Rokkasho redux: Japan’s never-ending reprocessing saga via Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

By Tatsujiro Suzuki | December 26, 2023

According to a recent Reuters report, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd (JNFL) still hopes to finish construction of Japan’s long-delayed Rokkasho reprocessing plant in the first half of the 2024 fiscal year (i.e. during April-September 2024). The plant—which would reprocess spent nuclear fuel from existing power plants, separating plutonium for use as reactor fuel—is already more than 25 years behind schedule, and there are reasons to believe that this new announcement is just another wishful plan that will end with another postponement.

[…]

1993: Construction starts.

1997: Initial target for completion.

2006-2008: Hot tests conducted, revealing technical problems with the vitrification process for dealing with waste produced during reprocessing.

2011: Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant accident.

2012: New safety regulation standards introduced.

2022: Completion target date postponed to June 2024)

The 2022 postponement was the 26th of the Rokkasho project.

[…]

Fourth, the financial costs to JNFL of postponement are covered by the utilities’ customers, because the utilities must pay a “reprocessing fee” every year, based on the spent fuel generated during that year, whether or not the reprocessing plant operates. The system by which the Nuclear Reprocessing Organization of Japan decides the reprocessing fee is not transparent.

Fifth, the project lacks independent oversight. Even though JNFL’s estimate of the cost of building and operating the Rokkasho plant has increased several-fold, no independent analysis has been done by a third party. One reason is that some of the shareholders are themselves contractors working on the plant and have no incentive to scrutinize the reasons for the cost increases or the indefinite extension of the construction project.

After so many postponements, there is reason to wonder whether the plant will ever operate, but the government and utilities continue to insist that the plant will open soon. Even if Rokkasho were to operate, it may suffer from the same kinds of problems that marked Britain’s light-water reactor spent fuel reprocessing experience, as described in Endless Trouble: Britain’s Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP).

Why does Japan’s commitment to reprocessing continue? Despite the serious and longstanding problems the Rokkasho plant has faced (and continues to face), Japanese regulators and nuclear operators have doggedly pursued the project. There are four reasons:

Spent fuel management. Currently, most of Japan’s spent nuclear fuel is stored in nuclear power plant cooling pools. But the pool capacities are limited, and the 3,000-ton-capacity Rokkasho spent fuel pool is also almost full. The nuclear utilities must therefore start operating the Rokkasho plant unless they can create additional spent fuel storage capacity, either on- or off-site. The Mutsu spent fuel storage facility is a candidate for additional capacity, but due to the concern that spent fuel could stay there forever, Mutsu city refuses to accept spent fuel unless the Rokkasho reprocessing plant begins to operate. The Rokkasho plant design capacity is 800 tons of spent fuel per year.

Legal and institutional commitments. Under Japan’s nuclear regulations, utilities must specify a “final disposal method” for spent fuel. The law on regulation of nuclear materials and nuclear reactors states that “when applying for reactor licensing, operators must specify the final disposal method of spent fuel” (Article 23.2.8). In addition, there was a clause that “disposal method” should be consistent with implementation of the government policy, which specified reprocessing as the disposal method. Although that clause was deleted in the 2012 revision of the law after the Fukushima accident, the Law on Final Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste still bans direct disposal of spent fuel. In addition, the 2016 Law on Reprocessing Fees legally requires utilities to submit reprocessing fees for all spent fuel generated every year since they stated in their applications that “final disposal method” for their spent fuel would be reprocessing.

Commitments to hosting communities. The nuclear utilities committed—albeit tacitly—to the communities hosting nuclear power plants that they would remove the spent fuel to reprocessing plants, since that was the national policy. Separately, JNFL signed an agreement with Rokkasho village and Aomori prefecture that says that if the Rokkasho reprocessing plant faces “severe difficulties,” other measures will be considered—including the return of spent fuel stored at Rokkasho to the nuclear power plants.

Local governments hosting nuclear power plants were not involved in this deal, however. They could therefore just refuse to receive spent fuel from Aomori. In fact, after the Fukushima accident, when the government was considering amending the nuclear fuel cycle policy to include a “direct disposal option” for spent fuel in a deep underground repository, the Rokkasho village parliament (at the behind the scenes suggestion by the then JNFL president, Yoshihiko Kawai), issued a strong statement asking for “maintenance of the current nuclear fuel cycle policy.”

The statement continued that, if Japan’s fuel cycle policy changed, Rokkasho would: refuse to accept further waste from the reprocessing of Japan’s spent fuel in the UK and France; require the removal of reprocessing waste and spent fuel stored in Rokkasho; no longer accept spent fuel; and seek compensation for the damages caused by the change of the policy.

