidens. B. M.

12. *Diary*, XIII, 48.
13. *Diary*, XIV, 41.
14. *Diary*, XIV, 42.
15. *Diary*, XIV, 138.
16. *Diary*, XIV, 96.
17. Braginskaia, "Ot sostavitelia," *Mif i literatura drevnosti*, p. 569.
18. "Vstupitel'naia rech' k kursu obshchego ucheniia o iazyke, chitannomu v Azerbaidzhanskom universitete" (1928), *Izbrannye raboty*, vol. II, 16.
19. *Diary*, III, 203, 182.
20. *Diary*, III, 207.
21. *Diary*, III, 80.
22. *Diary*, I, 48.
23. "Vospominaniia o N. Ia. Marre," *Vostok-Zapad: Issledovaniia, perevody, publikatsii* (M: Nauka, 1988), 181–204.
24. *Diary*, III, 178.
25. *Diary*, III, 134.
26. *Diary*, V, 183.
27. *Diary*, V, 184.
28. *Correspondence*, 125.
29. *Diary*, VI, 8.
30. *Diary*, V, 145.
31. Since this writing a new monograph has appeared: Vladimir Alpatov, *Istoriia odnogo mifa: Marr i marrizn* (M: Nauka, 1991).
32. References to Marr will be restored in future editions.
33. "K semanticheskoi paleologii v iazykakh neiafeticheskikh sistem," *Izbrannye raboty*, vol. II (L: Sotsial'noe-ekonomicheskoe izd., 1936), 255.
34. "Thamyris," *Iafeticheskii sbornik*, 5 (L: 1927), 76.
35. "Tersit," *Iafeticheskii sbornik*, 6 (L: 1930), 250.
36. *Correspondence*, 85.
37. "Mif ob Iosife Prekrasnom," *Iazyk i literatura*, 8 (L: 1932), 137–58.
38. "Evangelie—odin iz vidov grecheskogo romana," *Ateist*, 59 (Dec. 1930), 129–47.
39. *Tvorchestvo Fransua Rable i narodnaia kul'tura srednevekov'ia i renesansa* (M: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1965), 62, n. 1.
40. *Diary*, IV, 226.
41. "Evangelie—odin iz vidov grecheskogo romana," *Ateist*, No 59 (Dec. 1930), 129.
42. "Proiskhozhdenie èpicheskogo sravneniia," *Trudy iubileinoi nauchnoi sessii LGU*, Sektsiia filologicheskikh nauk, L., 1946, 103.
43. Michael Holquist, ed., *The Dialogic Imagination* (Austin: Univ. of Texas Pr., 1981), xviii.
44. *Rable*, 10–14.
45. "Tri siuzheta ili semantika odnogo," *Poétika siuzheta i zhanra* (L: 1936), 344.
46. Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Pr, 1969); Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, unpubl. MS.

47. Her students recall that Freidenberg always shocked her pupils out of complacent admiration for beautiful Classical culture with the phrase, "Don't forget that the Greeks reeked of garlic and urine." (They used urine to bleach their clothes.)
48. *Druzhby narodov*, 1988, 7, 203.
49. *Diary*, II, 129.
50. *Diary*, II, 130.
51. From a letter to Ol'ga Nikol'skaia, quoted in *Druzhby narodov*, 1988, 7, 205.
52. *Diary*, I, 20.
53. *Diary*, I, 12.
54. *Diary*, IV, 99.
55. *Diary*, III, 192.

Chapter 1

1. Recently works have appeared which examine the role of mythological ideas in the appearance and development of specifically poetic language in Classical philology as well. See, for example, А. А. Тахо-Годи, "Структура поэтических тропов в «Илиаде» Гомера," Вопросы античной литературы и классической филологии (М: Наука, 1966), с. 45–49, "Мифологическое происхождение поэтического языка «Илиады» Гомера," Античность и современность (М: Наука, 1972), с. 196 и сл. See also some thoughts on the mythological reality of what became poetic metaphor in literature in G. E. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 182ff; Snell points out the connection between ancient epithet and simile and metaphorical images that grew out of myth: Bruno Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind* (New York: Dover 1982); See also H. Blumenberg, *Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie* (Bonn, 1960); H.-J. Newiger, *Metapher und Allegorie. Studien zu Aristophanes* (Munich: Beck, 1957).