Institutional and bureaucratic inertia. In Japan, bureaucrats rotate to new positions every two or three years and are reluctant to take the risk of changing existing policies. They therefore tend to stick with past commitments. Institutional inertia becomes stronger as a project becomes bigger. The Rokkasho reprocessing project is one of the largest projects ever in Japan. Changing the project is therefore very difficult.

[…]

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Why Japan should stop its Fukushima nuclear wastewater ocean release via Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

By Tatsujiro Suzuki | September 22, 2023

[…]

Part of the radioactive substances that contaminate the water is now being removed by multi-nuclide removal equipment called “advanced liquid processing systems” (ALPS)—an unfortunate name given that the Alps mountain range in Europe is home to some of the cleanest freshwater in the world. After the removal of most radioactive substances—except for tritium, which cannot be removed by the ALPS system—treated water is then stored in tanks (see Figure 2). The ALPS process is supposed to reduce the concentration of radionuclides, except tritium, to levels below regulatory standards. However, according to TEPCO’s data, as of March 31, 2023, of the total of about 1.3 million m3 of treated water, only about a third satisfied regulatory standards and the other two-thirds needed to be re-purified.

[…]

It can’t be denied that “treated water” is not as pure as “tritiated water” because treated water may still contain other radioactive nuclides, albeit in small proportions. But the comparison of Fukushima’s “treated water” with other “tritiated water” released during the normal operation of other nuclear power plants can be misleading because the latter is not contaminated with other radioactive nuclides.

TEPCO says it re-purifies the “treated water” to make sure the water satisfies regulatory standards before it is released to the sea. To do that, the company’s plan is to dilute “treated water” with large amounts of sea water to reach a concentration of tritium of 190 Becquerel (Bq) per liter, which is much lower than the allowed concentration of 1,500 Bq per liter.

The first discharge happened over a period of 17 days and involved a total of 7,800 tons of treated water being released to the sea. TEPCO plans to discharge treated water three more times in 2023, and the total tritium discharge by the end of March 2024 is expected to reach about 5 trillion Bq. This is much lower than the annual discharge target of 22 trillion Bq set before the Fukushima accident.

In addition to tritium, TEPCO must report that the concentration of all other radionuclides is below regulatory standards. To do this, TEPCO uses a simplified index, which corresponds to the sum of ratios of the concentration of each radioactive nuclides (excluding tritium) compared to regulatory standards. If this ratio is below one, it means the concentration of other radionuclides is below regulatory standards. TEPCO reported that the water being discharged during the first period was measured to have an index of 0.28, therefore satisfying regulatory standards. TEPCO said the operation may last at least 30 years to discharge all “treated water.”

Scientific debate. The Japanese government and TEPCO argue that the whole operation satisfies both Japanese regulatory standards and international safety standards. Besides, the Japanese government officially asked the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct an independent review of the safety of the ALPS treated water release. On July 4, 2023, the IAEA published its “comprehensive report,” which concluded that the ALPS process is “consistent with relevant international safety standards” and that “the discharge of the treated water [into the sea], as currently planned by Tepco, will have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.”

But there are scientific arguments against TEPCO’s release plan.

The Pacific Island Forum expressed its concern in a statement in January 2023 about whether current international standards are adequate to handle the unprecedented case of the Fukushima Daiichi tritiated water release. Based on a report from an independent expert panel established by the forum, TEPCO’s guideline compliance plan does not appear to include the transboundary implications of IAEA’s guidance in its General Safety Guide No. 8 (GSG-8), which requires that the benefits of a given process outweigh the harms for individuals and societies.

The experts also recommended the alternative method of using the treated water to manufacture concrete for the construction industry instead of releasing it to the sea. By immobilizing the radionuclides in a material, this alternative would imply a lower potential for human contact and would avoid transboundary impacts. Quoted in a National Geographic article, one of the panel members, Robert Richmond, director of the Kewalo Marine Laboratory of the University of Hawaii, summarizes well the uncertainty surrounding the impacts of TEPCO’s water release plan on the ocean environment: “It is a trans-boundary and trans-generational event” and that he does not believe “the release would irreparably destroy the Pacific Ocean but it does not mean we should not be concerned.”

Lack of public trust. In addition to scientific debate, TEPCO’s ALPS treated water issue has become more of a social and political controversy. The origin of this debate was the speech given by then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe before the International Olympic Committee on September 7, 2013, in which he referred to the city where the 2020 Summer Olympics were to be held by saying: “Some may have concerns about Fukushima. Let me assure you, the situation is under control. It has never done and will never do any damage to Tokyo.” After Abe’s speech, the government took over the responsibility for the management of the contaminated water, while TEPCO is still responsible for all decommissioning operations at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Since then, all policy decisions about the treated water have been made by the Japanese government, with TEPCO simply following the government, which has complicated the decision-making process.

In August 2015, the Japanese government and TEPCO promised to the local fishermen that they “will not implement any disposal without understanding of interested parties.” The government even established a committee consisting of experts from a local university to discuss technical options and held meetings with local citizens for several years to build trust with the local communities. So, when the decision was made by former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga in August 2021 to release the “treated water” to the sea, this felt like a treachery for the local fishermen and many other interested parties. In a June 2023 statement opposing the planned discharge of treated water, the head of Japan’s national fisheries cooperatives Masanobu Sakamoto said: “We cannot support the government’s stance that an ocean release is the only solution. … Whether to release the water into the sea or not is a government decision, and in that case we want the government to fully take responsibility.”

The subsequent lack of public trust in TEPCO and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has been one of the major reasons for this continued controversy. In August 2018, a news investigation revealed that the “tritiated water” still contained other radioactive nuclides after treatment, which were above regulatory standards—a result that was not consistent with the explanation given by TEPCO. The justification then advanced by the ministry and TEPCO on the need and timing for the water discharge was no more convincing: They claimed that there would be a need for storage space once the melted fuel debris would be taken out of the reactors and that, without discharge now, the plant’s storage area would be filled soon. But, the timing—and even the feasibility—of removing the fuel debris is not known at all. Besides, there are potential storage space available at the nearby Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant.

[…]

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<ふくしま作業員日誌・56歳男性>高線量の現場 まだ多くある 福島第1原発 via 東京新聞

2023年10月27日 12時00分

[…]

春以降、現場の関係で被ばく線量が高くなって「これじゃあ、年度末の3月までもつかどうか…」と心配していたが、何とかなりそうだ。このままではみんな現場にいられなくなると、上の方に直談判してやり方が変わった。高線量の現場では遠隔やロボット作業など、現場に行かなくてできるように工夫されているけれど、作業によっては人がいかないとできない。

 事故直後と違って、今は作業員の被ばく線量は、年間20ミリシーベルト未満で管理されていて、それを万が一でも超えないために、東電から作業を請け負う元請け企業は、8掛けの約16ミリシーベルトを上限としている。それに近づくと、俺らは現場を離れなくてはならなくなる。

 高線量の現場では、1日の計画線量(被ばく上限)の設定が0.8や1ミリシーベルトだが、高いところでは2ミリシーベルトのときもあるという。さすがに事故直後のように3ミリシーベルトとか5ミリシーベルトなどはないけれど。そういう現場は人の入れ替わりが激しい。線量の低い現場と組み合わせて、どこの下請けも被ばく線量を記した名簿をにらみながら人繰りを工夫しているけど、技術や経験が必要な作業はどうしても特定の人に集中する。

 核燃料取り出しのための原子炉建屋やその周辺の作業や調査とか、汚染水を扱う現場やがれきが残る場所など、高線量の現場はいくつもある。単身赴任で来ているから、家族の元に帰って一緒に暮らしたいという気持ちもあるけど、子どもたちも大きくなったし、まだ作業があるから、ここで頑張りたい。(聞き手・片山夏子)

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何が何でも再稼働だから? 東海第2原発の「不備」を4カ月も黙っていた日本原電と原子力規制庁の不誠実 via 東京新聞

 首都圏唯一の原発、日本原子力発電東海第2原発で、防潮堤の施工不良が明らかになった。ただ原電の公表は不備の把握から4カ月後。原子力規制庁もかねて報告を受けていたのに、公表に動かなかった。立地自治体の茨城県東海村ではこの間、休止続きの東海第2の再稼働について議会が初めて賛意を示した。原発不信を招く話が伏せられるうちに再稼働の道筋が付く—。こんな話がまかり通っていいのか。(宮畑譲、山田祐一郎、長崎高大)

◆再稼働準備の工事中 「防潮堤」に施工不良

 「すぐに公表しないで、村議会議員や首長にも黙っていたことが問題。命と環境を守る意識が欠けている。信頼関係が崩れた」

 今月8日に開かれた東海村議会の全員協議会。原電の面々を前に、再稼働に反対する阿部功志村議(無所属)はそう糾弾した。

 大名おおな美恵子村議(共産)も「(防潮堤の不備は)重大な工事の失敗。少なくとも県や村、議会には報告してから対策するのが本来の姿だ」と切り出した上で、「全国の人が注目している。住民、地元議会、自治体にはいち早く説明していくスタンスが大事だ」と言葉を重ねた。