Chapter 2

1. Among O. M. Freidenberg's contemporaries I. G. Frank-Kamenetskii studied metaphor as one of the forms of human consciousness and the transition from mythological to poetic metaphor. The ideas in his article «К вопросу о развитии поэтической метафоры (Советское языкознание, Т. 1, Л., 1935) in large part correspond to the ideas of Freidenberg developed in this chapter.

   According to Frank-Kamenetskii, poetic metaphor and the mythological image share cognition of the concrete through the concrete. The mythological image presents a primitive, undifferentiated perception of the world in the single and particular, it is a cognitive category that combines features of generality and concreteness. Yet Frank-Kamenetskii

does not consider that the quest for the genesis of poetic metaphor in the same undifferentiated "ideology" from which mythology is also derived makes myth a direct source of poetic creativity. "The tendency of development in the poetic image is diametrically opposed to myth-creation. But both branches at first developed closely intertwined: poetry takes raw material from myth, myth reveals elements of poetic creativity in the process of re-forming traditional views. In myth the dualism of the fantastic and the realistic world perceptions is expressed not in the opposition of two world views, but in the opposition of two spatially separated and delimited worlds, both of which were recognized as real" (p. 142). Since the real and the illusory world are parallel, the transferral to the "illusory" world of characters and situations borrowed from reality allows the artist to use the images and relations of myth to reproduce reality in art. Here he presents the thesis that O. M. Freidenberg's *Poetics of Plot and Genre* is dedicated to proving: what is content on mythological ground becomes form for poetic contents. But he makes a very significant caveat: "One must not lose sight of the fact that changing the content brings with it a corresponding change in the form" (142). Frank-Kamenetskii shows how the anthropization of nature and cosmic phenomena in myth-creation becomes the basis for the artistic reproduction of real characters and situations through the poetic images of nature as animated and alive. But to become such an artistic means the anthropomorphic image of nature must be deprived of its "ideological" content and receive it again in the creation of the author; furthermore, according to Frank-Kamenetskii, this poetic image acts as the expression of ideas and generalizations which had as yet found no formulation in the abstract concept. Frank-Kamenetskii considers, furthermore, that the cognitive function of the image, which precedes and prepares the way for the appearance of abstract concepts, plays some role in myth creation.

2. Among the defenders of the "intellectualism" of primitive thinking who deny its "emotional" character Levi-Strauss is the most famous. He declares in his programmatic article "The Structural Study of Myths," "Instead of trying to enlarge the framework of our logic to include processes which, whatever their apparent differences, belong to the same kind of intellectual operation, a naive attempt was made to reduce them to inarticulate emotional drives, which resulted only in hampering our studies." (Claude Lévi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," *Structural Anthropology*, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf [NY:Basic Books, 1963], 207.) Mythological creation, according to Lévi-Strauss, is relatively independent from the influence of other forms of tribal life and therefore reflects the "anatomy of the mind" adequately, the mental structures that in themselves contain nothing mythological. "The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and ... the difference lies not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of the things to which it is applied." (*Ibid.*, 230). Although Freidenberg continually speaks of the difference between primitive (pre-formal-logical) thought and "conceptual" and abstract thought, and of the moment of split, she emphasizes unity of human thought in her analysis of the construction of concept by means of the image, which is the theme of this work.