 東海第2原発は2018年、原子力規制委員会による新規制基準の審査に通過。同年に運転期限となる40年を迎えたが、最長20年の運転延長が認められた。

その後、防潮堤の建設や非常用電源の設置など事故対策工事を進め、24年9月の完了を経て再稼働に向かう算段だった。

 そんな最中の今年10月、防潮堤に施工不良があったと原電は発表した。

 不備が見つかったのは、防潮堤の取水口付近の鋼製防護壁を支える基礎部分。外周部の地中に埋められた2本の柱(幅15.5メートル、長さ50メートル)の一つに、コンクリートの充填じゅうてん不足による隙間や鉄筋の変形があった。

◆事実の発表は、内部告発を受けた記者会見とまさかの同日

 当然ながら施工不良は問題だが、村議たちは公表の時期にも疑問のまなざしを向けた。原電が施工不良を見つけたのは今年6月。10月までの約4カ月間、公表していなかった。

原電の広報担当者は東京新聞「こちら特報部」の取材に「初めから公表する方向で調整していたが、原因を推定するのに時間がかかった。大方の原因が分かり、発表できるようになったのが10月だった」と説明する。

 ただ、不可解な経緯もある。先の大名村議は9月6日に工事関係者から内部告発を受け、同月22日には原電に質問書を出した。ところがその後に回答がなく、10月16日に会見を開こうとしたところ、原電も同じ日に公表したという。

 原電の担当者は「共産党は関係がない」と語るが、大名村議は「もっと早く公表できたはずだ。公表するつもりはなかったが、会見が入ったので公表したのではないか」といぶかる。

◆山中伸介・規制委員長「重大性がある問題と認識していない」

[…]

10月18日の定例会見で規制委の山中伸介委員長は「現時点で規制委が取り上げるほど重大性がある問題と認識していない」と述べ、「適切な工事がなされれば使用前検査できっちり確認していく」と繰り返した。

 改めて規制庁に聞くと、担当者は「法令に基づき報告を義務付けている事象がある。今回の施工不良は該当せず、われわれから公表するものではない。あくまで完成後に検査をして合否を判定する」と述べ、「立地自治体への説明は大事なことだが、事業者が行うべきこと。コメントする立場にはない」と話した。

◆日本原電と原子力規制庁の置かれた立場は

 首をかしげたくなる対応を取る原電と規制庁。両者に関していえば、東海第2原発の再稼働に前のめりな姿勢がうかがえる。

 原電は原発専業の電力会社だが、保有する敦賀原発1、2号機(福井県)、東海第2原発のうち、敦賀1号機は廃炉が決定。直下に活断層がある2号機も再稼働に向けた審査が滞る。震災以降、販売電力量はゼロで、再稼働を前提に原発の維持や管理費の名目で電力各社が支払う「基本料金」で経営をつなぐ。

[…]

◆知らされない間に東海村議会が「再稼働求める請願」採択

 国策と化す再稼働を巡っては、防潮堤の施工不良が公表されずにいた間、東海第2が立地する東海村では重要な局面を迎えていた。

 村議会原子力問題調査特別委員会は9月、村商工会などが出していた再稼働を求める請願を賛成多数で「採択するべき」とした。再稼働を巡って議会が事実上の賛意を示すのは初めて。再稼働に反対する請願は「不採択」とした。

 ただ施工不良が公表されていれば、委員会での審議に影響を与えた可能性がある。10月の公表でよかったのか。原電は「原因を一定程度推定するのに時間がかかった。村の請願とは関係ない」と答える。

脱原発を訴える市民団体「たんぽぽ舎」の柳田真共同代表は「原電はこれ以上、工事を遅らせることはできず、情報を伏せたのでは。何が何でも来年9月に工事完了できるよう躍起なのだろう」と推し量る。

 一方、茨城大の蓮井誠一郎教授(国際政治学)は「不備をすぐに公表しなかったのは地域や社会をどこか信頼しておらず、オープンな議論を避けた結果ではないか」といぶかる。

◆炉心溶融事故が起きたら経済的な損失は660兆円

 厳しい視線は村議会にも向く。防潮堤が完成していない段階で再稼働絡みの請願の審議を進めたほか、不備が発覚した後も再審議に動かなかったからだ。

 「地域のリスクを軽視しており、チェック機能が果たされていない」

 再稼働に前のめりになるあまり、安全面がないがしろにされては困る。

 東海第2で事故が起きれば甚大な被害が生じかねない。環境経済研究所の上岡直見代表は「炉心溶融事故が起きた場合、経済的な損失は660兆円を超える」と試算する。

 福島第1原発2号機の放射性物質放出量の推定値と同量が東海第2から大気中に放出された場合、東京23区の東半分までの住民が避難や一時移転を余儀なくされ、生産・消費活動が停止すると想定した。

 福島の事故では、民間シンクタンクが事故処理費用が最大81兆円に及ぶと試算した。「条件設定にも左右され、直接比較はできない」と語る一方、「再稼働した場合、利益と比べて桁違いのリスクがある。原電はどこまで認識しているのか」とも指摘する。

[…]

◆デスクメモ

 2020年9月の柏崎刈羽原発。東京電力はテロ対策の不備を把握し、規制庁に伝えたが、公表されなかった。表沙汰になったのは翌年1月の報道。その間、再稼働が絡む規制委の審査があり、ゴーサインが出た。「またか」と思う今回の件。双方に絡む規制庁。不信ばかりが募る。(榊)

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「飛散しない」自己判断でカッパ着ず、廃液が飛散して被ばく 福島第1原発汚染水浄化設備の事故報告書 via 東京新聞

 東京電力福島第1原発(福島県大熊町、双葉町)の汚染水を浄化処理する多核種除去設備(ALPS)の配管洗浄中に廃液が飛び散った事故で、東電と下請けの東芝エネルギーシステムズ(川崎市)は16日、原因の分析結果を発表した。入院した作業員2人は、過去の作業経験から廃液は飛散しないと考え、ルールで定められたかっぱを着用せず、被ばくにつながったと指摘した。

◆作業優先し「予定外」「ルール逸脱」でも中止せず

 両社によると、事故は10月25日に発生。配管の洗浄時間が長引き、高濃度の放射性物質を含む廃液の発生量を抑えようと、当初予定していなかった配管の弁を閉めて洗浄液の流れを抑えた。その結果、配管内の圧力が高まり、廃液をタンクに入れるホースが外れて飛散。タンク近くにいた2人にかかった。監視役の作業員もかっぱ着用を指示せず、予定外の作業員の配置換えや、ホースの敷設ルートの変更もあった。

 現場に常駐が必要な作業班長も、作業に当たった3社のうち1社の班長がいなかった。東芝は、現場管理のルール逸脱を認識していたが、作業の実施を優先して中止しなかった。

 東電の広報担当者は16日の記者会見で「ルールが守られていなかった。再発防止に努める」と話した。(小野沢健太、渡辺聖子)

【関連記事】福島第1原発、3回目の処理水海洋放出を始める 被ばく事故から8日、東京電力はまだ詳しい説明できず
【関連記事】福島第1原発の被ばく事故 漏れた廃液は100ミリリットルではなく、数十倍の「数リットル」だった

原文

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福島第1原発、3回目の処理水海洋放出を始める 被ばく事故から8日、東京電力はまだ詳しい説明できず via 東京新聞

2023年11月2日 21時56分

東京電力福島第1原発(福島県大熊町、双葉町)の汚染水を浄化処理した水の海洋放出で、東電は2日、3回目の放出を始めた。20日に完了する見通し。

同日午前10時21分にポンプを起動して放出を開始。期間中に処理水約7800トンを放出する。本年度は4回に分けて計約3万1200トンを流す計画だ。

東電によると、風評被害を巡る賠償では10月26日時点で賠償請求書の発送依頼が約510件あり、実際に十数件の請求があった。東電は賠償済みの件数や金額を明らかにしていないが、主な賠償先は日本産水産物の輸入を停止している中国向けにホタテやナマコを輸出していた水産業者という。

[…]

◆「事故が起きた作業と海洋放出は作業内容が違う」と主張

 3回目の処理水の海洋放出は、汚染水を浄化するALPSで起きた作業員の被ばく事故から8日後に始まった。汚染水処理の根幹となる設備での事故に対し、東京電力が詳しい説明をしない中での放出再開となり、東電が海洋放出を巡って強調する「透明性高く情報発信する」姿勢は全く感じられない。

事故は10月25日に発生。設備の配管洗浄中に廃液が飛散し、被ばくした作業員2人が一時入院した。2人は作業ルールで定められたかっぱを着用せず、現場に常駐する必要がある作業班長もいなかった。

 2日の記者会見では、事故が起きた原因や作業時の管理態勢について質問が相次いだが、東電の広報担当者は「これから調べる」と繰り返すだけだった。そのような状況でも放出を始めるのかを問われると、広報担当者は「事故が起きた作業と海洋放出は作業内容が違う」と強調し、放出に問題ないとの認識を示した。

 東電の説明は二転三転している。事故直後は作業員にかかった廃液の量は100ミリリットルとしたが、その後に数リットルだったと訂正。これには、1日の原子力規制委員会の定例会合で石渡明委員が「説明が変わるたびに数字が大きくなる」と不信感をあらわにした。(渡辺聖子)