3. In *Poetics* Freidenberg cites Usener on the basic identity of varied and polysemantic images: Hermann Usener, *Die Sintfluthsagen* (Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1899), 181–229; cited in Freidenberg, *Poètika siuzheta i zhanra* (L: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1936), 21, henceforth cited as *Poetics*.
4. An idea common to Lévy-Bruhl, Cassirer, and Marr: see *Poetics*, 30–31.
5. А. А. Потебня, «Из записок по теории словесности,» Эстетика и поэтика (М: Искусство, 1976), 428–9.
6. The notion that form on one level becomes content on another lies at the heart of all of Freidenberg's early work. In *Poetics*, she writes "the structure itself, which represents the morphological side of meaning, is the occasion for semantic deciphering and again gives rise to meaning. Thus every phenomenon lives in both hidden and apparent form, contradicting itself. What later makes up literary plots and genres is created in a period when there are still neither genres nor plots. They are built out of the world view of primitive society cast in a certain morphological system; when the meaning of this world view disappears, its structure continues to function in a system of new interpretations" (*Poetics*, 118–119; see also 283, 304).
7. νόμος
8. ὠδίς
9. inlūdere
10. ἀπάτη
11. The meaning of the world φαντασία begins to approximate "imagination" only in the late Classical period. In Plato it is "sensation" or "seeming," "illusion" (*Theaetetus* 152e, 161e, *Republic* 382e) and only in the *Sophist* (264a ff.) is the fantastic imitation (subjectively distorted) opposed to the eikastic (precise copy), and "phantasia" is found in an aesthetic context. In Aristotle φαντασία is completely in the sphere of psychology (*On the Soul* 428b 10 ff., 431b 2 ff. *et. al.*); for Pseudo Longinus (*On the Sublime* 15.1) φαντασία is visual images which give "visibility" to a verbal work. And only in Philostratus Flavius (*Life of Apollonius of Tyana* VI, 19) is φαντασία opposed to imitation (mimesis) and can it be translated as "artistic imagination," though it is still not equal to European "fantasy" (See E. Birmellin, "Die Kunsttheoretischen Gedanken in Philostrats Apollonios," *Philologus*, Vol. 88. H. 2, 4, 1933; Тахо-Годи, «Классическое и эллинистическое представление о красоте в действительности и искусстве,» Эстетика и искусство (М: Наука, 1966), 47–53).
12. Elsewhere Freidenberg refers to "cosmogonic systems, in which reality is thought of as a negative quantity, as opposed to the positive abstract substantial principle" (*Poetics*, 296).
13. The precise nature of Classical idealism, which places at the center of attention the theory of the perceptible cosmos, the materialist nature of

Classical idealism and the "idealism" of Classical materialism are analyzed in the many works of A. F. Losev.

14. Presumably Freidenberg has in mind *Antigone* 241, but ἀποφάργνυσαι κύκλῳ means "fence around" rather than "walk around."
15. *Antigone*, 232.
16. σιδήρεος οὐρανός *Od.* 15.329, 17.565.
17. σιδήρειον ἦτορ *Il.* 24.205, 24.521, κραδίη σιδηρέη *Od.* 4.293.
18. *Persians*, 821–22.
19. *Suppliant Maidens*, 1004.
20. *Suppliant Maidens*, 1006–7.
21. Surely Freidenberg means Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 942: ἄκαρπος νόσος.
22. *Suppliant Maidens*, 470–71.
23. See Freidenberg's «Происхождение эпического сравнения (На материале Илиады)», Труды юбилейной научной сессии ЛГУ, Л., 1946, 101–113.
24. 14.394, 396, 398, 400.
25. 17.20 ff.
26. *Il.*, 17.61–69.
27. Eumathius Makrembolites' Greek Novel *Tale of Hysmenes and Hysmenia* (12th century): "Bending to the maid as to a grapevine and pressing with my lips its still unripe berries, I drank the nectar the Eroses press; I pressed it with my fingers and drank with my lips, so that to the last drop it poured into my soul as into a vessel, so insatiable a grape gardener was I." (V.19, from the translation by S. V. Poliakova).
28. In one of her excursuses to "The Semantics of the Composition of Hesiod's *Works and Days*" called "Aristophanes' 'Eirene' " Freidenberg analyzes the metaphor of marriage as gathering the grape harvest, which is developed into the plot of the comedy *Peace* (*Eirene*): the marriage of Trugeus, the harvester of ripe fruits (from the verb τρυγᾶν -- "to harvest grapes or other fruits", Schol. Aristoph. Pax 60, 190; Diom. 487), to Opora, *i. e.* to the time of ripe fruits, to harvest autumn, to the very fruits themselves. "Remarkable in this respect is the hymeneia sung at the marriage of Trugeus and Opora. Here there are two motifs: one in the carol, where the plenty of barley, figs, wine, and childbirth is invoked; the second in the hymeneia itself, where the bride is metaphorized as a fig, the bridegroom as a harvester of ripe fruits (1320ff., 1336ff.); it is the same in Sappho, where "sweet apple" meant the bride, while the bridegroom is the "harvester of apples" (fr. 116 Diehl)" «Эйрена Аристофана», Архаический ритуал в фольклорных и раннелитературных памятниках, М., 1988, 225. The marriage union is metaphorized both as the harvest of grapes and as pressing the grapes (1349, 1084–87). "All these puns consist of terms connected with wine making, but applied to fertility; in the poetics of speech in Aristophanes these very ambiguities are suggested by the original dual-single meaning of the agricultural image, but this meaning has long been forgotten and is reinterpreted, so to say, by Aristophanes; it is interesting in that it

is given again the meaning it had from the very beginning, only in a new context" (*Ibid.*, 226).

29. Fr. 241, pp. 488–89 in John Maxwell Edmonds, The Fragments of Attic Comedy, Vol. II, Leiden: Brill, 1959 = CAF II Fr. 241 Kock, cf. Palatine Anthology XIV.110.
30. *Il.*, 17.61–69.
31. *Eugene Onegin*, 6.22.9.
32. Hymn to Delian Apollo, 156, 162–63.
33. *Il.* 5.72
34. θαῦμα and θέαμα.
35. θαῦμ' ἰδεῖν (ἰδέσθαι), *e. g. Il.* 5.725, 10.439, 18.83, 377, *Od.* 6.306, 7.45, 8.366, 13.108, Hymn to Aphrodite 90, Hymn to Demeter 427, see also Hymn to Aphrodite 205, *Il.* 15.286, 21.344, 22.54, *Od.* 3.373, 4.44, 7.145, 13.157, 19.30, 24.370, Hymn to Hermes 219, 414.
36. *Il.* 11.628–33.
37. *Il.* 11.639–40.
38. The image, for Freidenberg, attains definition through tautological reduplication in various forms which may later become epithets, similes, attributes: "The epithet which accompanies the hero turns out upon analysis to be the same as his name, *i. e.* his essence, only transferred from noun to the role of adjective. Thus the sun is quick, heat wild, fire inventive,—all because one metaphor is equal in meaning to another; the character of the hero is built of these tautological features, built of the same thing the image incarnated in the given hero represents" (*Poetics*, 245).
39. Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, 685.
40. Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, 685–7.
41. *Iphigenia in Tauris*, 1095.
42. According to Freidenberg, this holds for thing-attributes of divinities as well: "every divinity has his vegetative and animal attribute, which remained with him as an attribute because in a preceding stage it represented the god in the form of an animal or a plant" (Poetics, 133; see also 199–201, 226).
43. *Il.* 11.24—28.
44. *Il.* 11.29–33.
45. *Il.* 11.632–5.
46. *Medea*, 319.
47. *Il.* 18.396.
48. *Il.* 3.180 and *Od.* 4.145.
49. *Libation Bearers*, 621.
50. *Od.* 11.424.
51. Page PMG 360.
52. Page PMG 376.
53. Page PMG 417.
54. Olympian 11, 3.
55. Olympian 6, 97.
56. Olympian 6, 83.
57. Isthmian 5, 50.