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原発事故後の野菜「遠距離でも汚染」〜農水省の独自解析 via OurPlanet-TV

東京電力福島第一原子力発電所事故後、原発からの距離と野菜に付着した放射性物質の濃度との関係について、農水省が独自にまとめた解析資料をOurPlanet-TVが入手した。農林水産省の当時の担当者によると、農産物の検査対象をどのエリアに設定するか検討するために作成したという。解析の結果、原発から遠い地域でも一定の汚染があることが分かったため、検査の対象を、出荷制限が出されていた福島県、茨城県、栃木県、群馬県と隣接県(宮城県、山形県、新潟県、長野県、埼玉県、千葉県)。さらに、当時、暫定規制値を超えた食品を生産していた東京都でも、検査することを決めたという。

資料は、情報公開では一部不開示だった7文書のうち、審査請求により、農作物の採取をした場所を特定できる情報以外はほぼ開示された。

[…]

これによると、ヨウ素による汚染は必ずしも同心円状に広がっているわけではなく、原発から200キロ近い千葉市多古町のホウレンソウから3500Bq/kgの放射性ヨウ素が検出されていたほか、300キロ離れた地点でも1000Bq/kgを超えていた。グラフを作成した結果、「距離が離れていても、放射性物質が検出されていることが確認された」(当時の担当者)ため、検査の範囲を広く設定したという。

環境省が2015年に開催された「東京電力福島第一原子力発電所事故に伴う住民の健康管理のあり方に関する専門家会議(長瀧重信座長)」において、丹羽太貫元放射線影響研究所所長ら一部の委員が、放射性物質は同心円状に広がるなどと主張し、甲状腺検査を求める福島県外の市民の希望が抑え込んだ経緯がある。汚染が広く分布している子をを示す農水省の資料の存在が明らかになったことで、専門家会議の結論の妥当性が問われそうだ。

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Atoms for Peace was never the plan via Beyond Nuclear International

By Linda Pentz Gunter

[…]

After summarily tossing aside the Paley Commission report delivered to his predecessor, President Truman, and which advocated the US choose the solar pathway for energy expansion, Eisenhower embraced a very different report. In 1953, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) delivered a series of studies on Nuclear Power Reactor Technology from four groups of private industry companies.

On the cover of the report is a familiar rogues’ gallery of corporations, including Dow, Monsanto, and Bechtel.

These reports, an initiative of the companies themselves, were designed to find a way to bring private industry into the nuclear power sector. Hitherto, the nuclear sector — almost entirely focused on weapons of course — was firmly under the control of government and the military.

Whose idea was it? Says the AEC:

“Accordingly, when Dr. Charles A. Thomas, of Monsanto Chemical Co., in the summer of 1950 proposed that industry might with its own capital design, construct and operate nuclear reactors for production of plutonium and power, the AEC gave the suggestion interested consideration.”

Plutonium and power. Note which came first.

Before long there were four groups all vying to come up with the best proposal for a dual-purpose reactor — and that’s what they called them — that would make plutonium for the nuclear weapons sector, and oh yes, as a by-product, also generate electricity.

This was a stated pre-requisite, directly from the AEC. Even if Dow and Monsanto and others had wanted just to explore using nuclear power for electricity generation, the AEC required that the designs it would consider were: “not necessarily those which would have been selected had the studies been directed toward power-only reactors with the plutonium produced having but fuel value.”

They had to be dual-purpose.

And while all four groups considered dual-purpose reactors to be technically feasible, they all agreed that: “no reactor could be constructed in the very near future which would be economic on the basis of power generation alone.” 

Uneconomic, then, and still today.

The four groups of companies had completed their reports in the summer of 1952. So even as the Truman government commissioned and submitted the Paley Commission to Congress — which had flagged nuclear power as having limited utility — behind the scenes, the AEC and this private industry cabal was already trying to cement in place a scheme that would legitimize nuclear power by giving it a dual-purpose, the more important one being its role in further building up the US nuclear weapons arsenal.

This determination, to tie civil and military nuclear reactor technology together; to say that reactor technology should serve primarily to produce plutonium; effectively gave nuclear power an immovable seat at the energy table.

And all of this eclipsed and supplanted renewable energy development, despite what the Paley Commission had recommended, because of course renewable energy had no utility to the military sector.

None of the reactors presented by the four groups in the AEC report was ever built. In fact, no commercial, civilian-owned reactors were ever built in the United States that adopted the dual power production and plutonium production concept.

Instead, the US was already opening the way for private industry to develop, own and operate commercial nuclear power plants for the purpose of generating electricity. This effectively obviated the need to pursue the dual-purpose reactor path.

If the Paley Commission path had been taken, and the US had decided to lead the world in solar energy, we might not have had climate change at all.

[…]

The connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons remains unbroken, cemented in place by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), specifically, by Article IV which reads:

“Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” 

Unfortunately, these words were lifted verbatim and inserted into the otherwise excellent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. 

Article IV of the NPT even encourages the development of nuclear power in “non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.”

So, when a non-nuclear weapons country signs the Treaty, thereby declaring it will not develop nuclear weapons, its reward is not only permission, but encouragement to develop nuclear power, regardless of that country’s energy needs, climate, demographics, topography or political volatility.

Thus, you have a country like Saudi Arabia — along with others in the now ever more volatile Middle Eastern region — eager to develop nuclear power. Saudi Arabia’s argument is that this will allow it to export more oil rather than burn it, thus reducing its carbon emissions. All good for climate change, it says.

But if Saudi Arabia really needs a home-grown energy source, why would it embark on a long, slow and expensive program of building nuclear power plants? Surely a sunny and windy place like Saudi Arabia would be developing solar and wind power if this was really about electricity needs?

It’s quite obvious why Saudi Arabia wants nuclear power. It at least opens the option for a pathway to nuclear weapons, and it sends a message to its enemies in that region — most notably Iran — about that capacity to do so.

Allowing for the “inalienable right” to nuclear energy leaves the drawbridge to the peace castle perpetually down, an open invitation to marauders to charge in bearing the means to develop nuclear weapons. What began as a bad idea in 1953 should not be enshrined in laws meant to make the world nuclear-free.

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The solar world we might have had via Beyond Nuclear International

By Linda Pentz Gunter

We needn’t have had Fukushima at all, now 12 years old and still emitting radiation, still not “cleaned up”, still responsible for forbidden zones where no one can live, play, work, grow crops. We needn’t have had Chornobyl either, or Three Mile Island, or Church Rock. We needn’t have almost lost Detroit.

We could have avoided climate change as well. Not just by responding promptly to the early recognition of the damage fossil fuels were doing. But also by heeding one sensible plan that, if it had been acted upon, would have removed the nuclear power elephant from the energy solutions room and possibly also saved us from plunging into the climate catastrophe abyss in which we now find ourselves.

Right from the beginning, nuclear power made a significant contribution to the climate crisis we now face. 

And unfortunately, as is often the case, the United States played the starring role.

[…]

On July 2, 1952, President Harry Truman sent a report to Congress that had been completed a month earlier. It was called the President’s Materials Policy Commission “Resources for Freedom”. The Commission was chaired by William S. Paley, so it is commonly referred to as the Paley Commission.

Chapter 15 was entitled “The Possibilities of Solar Energy”. It went through many technical and economic scenarios, showing great potential and also flagging some stumbling blocks, most of which have since been solved. Here is what it concluded. In 1952.

“If we are to avoid the risk of seriously increased real unit costs of energy in the United States, then new low-cost sources should be made ready to pick up some of the load by 1975.” 

Even at that early date, the Paley Commission’s authors recognized the abundance offered by solar energy, observing that, “the United States supply of solar energy is about 1,500 times the present requirement.”

[…]

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Activists seek broader compensation for Americans exposed to radiation after decades in limbo via The Hill

BY ZACK BUDRYK – 10/03/23 6:00 AM ET

Now, a coalition of activists from St. Louis and New Mexico is working with the support of a bipartisan supermajority of senators to broaden the pool of such Americans who are eligible for federal compensation. 

A proposed amendment to the annual Defense funding bill that the Senate approved earlier this year with 61 votes would expand that pool to include people who were exposed as a result of nuclear testing in Idaho, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Guam and the St. Louis area. 

The Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA), passed in 1990, covered then-residents of Utah, Nevada and Arizona. But this excluded a number of Americans who had suffered exposure — including from the first-ever detonation of an atomic bomb, the Trinity test, which was conducted as part of the Manhattan Project in Los Alamos, N.M., in 1945.  

[…]

That first test dealt a major blow to many in the vicinity. A 2020 study by the National Cancer Institute estimated at least 1,000 individual cancers had developed or would develop in connection with it. The infant death rate in New Mexico in 1945, the year of the test, was 38 percent higher than 1946 and 57 percent higher than 1947.   

Cordova told The Hill that five generations of her family, who have long lived in the area, have been diagnosed with cancer, most recently including her 23-year-old niece.

“We were basically enlisted into service of our country. And we’ve given everything we have to this. We bury our loved ones on a regular basis and then somebody else is diagnosed, and it’s multigenerational for us,” she said of residents in the area. 

The St. Louis area, where multiple sites were used for the storage of uranium and nuclear waste during World War II, has also suffered significant health impacts. 

Studies conducted there by the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services indicated elevated levels of leukemia and breast, colon and kidney cancer relative to the rest of the state in eight ZIP codes along the Missouri River tributary Coldwater Creek from 1996 to 2011.  

Coldwater Creek was the site of extensive dumping by Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, which had an exclusive arrangement with the Department of Energy to produce weapons-grade uranium. 

“They began processing uranium for the Manhattan Project and that uranium came over from the Belgian Congo,” said Dawn Chapman, a leader of the group Just Moms STL, which has lobbied for the RECA expansion. “We were chosen because of our location — we’re right off the Missouri River, we’re in the middle of the country … we’re kind of out of sight.” 

Beyond Coldwater Creek, at least two other sites in the St. Louis area have been linked to exposure to radiation: the West Lake Landfill and the World War II-era Weldon Spring Ordnance Works.   

“Everybody has the same story … our sites are so complex, and they each have their own nuances,” said Kim Visintine, a leader with the community organization Coldwater Creek — Just the Facts Please.  

“The pollution that our government put out there … if you really look at it, you’re thunderstruck,” added Visintine, who describes the damage to the community as “World War II friendly fire.”   

Local activists have called for expansion of compensation for decades, but “our government has never really wanted to know the truth,” Cordova said. “So there’s these spotty studies, but no epidemiological study, no comprehensive epidemiological study of even one community or one state.” 

In Congress, Missouri Sens. Eric Schmitt (R) and Josh Hawley (R) have partnered with Mike Crapo (R-Idaho) and Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.) in an effort to add the expansion to the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The amendment passed the Senate with a filibuster-proof majority of 61 votes in July.   

[…]

Schmitt and Luján have vastly different politics overall. But when they discuss RECA expansion, they sound remarkably similar.   

“Nearly eight decades after the Trinity Test in New Mexico, many New Mexicans are still left out of the original RECA program. This is unacceptable given the number of New Mexicans who have gotten sick and died from radiation exposure,” Luján said after the amendment passed the chamber.  

“The federal government has an obligation to keep Americans safe, and the pure negligence that has harmed St. Louisans has been brushed aside and covered up for far too long,” said Schmitt, who grew up in Bridgeton, the St. Louis suburb that was the site of the West Lake Landfill. “What was wrong back then was to leave out inadvertently the communities that are represented here from that compensation. Because justice is not complete until it is justice for all. That is what we are asking for. Justice for everybody.”  

[…]

RECA currently offers payments of $50,000 in compensation to “downwinders” — those downwind of the Nevada National Security Site, the site of at least 1,000 nuclear tests since 1951 — as well as $75,000 to participants in atmospheric nuclear testing and $100,000 to uranium miners and millers. As of January, the federal government has paid out about $2.5 billion to 40,274 people under the law, according to the Justice Department.  

The Senate’s approval of the NDAA amendment marks the 13th attempt at expanding RECA. This year, proponents took advantage of the publicity surrounding Christopher Nolan’s biopic “Oppenheimer,” which depicts the Trinity test in a climactic set piece, to highlight the issue. The amendment passed the Senate July 27, six days after the movie opened.  

The House approved its own version of the NDAA before the Senate. The chambers are set to conference and craft a single final bill, likely toward the end of 2023. 

Efforts to expand eligibility — and even maintain those already in place — face a ticking clock: The original RECA sunsets in 2024. The amendment that passed the Senate would extend the law another 19 years.   

The bipartisan support for the expansion in the Senate has strengthened activists’ conviction that the issue can rise above any partisan fray.   

Activists from both New Mexico and Missouri feel the issue is “not just bipartisan in terms of the political parties but very much feels like a unified front right now,” Chapman said.  

“Radiation is nondiscriminatory, it doesn’t care what color you are, it doesn’t care what your politics are,” Visintine said. “It’s just as deadly to everybody.” It also knows no geographic boundaries, she added — even if an actual contamination site isn’t in a member of Congress’s state or district, interstate travel means a victim of it could easily become part of their constituency.

[…]

The St. Louis and New Mexico groups spent years working on the issue separately and lobbying their respective members of Congress, but the Union of Concerned Scientists ultimately connected them. Connecting with their New Mexican counterparts was an emotional, often painful experience, Chapman said, due to the guilt that accompanied St. Louis’s role in producing the uranium that ultimately caused so much suffering in New Mexico. 

“Sitting in a room at the Union of Concerned Scientists building with all these other people, we all sort of cried and hugged each other and mourned what we’ve been through but felt for the first time like we’re one big family,” Chapman said.  

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